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THE RISE AND FALL OF CLEAN AIR ACT 
CLIMATE POLICY 
Nathan Richardson* 
The Clean Air Act has proven to be one of the most successful and 
durable statutes in American law. After the Supreme Court’s 2008 
decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, there was great hope that the Act 
could be brought to bear on climate change, the most pressing current 
environmental challenge of our time. Massachusetts was fêted as the most 
important environmental case ever decided, and, upon it, the 
Environmental Protection Agency under President Obama built a 
sweeping program of greenhouse gas regulations, aimed first at emissions 
from road vehicles, and later at fossil fuel power plants. It was the most 
ambitious federal climate policy in American history. Now, twelve years 
after Massachusetts was decided, that program is in ruins, largely 
repealed or weakened by the climate-skeptic Trump administration. 
Massachusetts has not provided a foundation for durable climate policy. 
The roots of the Clean Air Act’s climate policy failures lie not just in 
changes in political leadership, but also in a Supreme Court majority 
increasingly skeptical of not just climate regulation but of the 
administrative state in general. This and other barriers will persist 
regardless of who occupies the White House. This article explores why 
climate regulation under the Clean Air Act has been so much more fragile 
than other regulations under the statute, which actors bear responsibility 
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Almost immediately after it was decided in 2008, Massachusetts v. EPA1 was 
hailed as one of the most important environmental decisions in American law.2 The 
perceived significance of the case has persisted, or if anything has grown, despite 
being subject to praise and criticism alike from the beginning.3 Though the decision 
is complex, the reason for its alleged significance is simple: it purports to draw the 
most pressing environmental problem of our (or perhaps any) time—climate 
change—within the sphere of federal environmental law. Specifically, it makes 
greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide, subject to regulation by the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the Clean Air Act. That statute has 
been among the most enduring and successful in American law, responsible for large 
reductions in a range of air pollutants from a diverse array of sources since being 
enacted in its modern form fifty years ago.4 If that durability, adaptability, and 
flexibility5 could be brought to bear on the greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) 
responsible for climate change, it was hoped, significant progress toward avoiding 
climate risks and unlocking international agreement was possible. 
Now, more than a decade after Massachusetts, and shortly after the passing 
of its author, Justice John Paul Stevens, it is a good time to reflect on that initial, 
hopeful assessment of the case and its effects. Is Massachusetts as important in practice 
as its reputation would suggest? Is the Clean Air Act a secure foundation for broad, 
effective climate regulation? The answer to both questions appears to be a qualified 
“no.” This is a powerful illustration of the wider failure of the American legal and 
political system to address climate change. The story is a tragedy in three acts. 
After Massachusetts, some commentators believed that reluctant presidential 
administrations (like that of George W. Bush at the time) could no longer drag their 
feet on climate policy and that future administrations eager to use the Clean Air Act’s 
 
1. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
2. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl & Jim Salzman, American Idols, ENV’T F., May-June 2019, at 40 (detailing 
surveys of environmental lawyers in which Massachusetts was already ranked as the most important 
environmental case in 2009, and remained the second-most important, after Chevron, in 2019). 
3. See, e.g., Jonathan Cannon, The Significance of Massachusetts v. EPA, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 
53, 53 (2007) (calling the case “an enormous, if narrow, victory for environmentalists); see also Jody 
Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51 
(elevating Massachusetts’s significance beyond environmental law and classing it as an “expertise-forcing” 
decision privileging technocratic expertise over politics); but see Cass R. Sunstein, Changing Climate 
Change, 2009-2016, 42 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 231, 242, 243 (2018) (calling Massachusetts “massively 
important” but concluding that “the Court was probably wrong” not to defer to the Bush EPA). 
4. See LESSONS FROM THE CLEAN AIR ACT: BUILDING DURABILITY AND ADAPTABILITY INTO 
U.S. CLIMATE AND ENERGY POLICY 1-3 (Ann Carlson & Dallas Burtraw eds., 2019) [hereinafter 
LESSONS FROM THE CLEAN AIR ACT]  
5. Id. at 3 (identifying the durability, adaptability, and flexibility of the Clean Air Act as crucial 
to its success). 
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tools need no longer fear their efforts would be easily undone.6 To be sure, 
Massachusetts’ narrow (5-4) decision was controversial when it was decided and has 
remained so. Opponents of climate regulation have never stopped rhetorically re-
litigating the case,7 nor have some of the Justices who dissented.8 But the case for 
Massachusetts’ significance has always been that it laid the foundation for real climate 
policy.9 The first act of the story ended with hope. 
The Clean Air Act powers secured by Massachusetts became the primary 
legal vehicle for climate policy at the federal level under President Obama, 
particularly after the failure of cap-and-trade legislation in the Senate in 2009.10  
With ambitious hopes and plans for broadening and strengthening regulation, 
Massachusetts would be, it appeared by around 2010, the foundation of the first, best, 
and, at least for the time being, only federal climate policy. From 2010 through 2016, 
the Obama EPA enacted a sweeping regulatory program limiting greenhouse gas 
emissions from a variety of sources, including, most importantly, new road vehicles 
(through fuel economy standards) and fossil-fuel power plants (via the Clean Power 
Plan).11 This regulatory agenda did not solve the climate change problem. It did not 
even reduce U.S. emissions very much.12 But it transformed Massachusetts’ promise 
into action, representing an ambitious first step that could be extended and 
strengthened in the future. The second act of the story ended with apparent (if not 
complete) success. 
But 2016 was to be the high-water mark for Clean Air Act climate policy. 
Not only would that policy program not be extended, it would be rolled back.13 Fuel 
economy standards would be stopped in their tracks, and the Clean Power Plan would 
 
6. See, e.g., Cannon, The Significance of Massachusetts v. EPA, supra note 3, at 59 (“The Court’s 
opinion seems to leave EPA little room in dealing with climate change.”). 
7. See, e.g., Marlo Lewis, The Unbearable Lightness of UARG v. EPA, GLOBALWARMING.ORG 
(July 4, 2014), http://www.globalwarming.org/2014/07/04/the-unbearable-lightness-of-uarg-v-epa/ 
(arguing that “the Court in Massachusetts wrongly decided that the 1970 Clean Air Act, a statute enacted 
years before global warming was a gleam in Al Gore’s eye, ‘speaks directly’ to the issue of greenhouse 
gases and global climate change”). 
8. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. (UARG) v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 344 (2014) (Alito, J., dissenting) 
(“I believed Massachusetts v. EPA was wrongly decided at the time, and these cases further expose the flaws 
with that decision.”). 
9. See infra Section I.C. 
10. See Amanda Reilly & Kevin Bogardus, 7 Years Later, Failed Waxman-Markey Bill Still Makes 
Waves, E&E DAILY (June 27, 2016), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060039422 (describing the failure 
of the 2009 legislation in the Senate and noting that that failure “spurred the Obama administration to 
aggressively use the executive branch to issue regulations aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions”). 
11. See infra Section II. 
12. See infra Section II.  
13. See infra Section III.  
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never cut a single ton of carbon emissions. As of 2020, Clean Air Act climate policy 
ranges from impotent to nonexistent. The third act of the story ends in near-complete 
failure. 
How did this happen? First, subsequent Supreme Court decisions have 
drawn into question the reach of the core legal holding in Massachusetts, exposing 
legal vulnerability in the climate regulatory powers of the EPA under the Clean Air 
Act. Arguably, these decisions have limited Massachusetts to its facts, i.e., to a single 
provision of the Clean Air Act granting authority over vehicle emissions. This assault 
on Massachusetts began at least as far back as 2014’s Utility Air Regulatory Group v. 
EPA decision; though never viewed as anywhere near as important as Massachusetts, 
the decision was, as Jody Freeman describes it, “laced with the legal equivalent of 
improvised explosive devices.”14 The Court’s unprecedented choice in 2016 to stay 
the Clean Power Plan before a lower court had issued a decision sealed that 
regulation’s fate.15 
Second, regulatory measures put into place using the authority made 
available by Massachusetts have lacked the stability of typical environmental 
regulation, much less that of the Clean Air Act’s air pollution limits. The climate-
skeptic Trump administration is rolling back or substantially weakening nearly every 
such measure finalized by the Obama administration. As of early 2020, the Trump 
administration is in the process of rolling back at least ninety-five environmental 
rulemakings or other executive actions, including ten based on the Clean Air Act 
which target greenhouse gases.16 
Progress toward reducing U.S. emissions over the last decade has been 
modest, and relatively few of the reductions that have been made since Massachusetts 
can be clearly attributed to federal regulatory policy. Rather, efficiency 
improvements and the closures of coal plants due in large part to cheap natural gas 
appear to be bigger drivers of emissions reductions.17 Meanwhile, states and local 
governments have supplanted the federal government’s leadership role on climate 
policy.18  
 
14. See Jody Freeman, Why I Worry About UARG, 39 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 9, 10 (2015). 
15.  See Order Granting Stay, West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016). 
16. See Nadja Popovich et al., 95 Environmental Rules Being Rolled Back Under Trump, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 21, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/climate/trump-environment-rollbacks.html.  
17. See, e.g., U.S. Energy-Related CO2 Emissions Fell 1.7% in 2016, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. 
(Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=30712 (attributing 2016 emissions 
decline to fuel switching from coal to natural gas and reductions in the energy intensity of the economy, 
and noting that the transportation sector, the most highly-regulated under the Clean Air Act, was the only 
sector in which emissions increased). 
18. See generally Vicki Arroyo, From Paris to Pittsburgh: U.S. State and Local Leadership in an Era of 
Trump, 31 GEO. ENV’T L. REV. 23. 
 Michigan Journal of Environmental and Administrative Law Vol. 10:1 
 
74 
There is little left of Massachusetts’ promise of meaningful tools to fight 
climate change. The decision’s perceived significance persists for now,19 but a future 
president serious about reducing greenhouse gas emissions would be ill advised to 
rely on the Clean Air Act. The failure of Clean Air Act climate policy to achieve 
significant and enduring environmental improvements stands in contrast to other 
regulatory programs under the same statute, which have a long track record of success 
and stability and have so far proven much more resilient to regulatory rollbacks.20 
This article explores why the hope and promise of Massachusetts as a vehicle 
for climate policy have not been fulfilled (and, in my view, why they probably never 
will be). Legal and structural factors are important, but so are less scrutable and 
predictable political and circumstantial factors. These legal, policy, and political 
questions matter because the unfulfilled promise of Massachusetts has major current 
and future environmental implications. The failure of Clean Air Act climate policy 
means that progress on reducing U.S. carbon emissions will probably require major 
new legislation, however dim hopes for such legislation may currently appear. 
Exploring the reasons for the Clean Air Act’s failure is particularly valuable for 
considering the form such legislation may take and the tradeoffs it may require. 
Other tools are available to a president intent on reducing emissions without 
congressional support, but they are limited, and most lack the near economy-wide 
reach of the Clean Air Act.21  
In order to chart a path forward for climate policy, it is first necessary to 
explore how we got where we are now: a place with almost no meaningful federal 
climate policy at all. And that requires starting at the beginning, with the roots of 
Massachusetts itself. 
Before that story, it is important to clarify the limits of the analysis in this 
article. First, it is not an attempt to relitigate the decision in Massachusetts but rather 
to evaluate its legal and policy implications and their durability. I have consistently 
taken the view over the past decade that climate regulation is compatible with the 
Clean Air Act and that ample tools exist under the statute to construct a robust, 
effective, and at least somewhat flexible climate policy.22 Those views have not 
 
19.  See Ruhl and Salzman, American Idols, supra note 2, at 40 (Massachusetts ranked as second-most 
important environmental case in 2019). 
20. See discussion and citations in Section III infra. 
21.  See discussions and citations infra Section V. 
22. See, e.g., Nathan Richardson et al., Greenhouse Gas Regulation Under the Clean Air Act: Structure, 
Effects, & Implications of a Knowable Pathway, 41 ENV’T L. REP. 10098 (2011); Playing Without Aces: Offsets 
and the Limits of Flexibility Under Clean Air Act Climate Policy, ENV’T L. 735 (2012); Nathan Richardson, 
Aviation, Carbon, and the Clean Air Act, 38 COLUM. J. OF ENV’T L. 67 (2013); Nathan Richardson & Art 
Fraas, Comparing the Clean Air Act and a Carbon Price, 44 ENV’T L. REP. 10472 (2014); Nathan Richardson, 
Trading Unmoored: How Strong is the Legal Foundation for Emissions Trading under §111 of the Clean Air Act?, 
120 PENN ST. L. REV. 181. 
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changed, but neither the Trump EPA nor a majority on the Supreme Court appears 
to agree. 
Second, climate policy is a rich, complex, and at times contentious field, the 
boundaries of which extend far beyond the limits of the single federal statutory 
scheme. This Article should not be interpreted as taking a position sub rosa in long-
running climate policy arguments. Instead, this Article is a legal, regulatory, and 
institutional analysis; it is only indirectly a policy prescription. 
I. WHAT DID MASSACHUSETTS DO? 
A. Background 
The backstory of Massachusetts has been told elsewhere, including in the 
opinion itself, but it is nevertheless useful to put the case in context. Its roots go back 
(at least) a decade earlier than the 2007 decision. In 1997, the U.S. Senate passed the 
Byrd-Hagel Resolution by a 95-0 vote, signaling it would not ratify an international 
climate change agreement that did not impose binding obligations on developing 
countries in addition to more developed countries including the United States.23 This 
made the Kyoto Protocol, negotiated that year and signed by President Clinton in 
1998, dead on arrival in the Senate.24 The Clinton administration at the time viewed 
reducing U.S. greenhouse gas emissions as a priority, partly driven by the influence 
of then-Vice President Al Gore.25 But after the Byrd-Hagel Resolution, it was clear 
that domestic and not treaty law would have to provide the basis for any such effort. 
For the first time, a president and his advisers would turn their attention to the 
existing Clean Air Act. If the Clean Air Act granted regulatory authority over 
greenhouse gas emissions, climate policy in some form could be implemented 
without a treaty or new legislation. 
At the time, however, and to a large extent today, it was unclear to what 
degree greenhouse gas emissions were subject to regulation under the Clean Air Act. 
The statute does not explicitly give EPA authority to regulate greenhouse gases or 
to act against climate change. But it does grant the agency broad, flexible powers to 
regulate air pollutants that harm public health and welfare. This regulatory authority 
comes from a variety of provisions in the statute, each aimed at a different category 
 
23. Byrd-Hagel Resolution, 105th Cong., 1st Sess., S. Res. 98 (1997). 
24. See White House, Statement by the Press Secretary, Nov. 12, 1998, 
https://clintonwhitehouse4.archives.gov/CEQ/19981112-7790.html (stating that “President Clinton has 
made clear that the United States regards the Kyoto Protocol as a work in progress, and that it will not be 
submitted for ratification without the meaningful participation of key developing countries in efforts to 
address climate change.) 
25. See Darren Samuelsohn, Clinton Memos Show Climate Tactics, POLITICO (June 6, 2014), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2014/06/clinton-library-memos-kyoto-protocol-china-india-107545 
(detailing direct involvement by President Clinton and Vice-President Gore in negotiations over the 
Kyoto Protocol). 
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of emissions or emitters. For example, Title I of the statute covers “stationary” 
sources of pollution, like factories and power plants, and includes schemes for setting 
national air quality standards26 and sectoral performance standards for new and 
existing sources.27 Title II covers mobile sources, including cars, trucks, and aircraft.28 
Instead of listing the pollutants they cover, most sections of the statute give EPA 
discretion to identify “air pollutants” and pollution sources that “endanger” health 
and welfare.29 Each provision then gives the agency a set of regulatory tools intended 
to reduce emissions from the covered sources.30 This flexibility allows EPA’s 
regulatory authority to adjust to new science on environmental and health risks from 
air pollution without Congressional intervention31 It is arguably the statute’s greatest 
innovation and a key to its success in reducing U.S. air pollution.32 
But climate change is a different sort of problem than those caused by the 
pollutants EPA had previously regulated under the statute. It is global, rather than 
local or regional, and it is an indirect effect of emissions, rather than a direct harm to 
people exposed to a pollutant. Does EPA have authority under the existing statute 
to limit greenhouse gas emissions? More precisely, are GHGs “air pollutants” within 
the statutory definition? 
In 1998, then-EPA Administrator Carol Browner claimed in congressional 
testimony the answer to these questions was “yes.”33 EPA General Counsel Jonathan 
Cannon confirmed this reading of the law in what is now referred to as the “Cannon 
Memo,” released in April of 1998.34 The memo argued that carbon dioxide was an 
“air pollutant” within the statute’s definition and potentially subject to EPA 
regulatory authority.35 Regulation would require a further finding of “actual or 
 
26. Clean Air Act § 108-110, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-7410. 
27. § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 7411. 
28. § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 7521. 
29. §§ 108, 111, 202, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408, 7411, 7521. 
30. See, e.g., § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (granting EPA authority to issue standards for new motor 
vehicles that “cause or contribute” to emissions that the agency has determined endanger public health or 
welfare). 
31. See LESSONS FROM THE CLEAN AIR ACT 3, supra note 4 (identifying durability, adaptability, 
and flexibility of the Clean Air Act as crucial to its success). 
32. Id. 
33. See Memorandum from Jonathan Z. Cannon, General Counsel to Carol M. Browner, 
Administrator, “EPA’s Authority to Regulate Pollutants Emitted by Electric Power Generation Sources” 
(Apr. 10, 1998) (“Cannon Memo”). 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 2-3. Although the Cannon memo only discussed regulation of carbon dioxide emissions 
from power plants, Massachusetts and the endangerment finding which followed under the Obama EPA 
Fall 2020 The Rise and Fall of Clean Air Act Climate Policy  
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potential harmful effects on public health, welfare or the environment” (an 
“endangerment finding”),36 which the agency had not yet made for greenhouse gases 
and would not for another decade. 
By late 1998, the Clinton administration was embroiled in scandal, nearing 
the end of its second term, and facing impeachment with Republican majorities in 
the House and Senate. It lacked the ability or willingness to push significant climate 
policy. Frustrated by the inaction, environmental groups petitioned EPA in 1999 to 
regulate greenhouse gas emissions.37 The petition did not ask the agency to regulate 
all such emissions, however, but only motor vehicle emissions38 using the agency’s 
authority under Section 202 of the Clean Air Act, which gives EPA broad authority 
to set emissions standards for new motor vehicles.39 The petition cited the Cannon 
Memo for the position that EPA had the power to do what the petition asked.40 
EPA did not respond to the petition before President Clinton left office in 
early 2001, and the Bush administration spent the next seven years trying to avoid 
climate regulation. In 2001, under new leadership, EPA responded to the 
environmental groups’ petition by requesting comment, generating a large volume 
of public comments and expert reports.41 In 2003, almost four years after the petition 
had been submitted, EPA issued a formal denial42 and withdrew the Cannon 
Memo.43 The agency gave two reasons for the refusal: first, rejecting the analysis in 
the Cannon Memo, it concluded that GHGs were not “air pollutants” subject to 
regulation under the statute.44 Second, even if they were subject to regulation, it 
would be “unwise” for the agency to do so at the time for a variety of reasons, 
including that GHG regulation would interfere with the President’s leverage in 
 
applied their analysis to the wider category of greenhouse gases, of which carbon dioxide is the most 
significant. 
36. Id. at 3-4 (paraphrasing similar requirements across a variety of sections of the statute). 
37 Int’l Ctr. Tech. Assessment et al., Petition for Rulemaking and Collateral Relief Seeking the 
Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New Motor Vehicles Under § 202 of the Clean Air Act 
(Oct. 20, 1999) [hereinafter Petition for Rulemaking], https://www.ciel.org/Publications/greenhouse_petiti
on_EPA.pdf.  
38. Id. at 2. 
39. Clean Air Act § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 7521. 
40. See Petition for Rulemaking, supra note 37, at 11. 
41. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 56 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
42. See EPA, Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, Notice of Denial 
of Petition for Rulemaking, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922 (Sept. 8, 2003). 
43. Id. at 52,925. 
44. Id. at 52,925–52,928. 
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international climate negotiations, an exercise of his foreign affairs powers.45 The 
agency also cited the Court’s decision in FDA v. Brown & Williamson, which had 
rejected another agency’s claim of “jurisdiction to regulate an industry constituting a 
significant portion of the American economy.”46 
Environmental groups, now joined by states, responded to EPA’s rejection 
of the petition by filing suit, seeking judicial review of EPA’s claimed bases for its 
refusal to regulate.47 In 2005, the D.C. Circuit ruled in favor of EPA in a fractured 
opinion (each judge wrote separately) that focused on issues of standing and agency 
discretion while avoiding the interpretive question of whether greenhouse gases were 
air pollutants within the scope of the Clean Air Act.48 The states and environmental 
groups appealed to the Supreme Court. 
B. The Decision 
The resulting decision, Massachusetts, came down in April of 2007, nine 
years after the Cannon Memo and only eight months before Barack Obama’s victory 
in the Iowa caucuses.49 It was decided 5-4, with Justice Stevens writing the opinion, 
 
45. Id. at 52,929–52,933. 
46. Id. at 52,925; 529 U.S. 120, 123 (2000). As I have written elsewhere, this argument by EPA 
was a misapplication of Brown & Williamson. In Brown & Williamson, the court refused to defer to the 
agency’s claim of authority on the basis that it had claimed broad, economically significant jurisdiction. In 
other words, the Brown & Williamson court determined such interpretive “major questions” were an 
exception to the general rule from Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), of deference to agencies’ 
statutory interpretations. In contrast to FDA’s claimed authority over cigarettes at issue in Brown & 
Williamson, EPA’s 2003 denial of the environmental groups’ petition was, obviously, an agency denying 
broad regulatory authority, not claiming it. This distinction matters. Brown & Williamson may have 
established that agency claims of broad authority receive less deference than previously believed, but not 
the opposite—that agencies receive more deference when disclaiming such authority. Moreover, Brown & 
Williamson created a new wrinkle on a meta-rule (Chevron deference). It did not claim to create new rules 
for the more fundamental task of statutory interpretation by agencies. At least in theory, the agency’s task 
is the same before and after Brown & Williamson: to read the statute (in context and with the benefit of its 
expertise) and determine the best reading of it. Deference (Chevron, as modified by Brown & Williamson) 
only comes into play in judicial review of that determination. For the agency’s interpretation of the statute 
to be shaped by Brown & Williamson was to put the cart before the horse. See Nathan Richardson, Keeping 
Big Cases from Making Bad Law: The Resurgent “Major Questions” Doctrine, 49 CONN. L. REV. 355, 367–71 
(2016). 
47. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
48. Judge Randolph explicitly refused to address the statutory issue, instead concluding that EPA 
had broad discretion to choose not to regulate in light of uncertainty in climate science. Id. at 53. Judge 
Sentelle dissented from this analysis but found that the states and environmental groups lacked standing. 
Id. at 59. The states and environmental groups’ suit was therefore dismissed, despite the fact that Judges 
Randolph and Sentelle disagreed about why. Only Judge Tatel reached the statutory issue, finding that in 
his judgment the greenhouse gases were air pollutants within the scope of the Clean Air Act and thus 
susceptible to EPA regulation. Id. at 61. 
49. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
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joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and Kennedy, presumably the crucial 
swing vote.50 Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts each wrote in dissent, with 
Justices Alito and Thomas joining both dissents and Scalia and Roberts joining each 
other’s opinions.51  
While Justice Stevens’s opinion is sprawling in its discussions of climate 
science, practical and economic effects of climate change, standing doctrine, 
separation of powers, canons of statutory construction, deference to administrative 
agencies, and the history of the Clean Air Act,52 its core holdings are straightforward. 
First, the majority concluded that greenhouse gases were “air pollutants” within the 
statutory definition, or at least within Section 202’s definition.53 Because the 
majority viewed the statute as “unambiguous,” no deference to the agency’s contrary 
reading was available under Chevron.54 That the Clean Air Act does not explicitly 
mention climate change did not matter for this analysis, because while Congress 
might not have envisioned climate change when the Clean Air Act was passed, it did 
envision change in knowledge of environmental risks. The statute therefore 
empowers and requires the EPA to react to new information on dangers.55 
Second, the Court held that EPA’s extra-statutory reasons for declining to 
regulate (like intrusion on the President’s foreign affairs powers) could not overcome 
the statute’s command: “While the statute does condition the exercise of EPA’s 
authority on its formation of a ‘judgment,’ that judgment must relate to whether an 
air pollutant ‘cause[s], or contribute[s] to, air pollution which may reasonably be 
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.’”56 As the Court elaborated, the 
law’s use of the term “judgement” was “not a roving license to ignore the statutory 
text.”57 
The Court held that the agency’s denial of the states’ and environmental 




52. Id. at 504-535. 
53. Id. at 528–29 (“[T]he definition embraces all airborne compounds of whatever stripe, and 
underscores that intent through the repeated use of the word ‘any.’ ”). As we shall see, this distinction 
becomes relevant in ensuing cases. 
54. Id. at 529. Massachusetts was a so-called Chevron Step One case. 
55. Id. at 532. (Congress “did understand that without regulatory flexibility, changing 
circumstances and scientific developments would soon render the Clean Air Act obsolete. The broad 
language of Section 202(a)(1) reflects an intentional effort to confer the flexibility necessary to forestall 
such obsolescence.”). 
56. Id. at 532–33. 
57. Id. at 533. 
58. Id. at 534-35. 
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greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles or any other source, as the 
Massachusetts holding has sometimes been characterized.59 Instead, the Court ruled 
only that EPA “must ground its reasons for action or inaction in the statute.”60 In 
other words, EPA has a choice. In order to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, it must 
first determine that they endanger public health or welfare and then issue an 
“endangerment finding.”61 But in order not to regulate, the agency must determine 
that greenhouse gas emissions do not endanger health or welfare and state that 
determination in the administrative record.62 After Massachusetts, the agency could 
still refuse to regulate vehicle greenhouse gas emissions; it just couldn’t use what the 
Court concluded were contra- or extra-statutory justifications for doing so.  
Justice Scalia’s dissent rejected the majority’s analysis of the statute;63 he 
would have upheld the agency’s view that greenhouse gases are not “air pollutants” 
within the statutory definition.64 Scalia’s statutory analysis is complex, involving the 
intersection of multiple similar terms, only some of which are defined in the statute,65 
Scalia concluded that greenhouse gases are not “air pollutants” because they do not 
cause “air pollution” in the traditional sense. Unlike other pollutants traditionally 
regulated under the Clean Air Act, carbon dioxide is present in relatively large 
concentrations in the lower atmosphere.66 He rejected the majority’s view that the 
statute was unambiguously clear and would have deferred to the agency’s view under 
Chevron.67 These arguments resurfaced in later cases, in particular the view that the 
 
59. See, e.g., Brett Maland, Note, A New Era of Green Regulation: EPA Must Regulate Climate 
Altering Gases Emitted from Motor Vehicles: Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 15 MO. 
ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. 369 (2008). Contemporaneous media accounts of the case from experienced legal 
journalists got this correct. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Justices Say E.P.A. Has Power to Act on Harmful 
Gases, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2007, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/03/washington/03scotus.html.  
60. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 535. 
61. Id. at 534 (“The statutory question is whether sufficient information exists to make an 
endangerment finding”). 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 549 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Note that Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent concludes that the 
case should have been dismissed for lack of Article III standing, without discussing statutory 
interpretation. Id. at 535 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
64. Id. at 560. 
65. Id. at 554–58 (“air pollutant,” “air pollution,” “air pollution agent”). 
66. Id. at 559 (“[R]egulating the buildup of CO2 and other greenhouse gases in the upper reaches 
of the atmosphere, which is alleged to be causing global climate change, is not akin to regulating the 
concentration of some substance that is polluting the air.”) (emphasis in original). 
67. Id. at 560. (“[T]he Court utterly fails to explain why this interpretation is incorrect, let alone 
so unreasonable as to be unworthy of Chevron deference.”). 
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scope of the term “air pollutant” in the Clean Air Act is more complex than the 
Massachusetts majority claimed.68 
C. Implications 
In a review published soon after the decision, Jonathan Cannon (then and 
now a law professor, having left his role at EPA) called Massachusetts an “enormous, 
if narrow, victory for environmentalists.”69 In  2009, a survey of academics and 
practicing environmental lawyers found it to be the consensus pick as the “most 
significant” environmental case,70 and a similar 2019 survey placed it second, behind 
only Chevron.71 Professor Eli Savit in 2017 called it “probably the most important 
environmental case in history.”72 Unsurprisingly, much has been written about the 
case and its implications for environmental law,73 administrative law,74 and the law 
of standing.75 
Massachusetts has not escaped criticism. Of the dissenting Justices, Thomas 
and Alito have called for its reversal.76 Cass Sunstein—Administrator of the Office 
of Information and Regulatory Affairs under President Obama and generally a 
defender of administrative agencies, EPA, and climate policy77—has criticized 
 
68. See discussion infra Section II.D. 
69. Cannon, supra note 3, at 53. 
70. See James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Who’s Number One?, 26 ENV’T F. 36, 37 (2009). 
71. See Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 2, at 43. 
72. Eli Savit, The New Front in the Clean Air Wars: Fossil-Fuel Influence Over State Attorneys 
General—And How It Might Be Checked, 115 MICH. L. REV. 839, 850 (2017) (incidentally, Savit clerked 
for two judges involved in Massachusetts—Judge Tatel at the D.C. Circuit and Justice Ginsburg). 
73. See, e.g., Cannon, supra note 3. 
74. See, e.g., Eric Biber, Two Sides of the Same Coin: Judicial Review of Administrative Agency Action 
and Inaction, 26 VA. ENV’T L.J. 461 (2008) (discussing Massachusetts’ influence on the doctrine of judicial 
review of agency denials of petitions for rulemakings); see also Richardson, supra note 46, at 367-76. 
75. See, e.g., Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Future Generations: Does Massachusetts v. EPA Open 
Standing for Generations to Come, 34 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 1 (2009). 
76. See UARG.  v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 344 (2014) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“I believed Massachusetts 
v. EPA was wrongly decided at the time, and these cases further expose the flaws with that decision.”). 
77. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 3, at 231 (“The various reforms show the extraordinary extent to 
which the executive branch, relying on longstanding regulatory authorities, can reorient national policy”). 
Sunstein is not, however, an unreserved supporter of agency action, having long backed cost-benefit 
analysis as the touchstone guide for agency decisionmaking, to the annoyance of some who believe it 
results in an anti-regulatory bias. See, e.g., Dylan Matthews, Can Technocracy be Saved? An interview with 
Cass Sunstein, VOX (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/10/22/18001014/cass-
sunstein-cost-benefit-analysis-technocracy-liberalism.  
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Massachusetts as insufficiently deferential to the Bush EPA’s interpretation of the 
Clean Air Act.78  
Massachusetts’ legal significance and the degree to which it was an 
environmental victory have been somewhat overstated. It took the American legal 
system ten years to answer a simple question: does the Clean Air Act give EPA the 
power and the duty to regulate emissions contributing to climate change? 
Massachusetts’ answer was “yes, but.” Massachusetts was less transformational than it 
appeared at the time (and than its continued ranking among the most important 
environmental cases indicates many still believe it to be). The reality is that 
Massachusetts had three distinct but closely related implications for environmental 
law.79 
1. A Limited Command 
First, Massachusetts did not require EPA to regulate greenhouse gases. As 
noted above, EPA could continue to refuse to regulate, provided it gave a reason 
grounded in the statute for not doing so. Under the Clean Air Act, EPA has some 
discretion over (1) what substances in the air it considers pollutants;80 (2) which of 
those pollutants are sufficiently harmful to justify regulation;81 (3) how stringently 
to restrict emissions of the pollutants it does regulate;82 and (4) how to prioritize all 
of these determinations.83 Massachusetts only constrained EPA’s authority regarding 
the first of these, holding that the statute foreclosed EPA’s classification of 
 
78. Sunstein, supra note 3, at 232, 243. 
79. Again, setting aside implications of the decision for standing, administrative law doctrines, or 
other areas. 
80. The statute does not generally list the pollutants the agency is to regulate, leaving it to the 
agency to determine what compounds fit the statutory definition, as Massachusetts itself illustrates. Section 
§112(b) of the Clean Air Act, listing hazardous air pollutants, is an exception to this general rule. 
81. See, e.g., Clean Air Act §202(a)(1) (directing the EPA Administrator to issue standards for 
motor vehicles emissions “which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may 
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”). 
82. Sometimes the statute gives no guidance at all to the agency on how strictly to regulate. See, 
e.g., §202(a). Other sections give guidance, but leave determination of actual levels or standards to the 
agency. See, e.g., Clean Air Act §109(b)(1) (standards to be “requisite to protect the public health” 
“allowing an adequate margin of safety”). 
83. In a few sections, the statute requires the EPA to conduct regular reviews of emissions 
standards. See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 111(b)(1)(B) (requiring review of new source performance standards 
every 8 years). But in most cases the agency is given no guidance on how to prioritize among the various 
mandatory and discretionary authorities it is given under the statute, despite constraints on agency time 
and resources. See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 202(a)(1) (directing the agency to “prescribe [] and from time to 
time revise” emissions standards for motor vehicles). 
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greenhouse gases as non-air-pollutants.84 But (as noted above) EPA could still avoid 
regulating GHGs under the second determination—“endangerment”—by finding 
they present no danger to public health and welfare.85 Massachusetts gave no guidance 
on the third and fourth determinations, stringency and prioritization, which would 
each become matters of contention later when the Obama EPA planned and 
implemented its regulatory agenda.86 
Returning to Massachusetts’ effects for the Bush EPA, it required the agency 
to confront climate science head-on: EPA could either accept the consensus scientific 
view that greenhouse gas emissions cause dangerous climate change and regulate to 
reduce that threat, or it could reject that consensus formally and publicly. 
Massachusetts has therefore been called an expertise-forcing decision; it forced the 
agency to decide whether and how to regulate based on its technocratic and scientific 
expertise, not political influence.87 
As noted, Massachusetts gave the agency no concrete timetable under which 
it had to act. In that way, “expertise-prodding” might be a better characterization of 
the decision’s impact. By the time the case was decided, the second term of George 
W. Bush’s presidency was nearing its end. This made it possible to punt the climate 
issue away without taking a position on climate science and endangerment. The Bush 
administration did so, issuing only an advance notice of proposed rulemaking 
(ANPRM) requesting comment on climate regulatory options under the Clean Air 
Act.88 This required major deviation from standard regulatory procedure and sparked 
conflict between EPA staff (and some agency political appointees) and the White 
House.89 
It would not have been possible for EPA to delay action in the wake of 
Massachusetts forever, but the ANPRM illustrates the Court’s limited ability to 
compel swift regulatory action. Even if the Bush EPA had been forced to act, it could 
have refused to regulate by rejecting at least some of the scientific consensus on the 
record, or it could have accepted the science while issuing a minimally stringent 
 
84. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 535 (2007). (“We need not and do not reach the 
question whether on remand EPA must make an endangerment finding, or whether policy concerns can 
inform S 535EPA’s actions in the event that it makes such a finding.”) 
85. See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 202(a)(1) (directing the agency to issue standards restricting 
emissions from new motor vehicles that (in the agency’s judgment) “endanger public health and welfare”). 
86. See infra Section II. 
87. See Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 3, at 52. 
88. See The EPA’s Elusive Climate Change Endangerment Report, UNION OF CONCERNED 
SCIENTISTS Dec. 1, 2008) [hereinafter EPA’s Elusive Climate Change], https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/
epas-elusive-climate-change-endangerment-report (detailing White House refusal to read EPA 
recommendations after Massachusetts). See also Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Regulating 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354 (July 30, 2008) [hereinafter 
ANPRM]. 
89. Id. 
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regulation, as the Trump EPA is doing a decade later.90 In any case, Massachusetts did 
not and could not compel EPA to impose meaningful regulations. 
Massachusetts exposed the tension in the Bush administration’s climate 
policy: it refused to regulate, but was not willing to publicly reject the scientific 
consensus. From today’s perspective, this reluctance seems charmingly quaint. 
Rejection of scientific consensus is common in the current political era of “alternative 
facts,”91 but would have been more politically costly a decade ago. 
2. A Limited Grant 
Second, Massachusetts did not enable Clean Air Act regulation of GHGs. 
Although EPA leadership was enthusiastic about climate policy under President 
Obama, the Court’s ruling afforded it no new tools. EPA’s regulatory authority over 
pollutants comes from Congress’ delegation in the Clean Air Act. The courts can 
interpret the scope of that grant, but as the Cannon Memo illustrates, a court ruling 
was not necessary to find authority to regulate GHGs under the statute. It’s true that 
had the dissent prevailed in Massachusetts, the Court would have foreclosed EPA 
regulation of GHGs under the statute, but the reverse is not true. The authority was 
there already.  
Massachusetts interpreted only one part of the Clean Air Act: Section 202, 
the provision that gives EPA authority to regulate emissions from motor vehicles. 
As discussed below, the Obama EPA would ultimately regulate greenhouse gas 
emissions not just under Section 202 but also under other sections of the statute that 
cover other sources, most notably power plants.92 While Massachusetts did not discuss 
those other sections of the Act, it did give the agency some confidence that courts 
would interpret similar or identical language in such sections to include GHGs 
(environmental groups had also petitioned the agency to regulate stationary sources 
before Massachusetts was decided).93 An administration opposed to GHG regulation 
would presumably refuse to make such a leap from Massachusetts’ holding regarding 
Section 202 to analogous readings of other sections of the statute, an action that could 
force a replay of Massachusetts for every major section of the Clean Air Act.94 For 
 
90. See discussion of the Trump EPA’s Alternative Clean Energy (ACE) Rule, infra Section III.B. 
91. See Eric Bradner, Conway: Trump White House offered 'alternative facts' on crowd size, CNN (Jan. 
23, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/22/politics/kellyanne-conway-alternative-facts/index.html.  
92. See text and citations infra Sections II.E and II.F. 
93. See ANPRM at 44,399-44,400 (announcing that the agency will “examine the full range of 
potential Clean Air Act regulation of GHGs, including a discussion of the issues raised by regulation of 
GHG emissions of mobile and stationary sources under the Act” and discussing petitions for new source 
performance standards, which the agency had initially rejected, for similar reasons to those the Court 
dismissed in Massachusetts). 
94. The Supreme Court has confirmed that at least one other section of the statute, § 111, 42 
U.S.C. § 7411 (dealing with performance standards for power plants and other stationary sources), grants 
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reasons discussed below, it is not at all clear that such sequels to Massachusetts would 
come out the same way.95 
3. Normalization 
What, then, did Massachusetts do? Why is it, despite this narrow scope, 
considered such an important case? It normalized climate regulation under the Clean 
Air Act and appeared to make the regulation of GHGs little different from regulation 
of other pollutants under the statute. To put it in political terms, Massachusetts moved 
the Clean Air Act’s Overton window96 to encompass climate. By the time 
Massachusetts was decided, nearly forty years of experience with the Clean Air Act in 
its modern form had shown what “normal” looked like. Painting with a broad brush, 
normal under environmentally ambitious presidential administrations meant the 
EPA would move to strengthen existing air pollution regulations and/or expand them 
to previously unregulated pollutants.97 Under more industry-friendly 
administrations, normal meant little if any tightening of existing standards (unless 
forced by litigation), and no expansion to new pollutants, but, crucially, equally little 
weakening of existing standards.98 As former EPA Administrator Carol Browner has 
noted, under Republican administrations, the general policy toward EPA has been 
one of “benign neglect.”99 This is an oversimplification. Even if Republican 
 
EPA authority over greenhouse gases. See Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 424–
25 (2011) (“The Act itself thus provides a means [§ 111] to seek limits on emissions of carbon dioxide from 
domestic power plants.”). 
95. See infra Section II.D. 
96. Named for and based on the work of Joseph P. Overton, this refers to the range of policy 
options or ideas that are politically acceptable at a given point in time. See The Overton Window, Mackinac 
Center for Public Policy, https://www.mackinac.org/OvertonWindow.  
97. For example, under Presidents Carter, Clinton, and Obama the EPA strengthened National 
Ambient Air Quality Standards for “conventional” pollutants such as ozone and particulates (or added 
standards for new pollutants) nine times. See NAAQS Table, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/criteria-air-
pollutants/naaqs-table. As detailed in Section II, infra, the agency under President Obama would move 
for the first time to regulate GHGs using a variety of provisions of the statute.  
98. For example, under Presidents Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and George W. Bush, the EPA 
strengthened the NAAQS only five times. Three of the five rules strengthening NAAQS under these 
administrations (and all of them since 1987) were issued under court order or consent decree. Only once 
has an existing primary NAAQS been reduced or revoked. See John Bachmann, Will the Circle be Unbroken: 
A History of U.S. National Ambient Air Quality Standards, 57 J. OF THE AIR & WASTE MGMT. ASS’N, 652, 
662-78 (2007); National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 73 Fed. Reg. 16,436, 16,438 (Mar. 
27, 2008) (schedule for review of standards set by consent decree); National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards for Lead, 73 Fed. Reg. 66,964, 66,968 (Nov. 12, 2008) (schedule for review of standards set by 
court order).  
99. Alexander C. Kaufman, Scott Pruitt’s First Year Set the EPA Back Anywhere From a Few Years to 
3 Decades, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 20, 2008), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/pruitt-one-year_n_5a61
0a5ce4b074ce7a06beb4.  
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administrations have rarely pushed through rulemakings reducing the stringency of 
Clean Air Act standards, their enforcement of existing standards has often been much 
less vigorous.100 Democratic administrations have not regulated as stringently as 
many climate activists would have liked either.101 But generally speaking, the Clean 
Air Act has been a one-way ratchet for reasons that may have more to do with interest 
group politics than the legal structure of the Act itself. Once a regulation is in place, 
industry has traditionally shifted its investment decisions to comply with it, which, 
to some degree, reduces the appetite for repeal.102 Regulation can also create its own 
vested interests: some regulated firms and their suppliers may competitively benefit 
under the new regulatory regime.103 And repealing a regulation has other costs; it 
takes significant administrative resources, may create conflict between political 
leadership and career staff, invites legal challenge, and carries political risk.104  
Massachusetts seemed to bring greenhouse gases into this well-understood 
regime, both offensively and defensively. While the Bush EPA would not be forced 
to regulate, Massachusetts’ holding meant that the next administration would have to 
confront the issue. Massachusetts also appeared to insulate regulatory action under the 
Clean Air Act from legal challenge by establishing that greenhouse gases were within 
the scope of the statute.105 The form, stringency, and timetable of Clean Air Act 
climate rulemakings remained unclear.106 But, at least it appeared, there were 
significant regulatory tools available to an administration interested in using them, 
and the resulting regulations would have the stability evidenced by decades of 
experience with the Clean Air Act in other contexts. Massachusetts was (and to a large 
 
100. For example, the Clinton administration filed a series of lawsuits against emitters alleging 
violation of New Source Review requirements that the Reagan and G.H.W. Bush administrations had not 
enforced. See Anna Solomon Greenbaum and Steve Curwood, New Source Review, LIVING ON EARTH 
(Sept. 7, 2001), http://www.loe.org/shows/segments.html?programID=01-P13-00036&segmentID=1.  
101. See, e.g., discussion infra Section II.G. 
102. See, e.g., Cass R Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 31 HARV. ENV’T L. 
REV. 67 (2007) (detailing early opposition by chemical firms to US regulation of aerosol propellants that 
cause damage to the ozone layer, followed by acceptance and eventual support by the same firms for US 
diplomatic efforts to get other countries to impose similar rules). 
103. For example, after sulfur dioxide emissions were more strictly regulated in the early 1990s, 
western coal mines benefited at the expense of those in the east due to the lower sulfur content of their 
product. See Richard Schmalensee & Robert N. Stavins, The SO2 Allowance Trading System: The Ironic 
History of a Grand Policy Experiment, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 103, 111 (2013). 
104. See, e.g., Coral Davenport, Trump’s Path to Weaker Fuel Efficiency Rules May Lead to a Dead End, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/13/climate/trump-fuel-economy-
rollback.html (describing significant delays, conflicts with agency staff, and other problems with attempts 
to roll back vehicle emissions standards). 
105. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528-529 (2007). 
106. Id. at 534-535 (“We need not and do not reach the question whether on remand EPA must 
make an endangerment finding, or whether policy concerns can inform EPA's actions in the event that it 
makes such a finding.”) 
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extent still is) perceived to be important in large part because it appeared to have 
normalized climate policy under the Clean Air Act. In practice, however, climate 
regulation has been far from normal. 
II. THE CLEAN AIR ACT CLIMATE POLICY PROJECT 
Massachusetts’ normalization of Clean Air Act climate regulation meant that 
upon taking office, the Obama administration could assume that it had authority 
under the Clean Air Act to regulate carbon emissions107 and that (if Massachusetts had 
indeed normalized these regulatory tools) any regulations it put in place would be 
more or less stable over the long term.  This assumption led the Obama 
administration to expend significant administrative and political resources in a series 
of Clean Air Act rulemakings aimed at reducing carbon emissions from a variety of 
sources, particularly after Congress’s failure to pass climate legislation in 2010. The 
story of this decade-long policy project has been told extensively elsewhere—perhaps 
most notably by one of its architects, Cass Sunstein, OIRA Administrator during 
President Obama’s first term.108 It is worth briefly retelling that history here to 
identify where it went wrong. 
A. Endangerment (2007–2009) 
In the 2008 presidential campaign, both Barack Obama and his opponent 
John McCain promised to make action on climate change a policy priority. But no 
matter how interested in climate policy the incoming Obama administration was, the 
Clean Air Act (and Massachusetts) did not give EPA authority to immediately begin 
limiting carbon emissions. First, the agency needed to identify pollutants that, in its 
judgment, caused specific harms to health and welfare.109 This determination, an 
“endangerment finding,” had to be documented, opened for public comment, and 
 
107. See ANPRM, supra note 88, at 44,399-44,400 (detailing authority to regulate GHG emissions 
under a variety of Clean Air Act provisions. See also EPA, Proposed Endangerment and Cause or 
Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 
18,886, 18,888-18,894 (proposed Apr. 24, 2009) (detailing EPA’s view on the legal basis for GHG 
regulation, grounded in §202 of the Clean Air Act, as interpreted by the Court in Massachusetts). 
108. See generally Sunstein, supra note 3. 
109. See Clean Air Act § 202(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (“The Administrator shall by regulation 
prescribe . . . standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new 
motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution 
which may reasonable be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”). 
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published in the Federal Register.110 An endangerment finding would then both allow 
regulation under the relevant section of the statute and compel it.111  
EPA, led by newly appointed Administrator Lisa Jackson, moved quickly 
to issue the required endangerment finding. Typically such a finding takes years, but 
the Obama EPA was able to publish a proposed finding in April of 2009, and a final 
version in December of that year—less than a year after President Obama’s 
inauguration.112 Two things made this rapid timetable possible. First, the 
endangerment finding relied on Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(“IPCC”) reports summarizing state-of-the-art climate science.113 The agency 
determined that a separate review of climate science was not necessary, substantially 
reducing the complexity of the endangerment finding process.114 
Second, EPA staff had begun work on the finding under the preceding Bush 
administration.115 After the Massachusetts decision, EPA staff quickly began the 
formal process of answering the endangerment question. The agency soon concluded 
that “the only scientifically defensible conclusion would be that global warming 
emissions did endanger public health.”116 EPA drafted a formal endangerment 
finding, submitting it to the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) for review 
in December of 2007, seven months after Massachusetts.117 Once submitted, however, 
White House officials pushed EPA to withdraw the finding.118 Steven Johnson, the 
Bush-appointed EPA Administrator, refused to do so.119 White House officials then 
claimed that the ninety-day OMB regulatory review process had not begun because 
they had not yet opened EPA’s email to which the proposed endangerment finding 
 
110. As a rule issued by an administrative agency not required by the relevant statute to follow 
“formal” procedures, the Administrative Procedure Act requires notice-and-comment procedures for 
endangerment findings. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §553. 
111. See Clean Air Act § 202(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) To put it differently, in order not to 
regulate, the agency would have to withdraw the endangerment finding with a second rulemaking; this 
would become relevant later under President Trump. See infra Section III.C. 
112. EPA, Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 
202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) [hereinafter Endangerment Finding]. 
113. Id. at 66,497. 
114. Id. This is exactly what the IPCC was created to do—provide a summary of climate science 
for use by policymakers. 
115. See EPA’s Elusive Climate Change, supra note 88. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. see also Timeline of EPA’s Endangerment Finding, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/sites/productio 
n/files/2016-08/documents/endangermentfinding_timeline.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2020).  
118. See EPA’s Elusive Climate Change, supra note 88. 
119. Id. 
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was attached.120 The end result of this farce was the eventual publication of the 
ANPRM in the Federal Register and resignations of high-level EPA staff.121 
The ANPRM that emerged was an unusual, even bizarre, document. 
Accompanied by letters from cabinet secretaries claiming that EPA regulation of 
greenhouse gases would be unwise or improper, the remainder of the document, 
written by EPA staff, was essentially a draft endangerment finding plus a methodical 
discussion of the suitability of all major provisions of the statute for greenhouse gas 
regulation. It requested comment on a variety of policy options122 but proposed no 
new law or regulation and gave little indication of which options the agency was more 
or less likely to pursue.123 The ANPRM created a regulatory roadmap, refused to say 
where to go, and then filed away the map while suggesting that taking a trip at all 
was a bad idea. Nevertheless, it provided a ready path to an endangerment finding 
for the Obama EPA to pick up.124 
The final finding released by EPA in late 2009 concluded that “greenhouse 
gases in the atmosphere may reasonably be anticipated both to endanger public health 
and to endanger public welfare” via “changes in air quality, increases in temperatures, 
changes in extreme weather events, increases in food- and water-borne pathogens.”125 
The same document also made a “cause or contribute” finding establishing that 
emissions from motor vehicles contribute to that endangerment.126 The stage was 
now set for the vehicle regulations the environmental petitioners sought more than 
a decade earlier. 
B. Transportation (2009-2012) 
Just days after his inauguration, President Obama announced that his 




122. See ANPRM, supra note 88, at 44,354. 
123. See id. 
124. The ANPRM’s muddled state was apparently the result of policy disagreement between 
agency staff, political leadership, and the White House. See EPA’s Elusive Climate Change, supra note 88. 
It would nevertheless become the regulatory ‘climate change bible’ for subsequent agency action under 
President Obama, something some predicted at the time. See Darren Samuelsohn, Will Much-Maligned 
EPA Reg Blueprint Emerge as ‘Climate Change Bible’?, GREENWIRE (Aug. 7, 2008), 
https://www.eenews.net/stories/67886. 
125. EPA, Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 
202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,497 (Dec. 15, 2009) (codified at 40 C.F.R ch. I). 
126. Id. 
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vehicles (cars and trucks), which had remained largely unchanged for decades.127 The 
2007 Energy Independence and Security Act (“EISA”) had set long-term goals for 
improved standards and granted the National Highway Traffic Safety Agency 
(“NHTSA”) authority to raise them, but the Bush administration had not 
implemented any new standards.128 Historically, U.S. car manufacturers opposed 
increases in fuel economy standards,129 but in 2009, the industry’s political power was 
minimal, with General Motors dependent on federal bailout funds (it would enter 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy within months).130 
Fuel economy standards were previously understood as industrial and 
energy policy and only secondarily as environmental policy, not (or at least not 
explicitly) as climate policy.131 NHTSA, not EPA, was responsible for setting the 
standards.132 Massachusetts and the endangerment finding, however, gave EPA 
authority to regulate vehicle greenhouse gas emissions. The transportation sector is 
responsible for about one-third of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, most of which is 
attributable to light vehicles.133 Unlike conventional pollutants from vehicles 
previously regulated by EPA, carbon dioxide is an inevitable byproduct of 
combustion that cannot be captured before it is emitted from a vehicle.134 The only 
way to meaningfully control carbon dioxide emissions, therefore, is to reduce fuel 
consumption.135 In practice, that puts EPA in the business of regulating fuel 
 
127. See Macon Phillips, From Peril to Progress (Update I: Full Remarks), WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Jan 
26, 2009, 4:35 p.m.), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2009/01/26/peril-progress-environment 
(posting the full remarks of President Obama on Jobs, Energy Independence, and Climate Change). 
128. See Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, H.R. 6, 110th Cong., § 102(b). 
129. See RICHARD BYRNE, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, LIFE IN THE SLOW LANE: 
TRACKING DECADES OF AUTOMAKER ROADBLOCKS TO FUEL ECONOMY 10 (July 28, 2003), 
https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/2019-10/slowlane-final.pdf. 
130. See generally Austan D. Goolsbee & Alan B. Krueger, A Retrospective Look at Rescuing and 
Restructuring General Motors and Chrysler, 29 J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (2015). But see Peter Whoriskey, GM and 
Chrysler, Owned by the Government, Lobby the Government, Wash. Post (Feb. 26, 2011). 
131. See Byrne, supra note 129, at 3-7. 
132. Id. 
133. Env’t Protection Agency, EPA 430-P-20-001, Draft Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
and Sinks: 1990-2018, at 2-25 (2020) [hereinafter EPA Draft Inventory], https://www.epa.gov/sites/produ
ction/files/2020-02/documents/us-ghg-inventory-2020-main-text.pdf (estimating transportation sector 
emissions at 27.9% of total U.S. GHG emissions, slightly more than the electric power industry at 26.9%). 
134. Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324, 25,327 (May 7, 2010) [hereinafter Phase I Light 
Duty Standards] (“the relationship between improving fuel economy and reducing CO2 tailpipe emissions 
is a very direct and close one. . . While there are emission control technologies that reduce the pollutants 
(e.g., carbon monoxide) produced by imperfect combustion of fuel by capturing or converting them to 
other compounds, there is no such technology for CO2.”) 
135. Road vehicles do emit GHGs other than carbon dioxide, mostly related to refrigerants in air 
conditioning systems. Control of these emissions was envisioned by the ensuing regulations, but in 
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economy, too. It also gives a legal and policy rationale for higher fuel economy 
targets. 
In May of 2009, shortly after the proposed endangerment finding was 
released, President Obama announced that EPA and NHTSA would collaborate to 
issue new, more stringent fuel economy standards, deriving legal authority in part 
from the Clean Air Act and Massachusetts.136 These Phase I standards would be 
effective for 2012-2016 model year vehicles, and would achieve the 35.5 miles per 
gallon fleet average fuel economy targeted by the  EISA by 2016—4 years earlier 
than the statute envisioned.137 The joint rulemaking was proposed later in 2009, and 
finalized in April of 2010.138 With this rulemaking, Massachusetts and the Clean Air 
Act substantially accelerated fuel economy improvements and associated emissions 
benefits.139 EPA estimated that the Phase I standards would reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions from U.S. cars and trucks by 242 million metric tons annually by 2030 and 
by almost 9 billion metric tons total by 2050.140 Net benefits were estimated at 
approximately $200 billion.141 
Almost immediately after the 2012–2016 standards were finalized, 
President Obama announced that EPA and NHTSA would begin work on standards 
for subsequent model year light duty vehicles.142 These Phase II standards were 
finalized in August of 2012.143 They set even more stringent standards for 2017–2025 
vehicles, ultimately reaching a fleet average of 54.5 mpg by 2025.144 These standards, 
EPA estimated, would reduce greenhouse gas emissions by a further 271 million 
 
practice is a relatively small part of total emissions reductions compared to fuel economy improvements. 
Id. at 25,330 (detailing credits for reductions in non-combustion GHG emissions).  
136. Press Release, White House, Obama Admin., President Obama Announces National Fuel 
Efficiency Policy (May 1, 2009). 
137. Id. 
138. Phase I Light Duty Standards, supra note 134. 
139. Id. at 25,328. 
140. Id. at 25,637. 
141. Id. 
142. Press Release, White House, Obama Admin., Presidential Memorandum Regarding Fuel 
Efficiency Standards (May 21, 2010), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/presidential
-memorandum-regarding-fuel-efficiency-standards.  
143. 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate 
Average Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,624 (Oct. 15, 2012) [hereinafter Phase II 
Light Duty Standards]. 
144. Id. 
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metric tons annually by 2030 and by over 10.5 billion metric tons total by 2050.145 
Net benefits for the Phase II rules were estimated at $326–451 billion.146 
Roughly contemporaneously with its work on the Phase II light vehicle 
standards, EPA moved to issue standards applicable to greenhouse gas emissions 
from heavy-duty vehicles (mostly semi-trucks, vans, and other fleet vehicles)—the 
ensuing final Phase I heavy-duty standards were issued in September of 2011.147 
Emissions reductions were estimated at 76 million metric tons annually by 2030,148 
and 270 million metric tons total over the lifetime of affected vehicles.149 Net benefits 
were estimated at forty-nine billion dollars.150 
Taken together, these three rulemakings, all issued within just over two 
years, substantially increased fuel economy standards for almost all new road vehicles 
in the United States. Annual emissions reductions in 2030 were estimated at 1,973 
million metric tons, an over 30 percent reduction of transportation-sector emissions 
of relative to 2005 levels.151  
In addition, EPA granted California authority to issue even stricter 
standards. Under Section 202 of the Clean Air Act, states are forbidden from setting 
more stringent emissions standards for new vehicles than those of the federal 
government (an exception to the general practice in environmental law of federal law 
operating as a floor, not a regulatory ceiling).152 But the statute does allow EPA to 
grant a waiver of this restriction to California, which requested such a waiver in 2005, 
motivated in part by concerns over greenhouse gases.153 The Bush administration 
denied the waiver in 2008.154 In July 2009, the Obama administration reversed that 
 
145. Id. at 62,892. 
146. Id. at 62,627. 
147. Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and 
Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles, 76 Fed. Reg. 57,106 (Sept. 15, 2011). 
148. Id. at 57,294. 
149. Id. at 57,106. 
150. Id. 
151. EPA estimated 2005 transportation-sector emissions to have been about 1976 million metric 
tons. See EPA, Greenhouse Gas Inventory Data Explorer, https://cfpub.epa.gov/ghgdata/inventoryexplorer/
#transportation/allgas/source/all (“U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions from the Transportation Sector, 1990-
2017”) (last visited Mar. 3, 2020). 
152. Clean Air Act § 209(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (authorizing EPA to waive preemption of state 
standards for any state that has adopted emissions standards for new vehicles before March 30, 1966; 
California is the only such state). 
153. California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; Notice of Decision Denying a 
Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s 2009 and Subsequent Model Year Greenhouse Gas 
Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 73 Fed. Reg. 12,156, 12,157 (Mar. 6, 2008). 
154. Id. 
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decision and granted California a waiver.155 California proceeded to issue its own 
standards, though negotiations with the Obama administration led to harmonization 
between the California and federal standards.156 Nevertheless, California’s standards 
were based on independent legal authority, which would later become relevant when 
the Trump administration rolled back the federal standards.157 Moreover, the Clean 
Air Act allows other states to adopt the California standard; by 2019, thirteen states 
had done so.158 
With these rulemakings, EPA achieved the narrow aim of the Massachusetts 
litigants—meaningful federal limits on greenhouse gas emissions from motor 
vehicles. More than that, the Phase I and Phase II standards remain to this day the 
most significant climate policy ever implemented by the federal government, under 
any president.159 But since all of this activity focused on one sector of the economy, 
transportation, the large majority of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions would be 
unaffected. The degree to which the Clean Air Act should or could provide the basis 
for regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from other sectors would prove a more 
difficult question. 
C. Congress, Copenhagen, and Another Way to Skin the Cat (2009-2010) 
Exploring whether the Clean Air Act would apply to greenhouse gas 
emissions from other sectors requires a brief return to the Bush EPA’s reluctant 
climate policy. At least as far back as 2002, environmental groups petitioned EPA to 
regulate greenhouse gases from fossil-fuel power plants (then the most-emitting 
sector of the economy)160 in the context of the performance standards under 
Section 111 of the Clean Air Act that the agency regularly issued for other 
pollutants.161 The Bush EPA rejected these efforts, issuing updated performance 
 
155. California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; Notice of Decision Granting a 
Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s 2009 and Subsequent Model Year Greenhouse Gas 
Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles; Notice, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,744 (July 8, 2009). 
156. See Brent Yacobucci et al., CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, Automobile and Truck Fuel 
Economy (I) and Greenhouse Gas Standards, CRS Report 7-5700 at 2 (2012). 
157. See infra Section III.A. 
158. Coral Davenport, Trump to Revoke California’s Authority to Set Stricter Auto Emissions Rules, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/17/climate/trump-california-emissions-
waiver.html.  
159. Only the Clean Power Plan was projected to achieve a similar magnitude of emissions 
reductions, see infra Section II.E, but it was never implemented, see infra Section III.B. 
160. See EPA Draft Inventory at 2-25, supra note 133 (Electric power industry estimated to be 
largest-emitting sector until surpassed by transportation in 2017). 
161. See Save Our Children’s Earth Found. & Sierra Club v. EPA, No. 03-cv-00770-CW, 
Complaint ¶¶ 4, 32 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2003), proposed consent decree published, 68 Fed. Reg. 65,699 
(Nov. 21, 2003), consent decree approved, Doc. No. 47 (Feb. 9, 2004). 
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standards for power plants in 2006 that did not address greenhouse gases.162 New 
York, other states, and environmental groups responded by suing the agency.163 After 
Massachusetts was handed down in 2007, a D.C. Circuit panel including now-Justice 
Kavanaugh remanded the case to the agency “for further proceedings in light of 
Massachusetts.”164 Massachusetts, of course, said nothing about whether the agency had 
authority to regulate greenhouse gases under any part of the statute other than 
through mobile sources under Section 202; the agency was left to make that 
determination on its own. 
Despite never issuing any Section 202 vehicle greenhouse gas regulations, 
the Bush EPA did consider regulation of other sources, as the 2007 D.C. Circuit 
remand required. In the 2008 ANPRM, the agency noted: 
The provisions of the CAA are interconnected in multiple ways such that a 
decision to regulate one source category of GHGs [i.e., emissions from one sector] 
could or would lead to regulation of other source categories . . .  How a term is 
interpreted for one part of the Act could also affect other provisions using the same 
term. These CAA interconnections are by design.165 
In particular, the agency speculated that an endangerment finding in one 
section of the statute would compel a similar finding, and therefore regulation, under 
other sections, most notably Section 111 (governing performance standards for 
stationary sources and the subject of the 2006 New York litigation).166 It also 
speculated that regulation of greenhouse gases under any provision of the statute 
would compel the agency to consider them when conducting “prevention of 
significant deterioration” (“PSD”) permitting, under which the agency requires “best 
available control technology” (“BACT”) for all new or substantially modified 
sources.167 In the 2008 ANPRM, the agency requested comment on these potential 
interconnections in the Clean Air Act.168 Finally, in December 2008, shortly before 
leaving office, EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson issued the “Johnson Memo,” 
concluding that regulation of greenhouse gases under any provision of the statute 
(including Section 202 vehicle standards) would trigger GHG inclusion in the PSD 
program so long as the new source seeking a permit emitted greenhouse gases “in 
 
162. See Standards of Performance for Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, Industrial-
Commercial-Institutional Steam Generating Units, and Small Industrial-Commercial-Institutional Steam 
Generating Units, 71 Fed. Reg. 9866, 9869 (Feb. 27, 2006) (to be codified 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). 
163. See Order Remanding Case to EPA, New York et al. v. EPA, No. 06–1322, Document 
#1068502, (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Sept. 24, 2007). 
164. Id. 
165. ANPRM, supra note 88, at 44,418. 
166. Id. at 44,419. 
167. Id. at 44,419–20. 
168. Id. at 44,418. 
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significant amounts.”169 Although this conclusion had little immediate effect, since 
the Bush EPA had not issued any such regulations, it would prove to be a significant 
problem for the Obama EPA, and would eventually be litigated to the Supreme 
Court.170 
Through at least the first two years of the Obama administration there was 
little, if any, apparent interest in Clean Air Act climate policy beyond the vehicle 
emissions standards under Section 202 of the statute at issue in Massachusetts. 
Instead, the administration’s focus was on new, comprehensive climate legislation 
that would create a nationwide cap-and-trade system, as promised in the 2008 
campaign. The House passed the American Clean Energy and Security (“Waxman-
Markey”) Act in May of 2009.171 The bill would have created a national renewable 
electricity mandate and cap-and-trade market with limited auctioning of allowances, 
and would have directed federal funding to electric vehicles, energy efficiency, and 
electric grid modernization.172 These policies were projected to reduce U.S. 
greenhouse gas emissions by seventeen percent relative to 2005 levels by 2020, and 
by eighty-three percent by 2050.173  
Formally, the Waxman-Markey bill would have substantially amended the 
Clean Air Act.174 It would have delegated new authority to EPA related to the cap-
and-trade system but also would have stripped the agency of authority to regulate 
emissions purely on climate grounds under much of its traditional authority under 
the statute—with the notable exception of the mobile source standards under 
Section 202.175 EPA would have overseen a national carbon market but would only 
have retained the power to set specific carbon emissions standards for new vehicles. 
In legal terms, the bill would have reinforced the holding in Massachusetts while 
restricting its reach. 
 
169. See Memorandum from Stephen L. Johnson, EPA Administrator, to EPA Regional 
Administrators, EPA’s Interpretation of Regulations that Determine Pollutants Covered by Federal 
Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) Permit Program, at 1 (Dec. 18, 2008) [hereinafter Johnson 
Memo], https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-07/documents/co2_psd.pdf.  
170. See infra Section II.D. 
171. See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. 
172. Id. at Subtitle C (Clean Transportation); Subtitle F (Transmission Planning); Title II (Energy 
Efficiency). 
173. See JOHN LARSEN ET AL., WORLD RES. INST., WRI SUMMARY OF H.R. 2454, THE 
AMERICAN CLEAN ENERGY AND SECURITY ACT (WAXMAN-MARKEY) (July 31, 2009), https://wriorg.s
3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/uploads/wri_summary_of_aces_0731.pdf.  
174. See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454 §331, 111th Cong. (adding 
a new Title VIII to the Clean Air Act). 
175. Id. at §831-835 (forbidding the EPA from regulating GHGs under a variety of Clean Air Act 
provisions solely on the basis of climate effects; no such limitation is applied to §202 vehicle standards).  
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The bill never became law. Both chambers spent late 2009 and early 2010 
focused on health care reform, and by the time the Affordable Care Act and its related 
amendments passed in March of 2010, Democrats had lost their filibuster-proof 
majority in the Senate and had expended budget reconciliation as a vehicle for 
passing legislation by majority vote.176 Cap-and-trade could therefore only pass with 
at least some Republican support, unavailable in a midterm election year marked by 
growing partisanship.177 The reasons for the bill’s failure remain contested, with 
commentators accusing the Obama administration, outside environmental groups, 
and both parties in Congress of authoring its demise.178 
Waxman-Markey’s failure created a domestic and international policy 
problem for the Obama administration. Not only was action on climate a campaign 
promise, there was also hope for agreement on a new, legally binding, post-Kyoto 
emissions treaty at the upcoming United Nations climate conference in Copenhagen 
in December of 2009.179 Such an agreement was impossible without U.S. 
participation, and that required a vehicle for credible commitment to emissions 
reductions under U.S. law.180 The international community was unwilling to repeat 
the Kyoto experience, with the U.S. Congress undercutting an agreement made by 
 
176. See David Reich and Richard Kogan, Introduction to Budget “Reconciliation,” CENTER ON 
BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-
budget/introduction-to-budget-reconciliation (describing Senate rules limiting the reconciliation process 
to a single spending, tax, and debt bill per budget resolution). Apparently, passing cap-and-trade via 
reconciliation was considered in 2009 but rejected. See ERIC POOLEY, THE CLIMATE WAR: TRUE 
BELIEVERS, POWER BROKERS, AND THE FIGHT TO SAVE THE EARTH 349 (2010). In theory, it might 
have been possible to pass both cap-and-trade and the amendments to the ACA that were in the March 
2010 reconciliation bill together, but at the time the Senate had not even debated cap-and-trade. 
177. See, e.g., Glenn Kessler, When Did Mitch McConnell Say He Wanted to Make Obama a ‘One-Term 
President’?, WASH. POST (Jan. 11, 2017) (quoting Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell’s 2010 
statement that “[t]he single most important thing we want to achieve is for President Obama to be a one-
term president . . . I don’t want the President to fail, I want him to change”). 
178. See, e.g., THEDA SKOCPOL, NAMING THE PROBLEM: WHAT IT WILL TAKE TO COUNTER 
EXTREMISM AND ENGAGE AMERICANS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST GLOBAL WARMING 96 (Jan. 2013), 
https://scholars.org/sites/scholars/files/skocpol_captrade_report_january_2013_0.pdf (noting that “each 
player tended to blame others and conclude that whatever approach he/she/it favored all along would be 
the best one to double-down on moving forward”; Skocpol allocates significant blame to strategic errors 
by environmental groups). See also Joe Romm, What Theda Skocpol Gets Wrong About the Climate Bill Fight, 
THINKPROGRESS (Jan. 18, 2013), https://thinkprogress.org/what-theda-skocpol-gets-wrong-about-the-
climate-bill-fight-9e1c2a859871/ (placing blame for the bill’s failure on the Obama administration and 
Republican opponents). 
179.  See, e.g., Shawn McCarthy, Optimism Marks Opening of Copenhagen Climate Summit, THE 
GLOBE AND MAIL (Dec. 6, 2009), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/optimism-marks-
opening-of-copenhagen-climate-summit/article4294689/.  
180. See id. (discussing Canadian unwillingness to make commitments without US involvement 
and the need for legal support for President Obama’s emissions reduction pledges). 
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the president.181 The cap-and-trade bill intended to be the credible commitment that 
would assuage fears of a Kyoto repeat had already failed by the time diplomats met 
in Copenhagen, and only narrow hope remained that the Senate would revisit climate 
legislation early in the following year.182 These plans were also in vain; the Senate 
finally abandoned any consideration of cap-and-trade legislation in mid-2010.183 The 
November 2010 midterm elections marked a further setback for President Obama 
and for prospects for climate legislation, with Republicans taking control of the 
House. 
At a press conference the day after the midterm election, Obama signaled 
a shift in thinking: 
 
The EPA is under a court order that says greenhouse gases are a 
pollutant that fall under their jurisdiction. And I think one of the 
things that’s very important for me is not to have us ignore the 
science, but rather to find ways that we can solve these problems 
that don’t hurt the economy, that encourage the development of 
clean energy in this country, that, in fact, may give us 
opportunities to create entire new industries and create jobs that—
and that put us in a competitive posture around the world. So I 
think it’s too early to say whether or not we can make some 
progress on that front. I think we can. Cap and trade was just one 
way of skinning the cat; it was not the only way. It was a means, 
not an end. And I’m going to be looking for other means to 
address this problem.184 
 
The “other means” to which Obama was referring were actions against stationary 
sources under the Clean Air Act. A month later, EPA settled with the environmental 
groups seeking stationary-source regulation by agreeing to implement emissions 
standards for both new and existing power plants and refineries by 2012 under 
Section 111 of the Clean Air Act.185 This marked the first step in a large-scale 
 
181. See id. 
182. Id. See also The Future of Climate Policy Could Be Found in Copenhagen, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN 
(Nov. 1, 2009), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/keys-to-copenhagen/.  
183. See Gail Russel Chaddock and Tarini Parti, Harry Reid: Senate will abandon cap-and-trade energy 
reform, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (July 22, 2010), https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2010
/0722/Harry-Reid-Senate-will-abandon-cap-and-trade-energy-reform.  
184. See Press Release, White House, Obama Admin., Press Conference by the President (Nov. 3, 
2010), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/03/press-conference-president. 
185. See Env’t Protection Agency, FACT SHEET: SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS TO ADDRESS 
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM ELECTRIC GENERATING UNITS AND REFINERIES (2013) 
[hereinafter EPA SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS FACT SHEET], https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/si
tes/production/files/2013-09/documents/settlementfactsheet.pdf (fact sheet detailing settlement 
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regulatory program that had seemed unlikely if not impossible a few months earlier. 
The 2008 ANPRM provided a rough roadmap, and the settlement agreements 
seemed to commit EPA to a timeline, but specifics were vague. They would largely 
remain so for almost four years. Almost no public action on stationary sources would 
be taken before the 2012 election. But while working on stationary-source rules 
behind the scenes, the agency was also racing to head off a serious regulatory side 
effect of its vehicle rules that would lead to the first legal test of its climate regulatory 
program. 
D. The Pyrrhic Victory of UARG 
In mid-2010, while cap-and-trade was still under consideration in the 
Senate, EPA released what it called the “Tailoring Rule.”186 Now that the agency had 
regulated greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act with the Phase I light vehicle 
emissions standards, the Johnson Memo’s interpretation of the statute meant that 
greenhouse gas emissions would be included in the PSD program.187 That 
interpretation threatened to consume a monstrous amount of administrative 
resources and extend the reach of EPA regulators to every sector of the economy, 
affecting small projects that the agency had no interest in regulating, and likely 
threatening the agency’s social license to regulate. As the agency put it in the “Does 
this action apply to me?” section of the Rule’s preamble: “Entities affected by this 
action include sources in all sectors of the economy, including commercial and 
residential sources.”188  
The PSD program requires all new or modified stationary sources to 
undergo a review process conducted by EPA—or, frequently, delegated to states—
in which they must demonstrate that they will employ “best available control 
technology” for all regulated pollutants emitted in “significant” quantities.189 This is 
a case-by-case technology review, and is de rigueur, albeit administratively costly, for 
large industrial facilities.190 The problem in the greenhouse gas context comes from 
the “significant quantities” threshold analysis. Greenhouse gases are emitted by 
almost every building or facility in the country. Of course, those emissions aren’t 
“significant” in any reasonable definition of the term. But the Clean Air Act does not 
 
agreements); see also Settlement Agreement between EPA, State, and Environmental Petitioners (Dec. 
16, 2020), https://archive.epa.gov/epa/sites/production/files/2013-09/documents/boilerghgsettlement.pdf 
[hereinafter Boiler GHG Settlement]. 
186. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71) [hereinafter Tailoring Rule]. 
187. See Johnson Memo, supra note 169. 
188. Tailoring Rule, supra note 186. 
189. Tailoring Rule, supra note 186, at 31,520. 
190. See Tailoring Rule, supra note 186, at 31,534-36. 
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delegate the threshold for significance to the agency’s judgment; rather, it specifies 
quantities in the statute: 250 tons per year of any regulated pollutant (or 100 tons per 
year for certain categories of sources).191 Those thresholds make sense for pollutants 
traditionally regulated under the statute: 250 tons per year is a substantial amount 
of, say, sulfur dioxide emissions. Only a large industrial facility that expects to be 
subject to air pollution regulation emits that much. But carbon dioxide is emitted in 
far larger quantities.192 The 250-ton threshold would draw a huge number of 
heretofore unregulated “commercial and residential sources” into EPA’s PSD 
program including, for example, hospitals and large apartment buildings.193 The 
agency estimated that over six million new PSD permits would be required, several 
orders of magnitude greater than the number of such permits the agency typically 
issued, with an average of sixty thousand dollars in related expenses per permit.194 
The Tailoring Rule’s Step One dodged this looming disaster by initially 
excluding all emissions sources from the PSD program that would be included based 
on their greenhouse gas emissions.195 Sources brought into the PSD program via their 
emissions of other regulated pollutants, so-called “anyway sources,” would still be 
subject to BACT analysis for their GHG emissions, but only if they emitted more 
than 75,000 tons per year.196 In the Tailoring Rule’s Step Two, beginning a year later 
in 2011, sources could be brought into the PSD program based on GHG emissions 
alone, but only those emitting greater than 100,000 tons per year.197 A Step Three 
under which these thresholds might fall was discussed in the Rule, but EPA gave no 
details.198 In short, the Tailoring Rule excluded all but the largest GHG emitters 
from PSD, indefinitely. It did not do so by altering the thresholds in the statute, 
something beyond the agency’s authority. Instead, it claimed that the “absurd results” 
that would ensue from a literal application of those thresholds, and the 
“administrative necessity” of avoiding six million PSD reviews gave the agency, as a 
matter of legal interpretation entitled to Chevron deference, the right to revise the 
thresholds in practice, phasing them in over time.199  
Despite the Tailoring Rule’s claims regarding “Step Three,” the agency had 
no credible intention of regulating sources down to 250 tons per year of GHG 
 
191. Clean Air Act § 165(a), 42 U.S.C. § 74791(1). 
192. Tailoring Rule, supra note 186, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,535. 
193. Id. at 31,514. 
194. Id. at 31,556, 31,596. 
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emissions in the PSD program. Another way to view the Rule was therefore as a 
move to buy time and plead to Congress to revise or eliminate the rigid thresholds 
in the statute. The Tailoring Rule was, in any case, a brazen attempt to evade the 
plain text of the Clean Air Act—something of which the agency’s critics regularly 
accuse it,200 though here the effect was to reduce, not increase the agency’s regulatory 
authority. Litigation ensued. 
States and industry groups filed a wide range of claims alleging that EPA 
had acted illegally.201 Among other assertions, they alleged that the endangerment 
finding, vehicle standards (the “Tailpipe Rule”), and the Tailoring Rule all exceeded 
the agency’s Clean Air Act authority and that the agency had acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously.202 The D.C. Circuit panel opinion dismissed the challenges to the 
endangerment finding and vehicle standards.203 It then ruled that the agency’s 
interpretation of the PSD triggers in the statute (dating back to the Johnson Memo) 
was correct: the language “any air pollutant,” the court said, “unambiguously means 
‘any air pollutant regulated under the CAA;’” the court then cited Massachusetts’ 
holding that this definition included greenhouse gases.204 “It is crystal clear,” the 
court concluded, “that PSD permittees must install BACT for greenhouse gases.”205 
EPA was therefore correct that a serious problem existed that the Tailoring 
Rule was designed to address. But the D.C. Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ challenge 
of that rule on the grounds that they lacked standing, because they had suffered no 
injury the court could redress.206 The Tailoring Rule, after all, operated to exempt 
sources from requirements, not impose them. Granting the plaintiffs’ requested relief 
and throwing out the Tailoring Rule would cause more injury than it remedied.207 
Industry plaintiffs sought en banc review, which the D.C. Circuit rejected over the 
dissent of then-Judge Kavanaugh.208 Plaintiffs then appealed to the Supreme Court. 
It is worth pausing to consider why industry plaintiffs, particularly the large 
electric utilities that led the case at the Supreme Court level, pressed the issue. The 
 
200. See, e.g., EPA Clean Power Plan Violates Plain Text of Clean Air Act, Murray Energy Tells Court, 
BLOOMBERG ENV’T (Dec. 17, 2014), https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/environment-and-
energy/epa-clean-power-plan-violates-plain-text-of-clean-air-act-murray-energy-tells-court.  
201. Coal. for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 113 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
202. Id. at 116. 
203. Id. at 113. 
204. Id. at 113, 136. 
205. Id. at 137. 
206. Id. at 146. 
207. Id. (“Indeed, the Timing and Tailoring Rules actually mitigate Petitioners’ purported 
injuries.”). 
208. Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, Order on Petitions for Rehearing en Banc, 
2012 WL 6621785, at *32 (Dec. 20, 2012). 
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large coal and gas power plants they operated were largely unaffected by the 
Tailoring Rule because they were already subject to PSD permitting due to emissions 
of other pollutants, and (again) to the extent the Rule did apply, it reduced regulatory 
burdens. Why pay to fight EPA on this? It is tempting to answer that industry groups 
reflexively challenge any major EPA rulemaking, but that’s not really true. A more 
nuanced suggestion is that some industry players might have been disadvantaged by 
the Tailoring Rule insofar as it excused smaller competitors from permitting 
requirements while imposing them on large facilities.209 But this seems unlikely for 
large electric power plants, which face little if any competition from smaller emitters, 
and in any case, this competitive standing argument appears not to have been 
advanced in briefing. The true reason for the litigation appears to have been to 
“heighten the contradictions” in EPA’s Clean Air Act climate policy.210 Overturning 
the Tailoring Rule might have forced the agency to reconsider the wisdom of 
regulating greenhouse gases from vehicles, lest it be forced to impose unpopular and 
expensive permitting requirements.211 It might even have been possible to get a 
reviewing court to overturn Massachusetts if it could be convinced of a fundamental 
inconsistency in the Clean Air Act as applied to climate. If this was the plaintiffs’ 
goal, it failed in the short run but may prove a success in the long run, fitting for such 
a bank-shot strategy. 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari with respect to only one question—
whether EPA’s regulation of greenhouse gases from vehicles did, as the Johnson 
Memo first established, trigger PSD permitting requirements.212 EPA and the D.C. 
Circuit had concluded that it did.213 But if it did not, then the legally suspect 
 
209. See Nathan Richardson, Standing and the Tailoring Rule, RESOURCES (Aug. 28, 2012), 
https://www.resourcesmag.org/common-resources/standing-and-the-tailoring-rule/.  
210. See Jonathan H. Adler, En Banc Petitions in D.C. Circuit Greenhouse Gas Litigation, THE 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 28, 2012), http://volokh.com/2012/08/28/en-banc-petitions-in-d-c-circuit-
greenhouse-gas-litigation/ (suggesting that “rejecting the ‘Tailoring Rule’ could force the EPA to consider 
alternative ways to avoid the ‘absurd results’ it fears from applying the Act as written to greenhouse 
gases—alternatives that might well exempt some of the industry petitioners from regulation”). 
211. Of course, EPA could not have withdrawn the vehicle rules and refused to regulate at all; the 
endangerment finding compels regulation, and even if that were also withdrawn, Massachusetts itself 
requires some finding on greenhouse gases. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse 
Gases under the Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/endangerment-
and-cause-or-contribute-findings-greenhouse-gases-under-section-202a-clean (last visited July 5, 2020). 
Nevertheless, the agency could conceivably have halted regulation and pled for Congress to bail them out 
of the dilemma with changes to the statute. Legislation stripping the agency of authority to regulate 
greenhouse gases was being considered in Congress at the time. See John M. Broder, House Panel Votes to 
Strip E.P.A. of Power to Regulate Greenhouse Gases, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2011, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/11/science/earth/11climate.html).  
212. UARG v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 314 (2014). 
213. Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,535; Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 
102, 113 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
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Tailoring Rule wasn’t necessary. The 2014 result, Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA 
(“UARG”) was a fractured opinion reaching far beyond the question presented.214 
Formally, EPA lost the case: the Tailoring Rule was struck down.215 UARG was a 
tactical win and a strategic loss for the agency. It was not forced to subject large 
numbers of sources to PSD permitting,216 but UARG revealed deep skepticism on 
the Court of the legal foundations of the agency’s regulatory climate policy. 
The Court’s UARG opinion is in some respects simple. All nine justices 
agreed that EPA need not subject small emitters to PSD regulations.217 I suspect that 
an agency has never been so pleased with a 9-0 loss at the Supreme Court. But there 
were major differences among the Justices’ reasoning for reaching that result, with at 
least three separate camps. The Chief Justice’s role in adjudicating the dispute 
between those camps appears to have been pivotal. Explaining why requires some 
reading between the lines of the three opinions in UARG and some speculation about 
how the Justices came to their positions. 
Some of the Justices’ positions are crystal-clear. Two of them, Thomas and 
Alito, would have used UARG as a vehicle to overturn Massachusetts. In their view, 
Massachusetts was wrongly decided and the PSD over-inclusion problem at issue in 
UARG “further expose[d] the flaws” in it, forcing the agency to “effectively amend” 
the Clean Air Act via its Tailoring Rule.218 In Justices Thomas and Alito’s view, the 
only options available to EPA were to regulate thousands of small sources or to halt 
Clean Air Act regulation of greenhouse gases by withdrawing the endangerment 
finding—exposing the agency to further litigation on the grounds that such a 
withdrawal is inconsistent with climate science and therefore arbitrary and 
capricious.219 The Court should have recognized that Massachusetts had trapped the 
agency in this Catch-22. Reversing Massachusetts would have at least given the agency 
another option—withdrawal of the endangerment finding on the grounds that 
greenhouse gas regulation is inconsistent with the regulatory design of the statute, 
one of the Bush EPA’s justifications for not regulating that the Massachusetts court 
had rejected as extra-statutory.220 
 
214. See UARG, 573 U.S. at 334. 
215. Id. at 332–33. 
216. See id. at 315; infra Part II.D.  
217. See UARG, 573 U.S. at 315. 
218. Id. at 344 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
219. See id. at 343-50. 
220. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 512-13, 533-34 (2007). A more radical rejection of 
Massachusetts is also possible. Instead of ruling that regulating GHGs under the Clean Air Act (or not) 
was within EPA’s discretion (the Bush EPA’s position), it could have ruled that GHG regulation is legally 
impermissible regardless of the agency’s view. More precisely, the Court could have determined that the 
text and context of the Clean Air Act foreclose any interpretation that would allow GHG regulation, 
despite deference under Chevron. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
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Justice Scalia and the Chief Justice likely found Thomas and Alito’s view 
tempting, given their dissent in Massachusetts. It would have been easy to conclude 
that the low tonnage limits in the PSD program and resulting Tailoring Rule were 
an illustration of the “regulatory train wreck” or “glorious mess” of Clean Air Act 
climate regulation commentators predicted in the wake of Massachusetts.221 Such 
problems might have provided sufficient basis for overturning Massachusetts despite 
stare decisis.222  
Even if so tempted, however, Scalia and Roberts realized that joining Alito 
and Thomas’ dissent would have been insufficient to make that dissent a majority 
opinion. Whatever their reservations about the impracticality of the PSD program 
for greenhouse gases (about which more below), none of the four liberal-leaning 
Justices were ever likely to sign on to overturning Massachusetts. Nor was Justice 
Kennedy, the apparent swing vote in Massachusetts, likely to change his mind and 
reject that holding.  
What, then, were the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia to do? Well, if you 
can’t beat them (the four liberal justices plus Kennedy), join ‘em. For any Justice, 
joining a majority at least gives you a chance to shape the opinion that emerges. But 
if you’re the Chief Justice, it gives you an even greater power—you can assign the 
opinion to yourself, or any other Justice you like, so long as the opinion is able to 
keep a majority. The Chief Justice doesn’t just get a voice, he gets to be the voice (or 
delegate it). Of course, Roberts could not just “join” the liberal justices and Kennedy, 
and write an opinion overturning Massachusetts that they wouldn’t accept. But he also 
did not need to convince five Justices to join an opinion—just one, presumably 
Justice Kennedy. The coup de grace was assigning the opinion Justice Scalia, author of 
the dissent in Massachusetts. 
 
(1984). Such a holding would have resolved the agency’s Catch-22 in UARG by forcing withdrawal of the 
endangerment finding. In short, Alito and Thomas’ dissent does not say whether they would overrule 
Massachusetts or reverse it. See UARG, 573 U.S. 344 (Alito, J. dissenting). Justice Scalia’s dissent in 
Massachusetts, joined by both Alito and Thomas, relies heavily on Chevron deference, so it appears unlikely 
(though not certain) that a radical reversal was on the cards. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 558 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
221. See Darren Samuelsohn, Pronouncements of ‘Glorious Mess’ at EPA Spark Fight, E&E NEWS  
(Apr. 23, 2008), https://www.eenews.net/stories/63711/print (reporting statement by President Bush that 
Massachusetts “would make the federal government act like a local planning and zoning board, and have 
crippling effects on our entire economy,” by White House officials that a government loss in the case 
would lead to a “regulatory train wreck,” and another statement by Congressman John Dingell (D-MI) 
that EPA regulation of climate would be a “glorious mess”). 
222. The Chief Justice and Justice Scalia had signaled acceptance of Massachusetts as settled law by 
signing on to Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion in 2011’s American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, in 
which the Court found that suits under the federal common law of nuisance over climate harms were 
displaced by the Clean Air Act. See American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 423 (2011). 
Justices Alito and Thomas also joined that majority, but in a brief concurrence signaled their continuing 
rejection of Massachusetts. See id. at 430 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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Scalia’s majority opinion in UARG is fractured, in the sense that different 
parts were joined by different groups of Justices. Only Scalia himself, Roberts, and 
Kennedy signed on to the entire opinion.223 All nine Justices signed on to 
introductory and background material in Sections I and II of the opinion. All nine 
also rejected EPA’s Tailoring Rule as an improper rewriting of the statute, though 
the four liberal Justices only did so implicitly.224 This meant that, as a formal matter, 
the agency lost the case.  
But seven Justices agreed in Part II-B-2 of the opinion that the agency 
should get what it wanted all along: the ability to include greenhouse gas emissions 
from large sources in the PSD permitting process to which they were already subject, 
without including thousands of small sources.225 The “best available control 
technology” that such large “anyway sources” were required to install to pass PSD 
review could include greenhouse gas controls, the Court ruled.226 This was the 
pragmatic solution to the Catch-22 that a rejection of the Tailoring Rule would have 
otherwise subjected the agency to, and was likely necessary for Justice Kennedy to 
sign on to the opinion. Justices Alito and Thomas refused to accept inclusion of 
“anyway” sources because, as noted above, they rejected the entire premise of 
greenhouse gas regulation under the Clean Air Act.227 But the four liberal Justices 
were willing to sign on to this part of the opinion with Kennedy, Roberts, and Scalia.  
Up to this point, I’ve described an opinion quite similar to what Kennedy 
and the liberal Justices would likely have written had Roberts and Scalia simply 
joined Thomas and Alito in dissent. But the remainder of Scalia’s UARG opinion 
differs sharply from the reasoning the liberal Justices would have preferred (as their 
dissent indicates). Moreover, it does so in a way that undermines Massachusetts. 
Despite losing those four votes, Scalia’s statutory analysis in Section II-A of his 
opinion still commanded a majority of the Court because Alito and Thomas joined 
it.228 That they did so is perhaps all the evidence needed to show that this part of the 
opinion does violence to Massachusetts, but it is still useful to explain how. 
Scalia’s opinion ruled that EPA under both Bush and Obama had 
misinterpreted the Clean Air Act. Recall that the agency, in the Johnson Memo and 
again in the Tailoring Rule, had concluded that the statute’s requirement of PSD 
 
223. See UARG v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014). 
224. See id. at 325–26, 338-39 (Breyer, J., concurring) (providing alternative reading of the statute 
under which the Tailoring Rule’s rejection of the numerical thresholds in the statute is unnecessary; no 
such alternative reading would be necessary if the Tailoring Rule were acceptable). 
225. See id. at 331. 
226. Id. Because motor-vehicle carbon emissions were being regulated, greenhouse gases were a 
“‘pollutant subject to regulation under this chapter (i.e., the entire Act)” and thus included within the 
scope of BACT. 
227. Id. at 344 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
228. Id. at 304. This makes the two other opinions partial concurrences and partial dissents. 
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permitting for major emitters of “any air pollutant” included emitters of greenhouse 
gases; Massachusetts had resolved that question (it seemed), and the statute therefore 
“compelled” such a reading.229 Scalia rejected this reading of Massachusetts, ruling 
instead that greenhouse gases might be “air pollutants” in one part of the statute but 
not another.230 Context—specifically, the universally acknowledged “absurd results” 
of regulating small greenhouse gas emitters under PSD—was, in Scalia’s view, 
sufficient to overcome the standard assumption that “identical words used in 
different parts of the same act are intended [by Congress] to have the same 
meaning.”231 In defense of this interpretation, Scalia pointed to multiple instances of 
EPA adopting a narrower reading of “any air pollutant” language in the statute in 
other regulatory contexts.232 
Scalia’s opinion found that a varying scope of definition was not only a 
permissible reading but one compelled by the statute. Thus, the agency’s reading was 
entitled to no deference under Chevron.233 This likely came as some surprise to 
agency lawyers: they had argued their interpretation of the statute was the only 
reasonable one, only to have the Court rule that, in fact, only the opposite 
interpretation was correct.234 There is some irony here—Scalia indicated in his 
dissent in Massachusetts that he would have ruled in favor of the Bush EPA’s 
interpretation largely on grounds of deference under Chevron,235 the same deference 
he denied the Obama EPA in UARG regarding identical language elsewhere in the 
statute.236 
Interpreting “any air pollutant” to exclude greenhouse gases in the PSD 
context got the agency out of having to regulate small emitters and, combined with 
the opinion’s aforementioned blessing of greenhouse gas BACT for “anyway” 
sources, gave the agency what it ultimately wanted. But UARG was nevertheless a 
blow to Massachusetts specifically and to the agency’s ambitions for climate regulation 
 
229. Id. at 315. 
230. Id. at 319. 
231. Id. at 319–20. 
232. Id. at 316–18. 
233. Id. at 320–25. 
234. This state of disagreement prompts a meta-inquiry on Chevron. If the agency and the Court 
view opposite readings of statutory language as unambiguous, isn’t that compelling evidence that the 
statute is (in fact) ambiguous, and therefore that the agency interpretation is entitled to Chevron deference? 
No, as it turns out: if the Court rules that the statute is unambiguous (or that the agency’s interpretation 
is outside whatever zone of ambiguity exists), the agency’s reading is irrelevant. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. 
v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (“[i]f the intent of Congress is clear, that is 
the end of the matter”). However much interpretive authority Chevron allocates from courts to agencies, 
UARG illustrates that courts retain the final say on matters of statutory interpretation. 
235. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 551–53 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
236. UARG v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 319 (2014). 
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under the Clean Air Act generally. Justice Scalia was clear about this in the majority 
opinion: 
 
Massachusetts does not strip EPA of authority to exclude 
greenhouse gases from the class of regulable air pollutants under 
other parts of the Act where their inclusion would be inconsistent 
with the statutory scheme. The Act-wide definition to which the 
Court gave a “sweeping” and “capacious” interpretation [] is not a 
command to regulate, but a description of the universe of 
substances EPA may consider regulating under the Act’s operative 
provisions.237 
 
After UARG, Massachusetts, in short, was far less definitive than it claimed to be. 
The four liberal Justices recognized the attack on Massachusetts and refused 
to join the statutory interpretation portion of Scalia’s UARG opinion. Instead, they 
offered an alternative interpretive approach in their dissent that would have left 
Massachusetts intact. They argued that the scope of PSD regulation in the statute 
could be flexibly read with respect to the sources included, rather than the pollutants. 
“Given the purposes of the PSD program and the Act as a whole,” Justice Breyer 
wrote, “finding flexibility in ‘any source’ is far more sensible than the Court’s route 
of finding it in ‘any air pollutant.’”238 In short, the problem with PSD regulation of 
greenhouse gas emitters wasn’t that the pollutants were somehow incompatible with 
the permitting program, but that most of the sources were too small for Congress to 
have intended them to be included—as evidenced by the majority of Justices’ 
willingness to allow PSD regulation of “anyway” sources.239 Scalia’s insistence on 
finding interpretive flexibility in “any air pollutant,” Breyer noted, “drains the Act 
of its flexibility and chips away at our decision in Massachusetts.”240  
The cuts to Massachusetts were deep, deep enough to convince that 
decision’s longstanding critics (Alito and Thomas) to join. The Massachusetts Court 
had at least seemed to rule that “any air pollutant” included greenhouse gases, 
anywhere in the statute and that alternative interpretations were foreclosed, beyond 
agency deference.241 After UARG, this single interpretation was discarded and 
replaced with three potential interpretations. “Any air pollutant,” in different 
 
237. Id. 
238. Id. at 337–39. 
239. Id. at 336 (“[t]o apply the programs at issue here to [small] sources would be extremely 
expensive and burdensome, counterproductive, and perhaps impossible; it would also contravene 
Congress’s intent that the programs’ coverage be limited to those large sources whose emissions are 
substantial enough to justify the regulatory burdens.”). 
240. Id. at 341–43. 
241. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528–30 (2007). 
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statutory contexts, might (1) unambiguously include greenhouse gases, might (2) 
unambiguously exclude them, or might (3) be legally ambiguous regarding inclusion 
and therefore be committed to agency discretion (which, of course, might change 
with administrations). UARG put the scope of pollutants in the PSD program in the 
second category (unambiguously excluded). Because Massachusetts was not overruled, 
the scope of the Section 202 motor vehicle provisions of the statute remained in the 
first category (unambiguously included). But the scope of every other provision of 
the statue was left indeterminate—it might be in any of the three categories. And 
because the availability of different interpretations of “any air pollutant” was crucial 
to the outcome in UARG, it could not be dismissed as mere dicta. In this sense, 
UARG did more than “chip away” at Massachusetts; it limited the case to its facts: the 
single provision of the Clean Air Act at issue. If that was Chief Justice Roberts’ 
intention, his maneuvering was a masterful exercise of his position’s powers. 
In so eroding Massachusetts, UARG threatened the viability and stability of 
Clean Air Act climate policy in two distinct ways. First, it opened all subsequent 
climate regulatory programs under any CAA provision other than Section 202 or the 
PSD program to the legal uncertainty that Massachusetts previously appeared to 
resolve.242 Second, it opened Clean Air Act climate policy to easier rollback or 
reversal by a subsequent, less-ambitious administration. Where the inclusion of 
greenhouse gases within the scope of any Clean Air Act provision is ambiguous 
(either because a court has not ruled or because a court has ruled it ambiguous), 
UARG granted the agency discretion to make that determination, including the 
inherent discretion to reverse an earlier determination.243 Should future EPA 
leadership want to avoid climate regulation in any part of the statute other than 
Section 202, only litigation can force the agency’s hand. After UARG, Massachusetts 
now must be relitigated for each provision of the Clean Air Act before a Court that 
seems substantially more skeptical of climate regulation. 
This erosion of regulatory certainty was not limited to relatively minor 
programs like greenhouse-gas PSD (so low-priority that EPA was actively avoiding 
regulation).244 The new-vehicle emissions rules put in place by EPA up to this point 
only covered a small portion of U.S. emissions.245 For Clean Air Act regulation to 
draw down U.S. emissions required substantial additional rules, in particular those 
for new and existing power plants that the agency had promised in the 2010 
settlement agreement. UARG created substantial new legal uncertainty for the 
agency’s entire climate regulatory agenda. Each regulatory program was now a 
separate battleground, and Massachusetts ceased to be the comprehensive victory it 
had appeared to be.  
 
242. See Jody Freeman, Why I Worry About UARG, 39 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 9, 10 (2015). 
243. See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009). 
244. See generally Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,535. 
245. See discussion supra Section II.B. 
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For the most part, contemporaneous public reaction to UARG was muted, 
treating it as a modest victory for the agency but likely not one with major long-term 
implications.246 But some analyses recognized the implicit attack on Massachusetts.247 
In an essay written after the decision, Jody Freeman noted that “[w]hile the short-
term outcome was favorable to EPA, UARG struck me as a decision laced with the 
legal equivalent of improvised explosive devices.”248 It also, she continued, “invites 
more legal challenges should EPA choose to take further action on GHGs under 
other Clean Air Act programs.”249  
Nor did UARG’s chilling effect on Clean Air Act climate regulation end 
with undercutting Massachusetts, Freeman observed. It evidenced a deep skepticism 
by much of the Court toward such regulation, including warnings to the agency 
against (in Scalia’s view) overstepping its regulatory authority.250 Justice Scalia’s 
opinion fired a shot across the bow of EPA’s regulatory ambition and imposed what 
amounts to a “clear statement” rule on further inclusion of greenhouse gases within 
the scope of Clean Air Act programs: 
 
EPA’s interpretation is also unreasonable because it would bring 
about an enormous and transformative expansion in EPA’s 
regulatory authority without clear congressional authorization. 
When an agency claims to discover in a long-extant statute an 
unheralded power to regulate ‘‘a significant portion of the 
American economy,’’ Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S., at 159, 120 
S.Ct. 1291, we typically greet its announcement with a measure of 
skepticism. We expect Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to 
assign to an agency decisions of vast ‘‘economic and political 
significance.’’251 
 
To the extent this position is followed in future cases, it is both a direct and indirect 
threat to climate regulation. Indirectly, it shows that the conservative Justices are 
skeptical of the agency’s climate regulatory agenda, viewing any extension beyond 
 
246. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Supreme Court: EPA Can Regulate Greenhouse Gas Emissions, with Some 
Limits, WASHINGTON POST (June 23, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme-court-
limits-epas-ability-to-regulate-greenhouse-gas-emissions/2014/06/23/c56fc194-f1b1-11e3-914c-
1fbd0614e2d4_story.html. 
247. See, e.g., Paul Beard and Daniel Cheung, Federalist Society, Utility Air Regulatory Group v. 
EPA: A Foreshadowing of Things to Come? 13 ENGAGE 31 (Oct. 13, 2015), https://fedsoc.org/commentary/
publications/utility-air-regulatory-group-v-epa-a-foreshadowing-of-things-to-come. 
248. See Freeman, supra note 242, at 9-10. 
249. Id. at 10. 
250. Id. 
251. UARG v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014). 
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motor vehicle rules as suspect. More broadly, it connects the legal battles over 
whether particular provisions in the Clean Air Act can be interpreted to apply to 
greenhouse gases to wider battles over deference to agency interpretations of law and 
the size and power of the administrative state.252 UARG, like Massachusetts before it, 
is not just a climate case (or even just an environmental case), but an administrative 
law case too.  
Directly, it raises the bar for showing that a provision of the Clean Air Act 
includes greenhouse gases within its scope—i.e., that it is within the first 
(unambiguously included) or even third (ambiguous) category described above. 
UARG suggests that implementation challenges with Clean Air Act climate programs 
can be resolved in favor of simply excluding greenhouse gases from the scope of the 
program, regardless of the agency’s reading of the statute. Because the statute never 
mentions greenhouse gases explicitly, the “clear statement” rule will always be 
difficult or impossible to satisfy. After reading this part of Scalia’s opinion, one 
wonders how Massachusetts survives. The Bush EPA had cited the same language 
from FDA v. Brown & Williamson that Scalia cites in UARG for his clear statement 
rule, only to have the Court reject that reading in Massachusetts.253 Resurrected, it 
threatens to become an insurmountable barrier to expansion of greenhouse gas 
regulation beyond Section 202 of the statute. 
Despite UARG’s warning, the Obama EPA moved ahead with broader 
climate regulation under the Clean Air Act, fulfilling its promise in the 2010 
settlement agreement to regulate emissions from fossil fuel electric power plants.254 
The ultimate failure of that effort is a direct result of the constraints on climate policy 
first articulated in UARG. UARG does not get the attention it deserves because it is 
in many ways such a strange case, with a fractured opinion and a defendant that 
seemed to want to lose. But however narrow it appears to be, it hung a sword of 
Damocles over every subsequent Clean Air Act climate rulemaking. 
E. The Clean Power Plan (2014-2016) 
The Obama EPA’s climate ambitions were never limited to road vehicles—
recall the President’s “another way to skin the cat” response to the failure of 
economy-wide cap-and-trade legislation. Indeed the agency had committed in the 
2010 settlement agreements to pursue carbon emissions limits for refineries and for 
fossil-fuel fired power plants.255 Power plants were at the time the largest source of 
 
252. See Freeman, supra note 242, at 10-13. The reference to Brown & Williamson in the majority 
opinion is similarly telling. 
253. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 530-31 (2007). 
254. See discussion infra Section II.E. 
255. See citations supra note 185. 
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greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S. economy,256 and regulation of their emissions 
would, combined with the vehicle standards, make the majority of U.S. emissions at 
least potentially subject to regulation. By regulating power plant emissions, the Clean 
Air Act could credibly be seen as a vehicle for general, if not comprehensive, climate 
policy. Without regulating the power sector, it would be at best a partial solution. In 
the ANPRM and in the early years of the Obama administration, there was 
significant debate inside and outside EPA over which of the many Clean Air Act 
regulatory programs applicable to stationary sources under Title I of the statute 
should be used to regulate greenhouse gas emissions.257 By around 2011, expert and 
agency opinion coalesced around using performance standards authority under 
Section 111 of the statute.258  
Though EPA was undoubtedly working on power plant performance 
standards as early as the late-2010 settlement agreement, if not earlier, and the 
agreement promised standards would be proposed in 2011 and finalized by 2012,259 
those deadlines were missed. Designing regulations takes time, but there is good 
evidence that the Obama administration was wary of proposing sweeping new 
climate rules in the run-up to the 2012 election.260 In any case, EPA did not propose 
any standards until 2012,261 though this proposal was later withdrawn.262 EPA only 
 
256. See Greenhouse Gas Inventory Data Explorer, EPA, https://cfpub.epa.gov/ghgdata/inventoryexp 
lorer/allsectors/allgas/econsect/all (“U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Economic Sector, 1990-2017”) 
(last visited Mar. 3, 2020). 
257. See, e.g., ANPRM, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354, 44,476–44,516 (July 30, 2008) (discussing options for 
stationary source GHG regulation); see also Nathan Richardson et al., Greenhouse Gas Regulation Under the 
Clean Air Act: Structure, Effects, & Implications of a Knowable Pathway, 41 ENV’T L. REP. 10098 (2011) 
(discussing similar policy options and circa-2011 views on their viability). 
258. See, e.g., Gregory E. Wannier et al., Prevailing Academic View On Compliance Flexibility Under 
§ 111 of the Clean Air Act, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE (July 13, 2011), https://www.rff.org/publications
/working-papers/prevailing-academic-view-on-compliance-flexibility-under-111-of-the-caa/.  
259. See EPA SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS FACT SHEET, supra note 185. 
260. See, e.g., David Bookbinder, Obama Had a Chance to Really Fight Climate Change. He Blew It, 
VOX (Apr. 29, 2017), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/4/28/15472508/obama-climate-change-
legacy-overrated-clean-power (claiming that “the Obama EPA fought against imposing CO2 standards 
for [power] plants. They were fearful of the political consequences.”); see also Juliet Eilperin, Obama 
Administration Slows Environmental Rules as It Weighs Political Cost, WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2012), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/obama-administration-weighs-political-cost-
of-environmental-rules/2012/02/07/gIQAvJzx8Q_story.html (detailing administration delays of 
environmental rules). 
261. EPA, Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions for New Stationary Sources: 
Electric Utility Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 22,392 (proposed Apr. 13, 2012). 
262. EPA, Withdrawal of Proposed Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
From New Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 1352 (Jan. 8, 2014). 
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issued a replacement proposal in early 2014.263 The initial standards, moreover, only 
covered new power plants.264 Not until June of 2014 did EPA propose standards for 
existing power plants in what would come to be known as the Clean Power Plan.265 
This delay—nineteen months after the 2012 election, two and a half years after the 
2010 settlement agreement committed EPA to regulating existing sources, and six 
years after the 2008 ANPRM first explored regulation of greenhouse gases under 
Section 111 performance standards—has never been fully explained.266 The delay 
arguably did not affect emissions reductions under the performance standards once 
they were finalized because compliance was not required until the 2020s,267 but it did 
leave EPA with little ability to react to legal challenges to the regulations before the 
end of President Obama’s second term. This, combined with the preliminary success 
of those challenges, was fatal to the regulatory program. 
Performance standards for new power plants were finalized in August of 
2015,268 with standards for existing sources in the Clean Power Plan following in 
October.269 In a speech announcing the regulations, President Obama called them 
the “single most important step America has ever taken in the fight against global 
climate change.”270 
Their requirements for the electric power sector were superficially 
sweeping, though in practice modest at best. The new source standards effectively 
banned construction of new coal power plants by setting the minimum performance 
standard based on an assumption that carbon capture and storage (“CCS”) would be 
 
263. EPA, Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New Stationary Sources: 
Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 1430 (proposed Jan. 8, 2014) (while not published in the 
Federal Register until early 2014, these standards were initially proposed by EPA in September of 2013). 
264. Id. 
265. EPA, Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830 (proposed June 18, 2014). 
266. See, e.g., Bookbinder, supra note 260 (blaming fear of political consequences for delay of the 
Clean Power Plan until after the 2012 election but offering no explanation for additional delays until 
2014/2015). 
267. 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830, 34,837 (“[t]he proposed interim goals would apply over a 2020–2029 
phase-in period”); Nevertheless, because the Clean Power Plan first required states to submit plans for 
EPA approval, an earlier start to the program might have made emissions reductions before 2020 plausible. 
268. Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New, Modified, and 
Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,510 (Oct. 23, 2015) 
[hereinafter Power Plant NSPS]. 
269. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) [hereinafter Clean Power Plan]. 
270. Press Release, White House, Obama Admin., Remarks by the President in Announcing the 
Clean Power Plan (Aug. 3, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/08/03/re
marks-president-announcing-clean-power-plan.  
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deployed271 (despite claims from industry and some states that such technology was 
not yet available).272 However, few, if any, coal plants were likely to be built even 
without the standards.273 
For existing plants, the Clean Power Plan implemented a complex system 
of state-level target emissions rates, calculated based on estimated efficiency 
improvements at coal plants, shifting of generation from coal to gas, and construction 
of new wind and solar generation.274 States were then given broad flexibility to meet 
these targets, with plans for doing so to be submitted to EPA for approval by 2016, 
although the deadline was extendable to 2018.275 Emissions reductions would not be 
required under the Plan until 2022, with stringency increasing up to 2030.276 EPA 
estimated that the Clean Power Plan would reduce greenhouse gas emissions from 
the power sector by around 375 million metric tons annually once fully implemented 
in 2030—a 32 percent cut relative to 2005 levels.277 Net benefits, the agency 
estimated, would range from twenty-six to forty-five billion dollars annually in 2030, 
depending on discount rates and compliance options chosen by states, with roughly 
half of those benefits coming from greenhouse gas reductions and the remainder from 
reductions in conventional co-pollutants.278 The agency estimated no emissions 
reductions, and little to no net benefits would come from the performance standards 
for new sources, as it projected no new coal plants without CCS would be built even 
without the Plan.279 New-source standards, however, were legally required for the 
agency to implement the existing-source standards in the Clean Power Plan,280 and 
provided a backstop measure in case changing market conditions made new coal more 
attractive than the agency predicted.281 
 
271. See Power Plant NSPS, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,510, 64,545 (Oct. 23, 2015). 
272. See, e.g., Abby Harvey, Partial CCS in NSPS is Note Adequately Demonstrated, Achievable, Court 
Briefs Say, EXCHANGE MONITOR (Oct. 14, 2016), https://www.exchangemonitor.com/partial-ccs-nsps-
not-adequately-demonstrated-achievable-court-briefs-say/?printmode=1.  
273. See Benjamin Storrow, Will the U.S. Ever Build Another Big Coal Plant?, CLIMATEWIRE (Aug. 
21, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060058864. 
274. Clean Power Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,667 (Oct. 23, 2015). 
275. Id. at 64,667–69. 
276. Id. at 64,669. 
277. Id. at 64,924 (converting short tons to metric tons). 
278. Id. at 64,679–80. 
279. Power Plant NSPS, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,510, 64,640 (Oct. 23, 2015). 
280. Clean Power Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,702 (Oct. 23, 2015). 
281. See EPA, EPA-452/R-15-005, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE FINAL STANDARDS 
OF PERFORMANCE FOR GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM NEW, MODIFIED, AND 
RECONSTRUCTED STATIONARY SOURCES: ELECTRIC UTILITY GENERATING UNITS 5-11–5-16 (Aug. 
Fall 2020 The Rise and Fall of Clean Air Act Climate Policy  
 
113
The Clean Power Plan’s estimated impact was smaller than but comparable 
to that of the already-issued motor vehicle standards. The Phase I and II vehicle 
standards, taken together, were estimated to achieve 513 million metric tons in annual 
emissions reductions by 2030, 138 million tons more than the Clean Power Plan.282 
Comparing estimated benefits of the programs is more difficult.283 Beyond the 
headline estimates, however, there were more significant differences in the programs. 
The Clean Power Plan’s reductions would not come until the 2020s, with much of 
them delayed until the last years of that decade.284 The vehicle standards, in contrast, 
began reducing emissions as soon as affected vehicles were sold and driven, though 
those reductions were spread over the life of the regulated vehicles extending into 
the 2030s and beyond. Because greenhouse gases are stock pollutants, emissions 
reductions are more valuable the sooner they occur.285 Moreover, as subsequent 
events would illustrate, the ability of the vehicle standards to lock-in emissions 
reductions with more efficient vehicles on the road and structural shifts in the auto 
industry made them more resilient to legal challenge and changing political priorities 
than the Clean Power Plan would prove to be. 
In fact, the Clean Power Plan would never, in practice, require a single ton 
of emissions reductions. It would first be suspended by the courts and then 
withdrawn by the Trump EPA before the agency even approved a single state plan.286 
Like all major EPA rules, the Clean Power Plan attracted legal challenge from states 
and industry groups. Among a variety of arguments, opponents alleged the agency 
had exceeded its authority by basing emissions reductions targets for regulated 
facilities (coal plants) based not only on estimated efficiency improvements but on 
“outside-the-fence” changes in the energy mix—shifts to gas generation and new 
renewables.287 EPA countered that the statute’s requirement that it set standards 
based on the “best system of emission reduction” required or at least permitted an 
 
2015), https://www3.epa.gov/ttnecas1/docs/ria/utilities_ria_final-nsps-egus_2015-08.pdf (showing that 
NSPS is binding under assumptions of high natural gas prices). 
282. See Phase I Light Duty Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25324, 25637 (May 7, 2010); Phase II Light 
Duty Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,624, 62,892 (Oct. 15, 2012). 
283. Phase I and Phase II standards estimate benefits over lifetime of vehicles, while CPP does so 
on annual basis. Compare Phase I Light Duty Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324, 25,637, with Clean Power 
Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,679–80. 
284. Clean Power Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,669. 
285. See Grantham Research Institute and Duncan Clark, Why Does Climate Change Get Described as 
a 'Stock-’Low' Problem?, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 20, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/
2012/feb/20/climate-change-stock-flow.  
286. See discussion and citations infra Section III.B. 
287. See Opening Brief of Petitioners on Core Legal Issues at 41, West Virginia v. EPA (D.C. Cir. 
2016) (No. 15-1363), https://ago.wv.gov/publicresources/epa/Documents/Opening%20Core%20Brief%20
-%20file-stamped%20(M0119247xCECC6).pdf.  
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expansive view of opportunities for emissions cuts.288 Challengers requested that the 
reviewing court stay the Clean Power Plan until these issues could be resolved, but 
the D.C. Circuit refused in early 2016.289 
The challengers sought interlocutory appeal of the D.C. Circuit’s refusal to 
stay the regulation from the Supreme Court.290 In February of 2016, the Court 
granted the stay by 5-4 vote, one of Justice Scalia’s last acts on the Court.291 The 
decision halted implementation of the Clean Power Plan until a final disposition by 
the Supreme Court.292 No rationale was given. The Court had never before granted 
an interlocutory stay of a regulation,293 (though the Court’s receptiveness to 
interlocutory relief appears to have increased in the years since).294 
Without an opinion from the Court, it is only possible to speculate about 
the Court’s rationale for granting the stay. Well-settled doctrine on stays requires a 
showing by the challenging party of irreparable harm and a likelihood of success on 
the merits, plus a harms-balancing test and public interest factor.295 On the 
irreparable harm prong of the test, some on the Court may have been influenced by 
EPA leadership’s reaction to the Court’s 2015 Michigan v. EPA decision296 in which 
the Court rejected an  rule imposing mercury emissions limits on coal power 
 
288. See Respondent EPA’s Initial Brief at 27, West Virginia v. EPA (D.C. Cir. 2016) (No. 15-
1363), https://ago.wv.gov/publicresources/epa/Documents/EPA%20Response%20Brief%20(consolidated
)%20(M0122282xCECC6).pdf.  
289. See Order Granting Expedition and Denying Stay, West Virginia v. EPA (D.C. Circ. 2016) 
(No. 15-1363), https://ago.wv.gov/publicresources/epa/Documents/Order%20granting%20expedition%20
and%20declining%20stay%20(M0116449xCECC6).pdf.  
290. See Order Granting Stay, West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016). 
291. Id. 
292. Id. (or, less likely, a decision by the losing party at the D.C. Circuit not to seek cert). 
293. See, e.g., Keith Goldberg, High Court Stay Could Spell Doom for EPA’s Clean Power Plan, LAW360 
(Feb. 10, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/757509/high-court-stay-could-spell-doom-for-epa-s-
clean-power-plan (noting that the Clean Power Plan stay was “the first time the Supreme Court has ever 
blocked federal regulations before the D.C. Circuit has completed a merits review”). 
294. See Stephen J. Vladeck, The Solicitor General and the Shadow Docket, 133 HARV. L. REV. 123 
(2019). 
295. See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 19–20 (2008) (summarizing the requirements 
for a preliminary injunction of regulatory action: “[a] plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must 
establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence 
of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public 
interest.”). 
296. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015). 
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plants.297 Then-EPA Secretary Gina McCarthy had suggested the decision would 
have little or no impact because industry had already made investments to comply 
with the challenged rule in the three years since it had been issued.298 The Justices 
voting for the stay may have wanted to avoid a repeat of that experience.  
It is even more difficult to know what led the court to conclude that the 
challengers were likely to succeed on the merits. The most likely candidate for such 
success is probably the claim, mentioned above, that the agency had exceeded its 
authority by basing standards on “outside the fence” emissions reductions. A deeper 
UARG-style challenge that Section 111 of the statute (on which the Clean Power Plan 
is based) is not applicable to climate is also plausible. The Clean Power Plan 
challengers made this argument, citing UARG in their initial petition for a stay, 
specifically in its broader administrative law context, as a “clear-statement rule” for 
broad claims of agency authority.299  
However, the Court appeared to foreclose a UARG-style argument in its 
2011 American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut (“AEP”) decision.300 In that case, states 
and environmental groups had sought injunctions against coal power plant 
greenhouse gas emissions based on the federal common law of nuisance.301 The Court 
ruled, 8-0 with Justice Sotomayor recused, that such actions were displaced by the 
federal common law arising from the Clean Air Act, specifically Section 111 which, 
the Court ruled, “speaks directly” to coal plant carbon emissions.302 Justice 
Ginsburg’s opinion was joined by five other Justices (Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, 
Breyer, and Kagan), putting them on record agreeing with the view that Section 111 
encompassed greenhouse gases.303 (Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, wrote in 
 
297. See Michael S. Greve, Clean Power, Dirty Hands, LAW & LIBERTY (Feb. 1, 2016), 
https://www.lawliberty.org/2016/02/01/clean-power-dirty-hands/ (noting that the rule challenger’s 
discussed Michigan in their motion for stay). 
298. See Timothy Cama & Lydia Wheeler, Supreme Court Overturns Landmark EPA Air Pollution 
Rule, THE HILL (June 29, 2015), https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/246423-supreme-court-
overturns-epa-air-pollution-rule (quoting EPA Administrator McCarthy saying that “even if we don’t 
[win the case], it was three years ago. Most of them are already in compliance, investments have been 
made, and we’ll catch up. And we’re still going to get at the toxic pollution from these facilities”). 
299. See State Petitioner’s Motion for Stay and for Expedited Consideration of Petition for Review 
at 6-7, West Virginia v. EPA (D.C. Cir. filed Oct. 23, 2015) (No. 15-1363), https://ago.wv.gov/publicreso
urces/epa/Documents/StatePetrsMotionForStay.pdf (describing UARG as a “clear-statement rule” that 
§ 111 fails to meet insofar as EPA relied on it to build broad climate regulation in the Clean Power Plan); 
EPA Rules for New and Existing Coal-Fired Power Plants: Litigation and Rulemaking Documents, OFFICE OF 
THE WEST VIRGINIA ATTORNEY GENERAL (Oct. 19, 2016), https://ago.wv.gov/publicresources/epa/. 
300. See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011). 
301. Id. at 418-420. 
302. Id. at 424. 
303. Id. at 410.  
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concurrence solely to note their continuing objection to Massachusetts).304 Of course, 
AEP was decided before UARG cast doubt on the extent of Massachusetts’ holding, 
but the conclusion that Section 111 encompasses greenhouse gases is no mere dicta; 
it is necessary for the displacement holding in the case.305 After UARG, therefore, 
Section 111 became the only section of the Clean Air Act formally recognized by the 
Court to extend to greenhouse gases other than Section 202 in Massachusetts itself.  
AEP’s discussion of Section 111 was not entirely favorable, however. In a 
bit of black comedy, inconsistencies between the House and Senate versions of the 
1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act never resolved in conference led to 
alternative restrictions on the agency’s Section 111 powers.306 Both versions link 
Section 111(d) standards for existing sources (like the Clean Power Plan) with 
separate, strict regulations under Section 112 of emissions of any of a large class of 
“hazardous” pollutants (i.e., those that cause cancer or other serious effects at low 
concentrations). The Senate version of the text would apparently prevent the agency 
from setting Section 111(d) standards only for any pollutant regulated under 
Section 112.307 The House version (adopted by the U.S. Code), read literally, would 
prevent the agency from setting standards for any source regulated under 
Section 112.308 As large, complex industrial facilities, coal plants are universally 
subject to Section 112 regulation and would under this more restrictive interpretation 
be excluded from existing-source Section 111(d) standards, including the Clean 
Power Plan. The AEP Court noted the Sections 111–112 connection in a footnote, 
stating that “EPA may not employ [Section 111] if existing stationary sources of the 
pollutant in question are regulated under . . . the ‘hazardous air pollutants’ 
program.”309 
This appears to adopt the more restrictive House version. But if so, it 
remains unclear why it does not eviscerate AEP’s displacement holding. In any case, 
the Clean Power Plan challengers later claimed the Plan was illegal because of this 
“Section 112 exclusion,” citing the AEP footnote.310 EPA, for its part, claimed that 
the presence of two alternate versions of the text constituted a statutory ambiguity it 
 
304. Id. at 429–430 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
305. Id. at 418–24. 
306. See Lesley S. Cruickshank, Note, The “Drafting Error” That Could Derail the Clean Power Plan, 
67 ALA. L. REV. 887, 897 (2016) (“By what is undoubtedly a clerical oversight, the version of the bill that 
emerged from the conference committee and was eventually signed into law included both provisions.”). 
307. Id. at 897–901. 
308. Id. 
309. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 425 (2011). 
310. See Opening Brief of Petitioners on Core Legal Issues at 62, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-
1363, (D.C. Cir. Filed Feb. 19, 2016), https://ago.wv.gov/publicresources/epa/Documents/Opening%20
Core%20Brief%20-%20file-stamped%20(M0119247xCECC6).pdf.  
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was forced to resolve, and which therefore entitled the agency to Chevron 
deference.311 In short, AEP may have shielded the Clean Power Plan from a UARG-
style facial attack, chipping away at its Massachusetts foundation, but it simultaneously 
legitimized another avenue of legal challenge. 
Alternatively, a majority of Justices may have simply concluded that the 
Clean Power Plan’s challengers were likely to succeed on the merits because EPA’s 
regulatory reach had exceeded its statutory grasp. As Jonathan Adler put it:  
 
[i]n promoting the plan, the EPA repeatedly emphasized that 
the CPP represented the most ambitious climate-related 
undertaking in the agency’s history and crowed that the plan 
would lead to the complete restructuring of the energy sector. 
Making these claims may have undermined the EPA’s position, 
because it made it easier for the stay applicants to argue that a stay 
was justified. Put another way, an unprecedented assertion of 
regulatory authority may itself have justified an unprecedented 
exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction to stay the agency’s action.312 
 
This suggests that the stay, like UARG and Massachusetts before it, is as 
much an administrative law decision as a narrow Clean Air Act one. It is possible 
that Clean Air Act climate policy was drawn into wider disputes on the Court over 
administrative law questions: the scope of agency authority and judicial deference.  
Even if UARG did not provide a doctrinal roadmap for the legal challenge 
to the Clean Power Plan, both UARG and the stay were indicative of a Court 
increasingly skeptical of Clean Air Act climate policy, particularly to the extent it 
could be described as a broad expansion of agency authority.313 From its short 
statement, it remains unclear which of the arguments the Court concluded gave the 
challengers a likelihood of success on the merits, and different arguments may have 
swayed different Justices. Recall that Justices Alito and Thomas were on record 
supporting overturning Massachusetts—for which Clean Power Plan litigation would 
 
311. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,711 (Oct. 23, 2015). This argument is somewhat persuasive, 
but suffers from at least two flaws. First, to the extent Chevron deference is premised on an implied 
delegation of interpretive authority from Congress to the agency, it seems unlikely that Congress meant 
to create a gap ripe for agency interpretation by passing two inconsistent versions of the same provision. 
Second, the AEP footnote suggests the Court views the § 111/§ 112 conflict as one resolvable without resort 
to agency deference (i.e., a Chevron step one matter), in that it appears to adopt one interpretation of the 
statutory text without reference to the agency’s view, See AEP, 564 U.S. at 425. 
312. Jonathan H. Adler, Supreme Court Puts the Brakes on the EPA’s Clean Power Plan, WASH. POST 
(Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/02/09/supremecourt-
puts-the-brakes-on-the-epas-clean-power-plan/.  
313. See UARG v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 323-25 (2014) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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have provided another opportunity314—so it was only necessary to convince three 
other Justices that one or more of the arguments were persuasive.  
The stay left the Clean Power Plan in tatters. States that would have soon 
been required to submit plans to the agency or seek extensions to 2018 were now 
relieved of that obligation.315 Meetings between state regulators, industry groups, 
environmental groups, and other stakeholders aimed at laying the groundwork for 
such plans were cancelled.316 Litigation proceeded at the D.C. Circuit level, but no 
decision was reached (nor did EPA revise the regulation) before the 2016 election.317 
One might suspect, therefore, that pressure on the electric power industry 
to close or reduce the use of coal plants in anticipation of the plan would have been 
relieved. Perhaps it was in some cases, but a national trend of coal plant closures 
continued unabated, driven by market forces and other, non-climate regulations.318 
Low prices of renewables and natural gas made operating and building coal plants 
increasingly unattractive.319 This illustrates a further indictment of the Clean Power 
Plan—in addition to its legal vulnerability and modest ambition compared to the 
vehicle standards, it appears that some or all of the emissions reductions it promised 
would have been achieved anyway due to “secular” electric power industry changes 
the agency did not fully account for in its impact estimates.320 Heralded as the most 
significant federal climate regulation ever, the Clean Power Plan was moribund 
within six months, dead in three years, and might never have reduced emissions very 
much anyway. 
 
314. Id. at 343-345. 
315. See Adler, supra note 312 (“this stay means that the EPA may not continue to take any actions 
to implement or enforce the CPP pending the resolution of the state and industry challenge to the rule.”). 
316. For example, meetings between the South Carolina state regulatory agency and stakeholders, 
in which I played a very minor role, stopped shortly after the stay. South Carolina Energy Coalition, 
SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL, (2019), 
https://scdhec.gov/environment/your-air/south-carolinas-energy-future/south-carolina-energy-coalition.  
317. See Petition for Review, West Virginia et al v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. filed Oct. 23 
2015), http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/case-
documents/2015/20151023_docket-15-1363_petition-for-review.pdf. No final disposition in the case was 
reached until September of 2019 when, after repeated delays, the D.C. Circuit dismissed the challenge to 
the Clean Power Plan as moot, given the Trump administration’s later withdrawal of the rule. See Order 
Granting Motion to Dismiss, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. filed Sept. 17, 2019), 
http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/case-documents/
2019/20190917_docket-15-1363_order.pdf.  
318. See, e.g., More U.S. Coal-Fired Power Plants Are Decommissioning as Retirements Continue, U.S. 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (July 26, 2019), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=40212 (citing 
flat demand growth and competition from natural gas and renewables as causes of sharp increase in coal 
plant retirements). 
319. Id. 
320. See infra Section II.G, for discussion of the impact of the Obama EPA’s climate regulations. 
Fall 2020 The Rise and Fall of Clean Air Act Climate Policy  
 
119
F. The Final Burst: HFCs, Methane, and Trucks (2016) 
The Supreme Court’s stay froze and ultimately doomed the Obama EPA’s 
signature climate policy. Nevertheless, the agency continued moving through its 
climate regulatory agenda in 2016. Much of this action was focused on further 
regulation of vehicle emissions under Section 202. 
In 2015, shortly before the Clean Power Plan was finalized, EPA issued its 
first Clean Air Act climate rules aimed at emissions outside the electric power and 
vehicle sectors. Based on its authority over ozone-depleting substances under 
Section 605(a) of the statute, the agency effectively banned or restricted use of some 
hydrofluorocarbon (“HFC”) refrigerants that are extremely potent greenhouse gases 
(thousands of times moreso than carbon dioxide).321 
In August of 2016, EPA issued a “cause or contribute” finding applicable to 
greenhouse gas emissions from aircraft.322 As with the 2009 finding for road vehicles, 
this both permitted and required the agency to regulate emissions from new vehicles 
(in this case, new aircraft and new air engines for use in existing airframes). To date, 
however, no actual greenhouse gas emissions regulations on aircraft have been issued, 
leading environmental groups to threaten suit against the agency.323 
Paramount among its 2016 rulemakings, the agency issued a second round 
of emissions standards for heavy-duty vehicles in October, applying to model years 
2019-2027.324 These Phase II heavy-duty vehicle standards were projected to 
generate an additional billion tons of greenhouse gas emissions reductions over the 
lifetime of affected vehicles and $117-229 billion of net benefits.325 These standards 
required for the first time that engines installed in new “glider” vehicles meet the 
new fuel economy requirements.326 The agency issued one other notable climate 
rulemaking in 2016: performance standards for new oil and gas wells under 
 
321. EPA, Protection of Stratospheric Ozone: Change of Listing Status for Certain Substitutes 
Under the Significant New Alternatives Policy Program, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,870 (July 20, 2015) (to be 
codified in 40 C.F.R. pt. 82). 
322. EPA, Finding That Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Aircraft Cause or Contribute to Air 
Pollution That May Reasonably Be Anticipated to Endanger Public Health and Welfare, 81 Fed. Reg. 
54,422 (Aug. 15, 2016) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. pts. 87, 1068). 
323. See Rachel Frazin, Green Groups Threaten to Sue EPA Over Airplane Pollution, THE HILL (Jan. 
30, 2020), https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/480764-green-groups-threaten-to-sue-epa-
over-airplane-pollution.  
324. EPA, Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy-
Duty Engines and Vehicles—Phase 2, 81 Fed. Reg. 73,478, 73,481 (Oct. 25, 2016). 
325. Id. at 73,482. 
326. Id. at 73,478. Gliders are newly-manufactured truck bodies that require installation of an 
existing engine likely manufactured under old, less-stringent emissions standards. 
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Section 111 of the statute.327 The 2010 settlement agreement had committed the 
agency to issue greenhouse gas emissions standards for oil refineries by 2012,328 but 
the agency shifted focus to oil and gas extraction, largely driven by concerns over 
emissions of methane, a potent short-term greenhouse gas.329 Oil and gas wells had 
long been subject to emissions standards, last updated in 2012, but the 2016 standards 
restricted methane emissions for the first time.330 The agency estimated methane 
emissions reductions of forty to forty-five percent by 2025—relative to 2012 levels—
from the new standards, in addition to reductions in volatile organic compounds 
(“VOCs”), benzene, and other toxic air pollutants.331 Just as for power plants, new 
source standards were a necessary prerequisite for any regulation of existing oil and 
gas extraction under Section 111(d) of the statute.332 
In late 2016, the agency also issued a binding Information Collection 
Request requiring oil and gas extraction companies to “provide extensive information 
instrumental for developing comprehensive regulations to reduce methane emissions 
from existing oil and gas sources.”333 This strongly suggested that existing-source 
standards would be forthcoming. Section 111 standards restricting methane from new 
landfills followed in August of 2016.334 
The methane standards and the 2015 HFC bans signaled an intent to 
gradually bring more of the U.S. economy within the scope of Clean Air Act climate 
policy. The vehicle standards and Clean Power Plan covered a large share of 
emissions from the two sectors with the greatest emissions, but roughly one-third of 
 
327. EPA, Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified 
Sources, 81 Fed. Reg. 35,824 (June 3, 2016). 
328. See EPA SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS FACT SHEET, supra note 185. 
329. EPA, Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified 
Sources, 81 Fed. Reg. 35,824, 35,825 (June 3, 2016). Methane traps many times more solar radiation than 
carbon dioxide but decays in the atmosphere over roughly a decade; the CO2 it eventually produces sticks 
around. Duncan Clark, “How Long Do Greenhouse Gases Stay in the Air?,” THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 16, 2012, 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/jan/16/greenhouse-gases-remain-air.  
330. See EPA, FACT SHEET: EPA’S ACTIONS TO REDUCE METHANE EMISSIONS FROM THE OIL 
AND NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY: FINAL RULES AND DRAFT INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST 2 
(May 12, 2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-09/documents/nsps-overview-fs.pdf.  
331. Id. at 1. 
332. See Clean Air Act §111(d)(1) (existing source standards are to be issued only for sources “to 
which a standard of performance under this section would apply if such existing source were a new 
source”). 
333. See EPA, FACT SHEET: EPA’S ACTIONS TO REDUCE METHANE EMISSIONS FROM THE OIL 
AND NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY: FINAL RULES AND DRAFT INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST 1 
(May 12, 2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-09/documents/nsps-overview-fs.pdf.  
334. EPA, Standards of Performance for Municipal Solid Waste Landfills, 81 Fed. Reg. 59,332 
(Aug. 29, 2016). 
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U.S. emissions came from a wide variety of other sectors and industries.335 Unlike a 
comprehensive, economy-wide carbon price scheme like carbon taxes or cap-and-
trade, the fragmented structure of the Clean Air Act requires the agency to proceed 
sector-by-sector.336 So long as agency leadership remained committed to doing so 
and the courts allowed, most emitting industries could have been climate-regulated 
under the statute. As UARG and the Clean Power Plan stay illustrate, the willingness 
of the Supreme Court to permit this expansion was perhaps being pushed beyond its 
breaking point. And as Section III below describes, any appetite for climate 
regulation by EPA leadership collapsed after the election of President Trump in 
2016. 
G. Did All This Matter? 
The above discussion has noted EPA’s impressive estimates of emissions 
reductions and net benefits. A few years of experience can shed some light on the 
accuracy of those estimates. The hope and aim of climate regulation was not just a 
reduction in U.S. emissions, but a meaningful reduction in the risk of catastrophic 
climate change that also required motivating other countries to make similar or 
greater commitments. The success of U.S. policy should therefore be evaluated in 
large part based on its ability to push or pull other emitters to act. 
U.S. greenhouse gas emissions did decline substantially during President 
Obama’s tenure in office,337 but that decline was largely unrelated to regulatory 
moves under the Clean Air Act, some of the most important of which would not take 
effect until after Obama left office (like the 2017-2025 vehicle emissions standards 
and the Clean Power Plan). The Phase I vehicle emissions standards had some 
effect,338 as did regulations aimed at other pollutants, including the mercury limits at 
issue in Michigan v. EPA, which likely caused some coal retirements.339 But the 
 
335. See EPA DRAFT INVENTORY, supra note 133, at ES-26 (identifying substantial emissions from 
industry, agriculture, and other sectors). 
336. See, e.g., Clean Air Act Title I and Title II (covering stationary and mobile sources, 
respectively). Both Titles are further subdivided into a variety of regulatory programs covering specific 
categories of pollutants or sources, each in their own Section or subsection. 
337. See EPA DRAFT INVENTORY, supra note 133, at ES-5 (reporting 7,206 million metric tons of 
CO2-equivalent greenhouse gas emissions in 2008, and 6,526 tons in 2016). 
338. The Phase I standards applied to vehicles manufactured during the Obama administration, but 
the emissions impact of those vehicles is measured over their lifespan on the road, most of which would 
come after 2016. 
339. See EIA, Coal Plants Installed Mercury Controls to Meet Compliance Deadlines (Sept. 18, 2017), 
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=32952 (“Between January 2015 and April 2016, about 
87 GW of coal-fired plants installed pollution-control equipment, and nearly 20 GW of coal capacity 
retired. About 26% of those retirements occurred in April 2015, meeting the MATS rule's initial 
compliance date.”). 
 Michigan Journal of Environmental and Administrative Law Vol. 10:1 
 
122 
primary causes were the 2009 recession, a large and consistent drop in natural gas 
prices (allowing gas to substitute for coal), efficiency improvements, and rapidly 
falling prices of renewable generation.340 
These pre-existing macroeconomic, energy market, and technological 
factors led some to criticize the Obama EPA’s regulatory moves—particularly the 
Clean Power Plan—as unambitious or superfluous.341 Recall that the Clean Power 
Plan would not require any emissions reductions until 2022, with mandated 
reductions increasing until 2030, at which point emissions from the power sector 
would be at least thirty-two percent below 2005 levels.342 But by the time the plan 
was finalized, U.S. emissions had already dropped roughly fifteen percent since 2005; 
to meet the stated target, the Plan would only require an additional seventeen percent 
reduction, at a slower rate than that already being driven by other factors.343  
Some critics also argued that the target of thirty-two percent below 2005 
emissions was an inadequate response to the severity of climate risks and unlikely to 
constitute leadership sufficient to push other countries to take measures of their 
own.344 The Clean Power Plan, vehicle emissions standards, and other Clean Air Act 
regulations proposed or finalized during the Obama administration—had they been 
fully implemented—plus reductions from secular and market trends, were projected 
to at least put U.S. emissions reductions within striking distance of commitments 
 
340. By far the largest annual decline in U.S. emissions during the Obama administration occurred 
in 2009, during the Great Recession; from 2010-2015, emissions increased in as many years as they 
decreased. See EPA DRAFT INVENTORY, supra note 133, at ES-5. See also U.S. Energy-Related CO2 
Emissions Fell 1.7% in 2016, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.eia.gov/todayinen
ergy/detail.php?id=30712 (attributing 2016 emissions decline to fuel switching from coal to natural gas 
and reductions in the energy intensity of the economy, and noting that the transportation sector, the most 
highly-regulated under the Clean Air Act, was the only sector in which emissions increased). 
341. See, e.g., Ben Adler, How Are Environmentalists Reacting to Obama’s Clean Power Plan?, GRIST 
(Aug. 3, 2015), https://grist.org/climate-energy/how-are-environmentalists-reacting-to-obamas-clean-
power-plan/ (describing view of some environmental groups that the Clean Power Plan “will not go far 
enough and fast enough in reducing emissions). See also Michael Grunwald, 5 Reasons Obama’s 
Transformative Power Plan Won’t Transform Anything, POLITICO (May 26, 2015), https://www.politico.co
m/agenda/story/2015/05/obama-transformative-energy-power-plan-000016.  
342. Clean Power Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,669 (Oct. 23, 2015). 
343. See Brad Plumer, A Guide to Obama’s New Rules to Cut Carbon Emissions from Power Plants, VOX 
(June 1, 2014), https://www.vox.com/2014/6/1/5770556/EPA-power-plant-rules-explainer.  
344. See, e.g., Kyle Ash, Why President Obama’s Clean Power Plan Is an Exaggeration, GREENPEACE 
(Aug. 3, 2015), https://www.greenpeace.org/usa/why-president-obamas-clean-power-plan-is-an-exaggera 
tion/ (advocating a 40% cut in U.S. emissions relative to 2005 levels and binding international 
commitments). 
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under the Paris Agreement.345 While a useful start, the Paris goals are insufficient to 
keep temperature change below two degrees Celsius.346 
This view led to calls for EPA to substantially increase the stringency of 
the program.347 Whether a more aggressive Clean Power Plan was is unclear. EPA’s 
decision to drop an energy efficiency component of its “best system of emission 
reduction” (“BSER”) calculation (which determined stringency of the Plan) suggests 
it believed the final plan was operating at the political or legal margin or both.348 The 
success of challengers in getting the Supreme Court to stay the regulation supports 
the view that EPA was operating at or near the legal limits of what the Clean Air Act 
would support. On the other hand, some evidence suggests that EPA had an adequate 
technical basis for substantially increasing the emissions reductions it projected from 
improvements in coal plant efficiency (building block 1), the most legally defensible 
part of the BSER calculation.349 
In any case, emissions reductions from the power sector have mostly 
continued since the final Clean Power Plan was released in 2015, though they did 
increase slightly in 2018.350 Medium-term projections indicate that power sector 
emissions will continue to decline rapidly enough to meet the Clean Power Plan’s 
2030 target by around 2020-2022, and continue to decline through the 2020s (See 
Figure 1).351 These declines will be driven largely by rapid retirements of coal plants 
 
345. See DOUG VINE, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS, ACHIEVING THE UNITED 
STATES’ INTENDED NATIONALLY DETERMINED CONTRIBUTION (Nov. 2016), https://www.c2es.org/si
te/assets/uploads/2016/09/achieving-us-indc-nov-2016.pdf (projecting 22% economy-wide emissions 
reductions, short of the U.S. commitment of 26-28% reductions, both relative to 2005 levels). 
346. See David Roberts, There’s a Huge Gap Between the Paris Climate Change Goals and Reality, VOX 
(Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2017/10/31/16579844/climate-gap-unep-
2017.  
347. See, e.g., David Biello, How Far Does Obama's Clean Power Plan Go in Slowing Climate Change?, 
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Aug. 6, 2015) (“the Clean Power Plan alone is not enough”). 
348. See Nathan Richardson, 10 Things We Looked for in the Clean Power Plan. . . and What We Found, 
RESOURCES (Aug. 3, 2015), https://www.resourcesmag.org/common-resources/10-things-we-looked-for-
in-the-clean-power-plan-and-what-we-found/.  
349. See Dallas Burtraw, Inside the Fence: Keep an Eye on Cofiring under the Clean Power Plan, 
RESOURCES (July 16, 2015), https://www.resourcesmag.org/common-resources/inside-the-fence-keep-an-
eye-on-cofiring-under-the-clean-power-plan/.  
350. See EPA DRAFT INVENTORY, supra note 133, at ES-7. 
351. See John Larsen & Whitney Herndon, What the Clean Power Plan Would Have Done, RHODIUM 
GRP. (Oct. 9, 2017), https://rhg.com/research/what-the-cpp-would-have-done/ (“Our current projections 
put power sector CO2 emissions 27% to 35% below 2005 levels [by 2030]—bookending EPA’s [32%] target 
for the CPP. Gas prices have stayed lower for longer than EIA predicted, electricity demand has remained 
flat, rapidly declining wind and solar costs and a multi-year extension of the PTC and ITC have driven 
aggressive renewable energy deployment, and many coal-fired power plants have been retired.”); see also 
Tracking Power Sector Changes in the Years Since the Clean Power Plan, BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR. (Aug. 6, 
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and deployment of wind and solar generation.352 The projections indicate that the 
climate-hawk critics of the Clean Power Plan were correct. Arguably, if it was not 
legally or politically possible to issue a more stringent rule, the administrative 
resources and political capital devoted to the Clean Power Plan might have been 
better used elsewhere. 
Figure 1: Rhodium Group estimates of emissions reductions from the power sector353 
That said, the Clean Power Plan would not have been useless. Because it 
imposed individual goals on each state, some states would still have been required to 
reduce emissions or purchase emissions allowances in an interstate trading regime.354
Moreover, it is not a given that projections would have come true: coal retirements 
and renewable deployment could slow, the economy and its attendant energy needs 
could grow faster than expected, or some other factor, like changes in fuel prices, 




352. Larsen & Herndon, supra note 351. 
353. Id. 
354. Id. (noting “21 states would have had to do more to comply with the CPP than what they were 
already on track to achieve in absence of the rule”). See also Martin T. Ross et al., Assessing Impacts of the 
Clean Power Plan on Southeast States 1-3 (Duke Nicholas Inst. for Envtl. Pol’y Solutions, Working Paper 
NI WP 15-03, May 2015), https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/sites/default/files/publications/ni_wp_15-
03_full_pdf.pdf (projecting substantial changes in generation mix in the Southeast as a result of the Clean 
Power Plan; note that projections are based on the draft CPP, not the final rule). 
Figure I: Current power sector CO2 projections and EPA's CPP headline 2030 target 











Source: EPA, EIA and Ahcxlium Group analysis. 
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would have provided a backstop.355 The Clean Power Plan, had it been upheld, would 
have also provided a ready framework for interstate emissions trading and, possibly, 
more stringent goals in the future.356 
However useful it might have been, the Plan was not sold or apparently 
intended as a regional effort or backstop but as a primary driver of national emissions 
reductions.357 Had the Obama EPA known in 2014 and 2015 that power sector 
emissions would decline as fast as they have, it would (I believe) have either produced 
a more ambitious rule or focused on other sectors where emissions were not already 
declining. The green critics at the time suggested EPA did know this would happen, 
or at least should have known.358 
The Clean Power Plan was, like any regulatory climate policy, vulnerable 
to being overtaken by events. Although it delegated substantial flexibility to states 
in meeting emissions reduction targets, those targets were rigid and set as far as 
fifteen years in the future.359 Such delay and long-term certainty is good for industry, 
but it is risky when information on climate risks and trends in energy technology and 
economics are in flux. Even if the Plan’s targets were defensible as the best 
compromise available at the time, the Plan’s rigidity is harder to defend. A future 
EPA could and, presumably would, update the Plan in response to new information. 
That is exactly what the Trump EPA is doing now, albeit in the opposite direction 
of what the Plan’s architects hoped.360 
The effect of Clean Air Act climate policy on international agreements is 
similarly mixed. Copenhagen and Paris would almost certainly have failed361 without 
President Obama’s ability to rely on executive authority under the statute to show 
 
355. Maria Gallucci, Trump’s Order Will Unravel America’s Best Defense Against Climate Change, 
MASHABLE (Mar. 27, 2017), https://mashable.com/2017/03/27/trump-climate-change-executive-order/ 
(quoting Sierra Club climate policy director John Coequyt characterizing the Clean Power Plan as a 
valuable “backstop”). 
356. Larsen & Herndon, supra note 351. 
357. See, e.g., EPA, Fact Sheet: Overview of the Clean Power Plan, https://19january2017snapshot. 
epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/fact-sheet-overview-clean-power-plan_.html (“The Clean Power Plan cuts 
significant amounts of power plant carbon pollution . . . while advancing clean energy innovation, 
development and deployment, and laying the foundation for the long-term strategy needed to tackle the 
threat of climate change.”) 
358. See, e.g., Grunwald, supra note 341 (predicting that EPA’s projections of coal retirements were 
obviously too low and its projections of renewables deployment rates likely too low, leading to “targets 
that are likely to be achieved even without the plan”). 
359. See Clean Power Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,665 (Oct. 23, 2015). 
360. See supra Section I.C.1. 
361. Or failed more completely, if one views their output as inadequate. 
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credibility on climate in the wake of the failure of cap-and-trade legislation. 362  
Similarly, Clean Air Act policies (chiefly the vehicle standards and the Clean Power 
Plan) provided the only credible vehicle for achieving U.S. commitments under the 
Paris Agreement in 2015.363 Negotiators in Paris were aware that the U.S. Congress 
was unlikely to support climate policy action in 2015: the accord was structured as an 
executive agreement rather than a formal treaty specifically to avoid having to seek 
U.S. Senate ratification.364 To the extent those negotiators took U.S. emissions 
promises seriously, therefore, it could only have been based on Clean Air Act 
regulatory powers. Had Congress passed the 2009 cap-and-trade bill or some other 
robust climate policy, the Obama administration’s negotiating position would have 
been stronger, and an agreement with more ambitious emissions cuts or enforcement 
mechanisms might have been plausible in 2009 or 2015. The Paris Agreement is 
widely understood to be inadequate.365 But it is better than nothing, and would likely 
have been impossible without the Clean Air Act and Massachusetts. 
On election day in 2016, Clean Air Act climate policy was at an inflection 
point: it had achieved some small emissions reductions and built a basic regulatory 
structure, but the jury was still out on its long-term domestic and international 
effectiveness. Perhaps a Hillary Clinton administration could have navigated that 
uncertainty and built a robust and successful climate policy, although I am skeptical 
for reasons discussed in Section IV. In any case, President Trump has done the 
opposite, using executive authority to dismantle the Obama administration’s climate 
policy. 
III. THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION ROLLBACK 
Before his election to the Presidency, Donald Trump frequently referred to 
climate change as a “hoax . . . created by and for the Chinese in order to make U.S. 
manufacturing non-competitive” (he may or may not have been joking).366 In office, 
 
362. The United States’ “Nationally Determined Contribution” under the Paris agreement (it’s 
commitment to future emissions reductions) is largely based on Clean Air Act authority. See U.S.A. First 
NDC Submission at 4-5 (Sept. 2, 2016), https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/
United%20States%20of%20America%20First/U.S.A.%20First%20NDC%20Submission.pdf. Without 
that authority, it is unlikely that the US would have been able to make any credible emissions reduction 
commitments. 
363. See id. 
364. See David Bookbinder, Is the Paris Agreement a Treaty?, NISKANEN CTR. (May 5, 2017), 
https://www.niskanencenter.org/paris-climate-agreement-treaty/.  
365. See, e.g., Aya Batrawy and Malak Harb, UN chief warns Paris climate goals still not enough, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 30, 2019), https://apnews.com/189872262c4748e6af4752fb96b8da01/.  
366. See Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 6, 2012, 2:15 PM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/265895292191248385 (tweeting that “[t]he concept of global 
warming was created by and for the Chinese in order to make U.S. manufacturing non-competitive.”); see 
also Louis Jacobson, Yes, Donald Trump Did Call Climate Change a Chinese Hoax, POLITIFACT (June 3, 
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his administration has done everything within its authority (and perhaps more) to 
undo existing climate policy and halt progress toward future emissions controls. The 
strongest public signal of the Trump administration’s climate policy views was its 
2017 decision to pull out of the Paris agreement.367 But the administration’s most 
significant move has been a comprehensive rollback of Clean Air Act climate policy, 
beginning in the first months of the President’s term and continuing throughout. 
This rollback was initiated under the leadership of President Trump’s first EPA 
Secretary, Scott Pruitt, the former Attorney General of Oklahoma and frequent 
litigant against the Obama EPA.368 Pruitt’s selection indicated that the Trump 
administration intended a sharp reduction in EPA regulatory efforts, particularly on 
climate, and was perhaps the best example of then-adviser Steve Bannon’s claim that 
cabinet officials were selected to lead the “deconstruction of the administrative 
state.”369 Pruitt would resign in 2018 amid allegations of unethical conduct,370 but his 
successor, Andrew Wheeler, has continued much the same regulatory agenda.371 
The rollback of environmental regulations under President Trump has been 
sweeping: by one count the administration has proposed or completed withdrawal or 
substantial weakening of ninety-five environmental regulations or executive actions, 
twenty-five of which concern air pollution and ten of which are specifically climate-
driven and derive from the agency’s Clean Air Act authority (and, thus, at least in 
part from Massachusetts).372 Ninety-five is a large number, but it is far from 
comprehensive—American environmental law is built on thousands of rules.373 The 
 
2016), https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2016/jun/03/hillary-clinton/yes-donald-trump-did-call-
climate-change-chinese-h/ (detailing that Trump later claimed his tweet was a joke). But see Dean Baker 
(@DeanBaker13), TWITTER (Feb. 28, 2020, 9:53 PM), https://twitter.com/DeanBaker13/status/1233586
110938222593 (arguing that “I think Trump doesn’t use the word ‘hoax’ the way most people do. For him 
‘hoax’ means something like ‘problem.’”). 
367. See Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord, WHITE HOUSE (June 1, 2017), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-trump-paris-climate-accord/.  
368. See Chris Mooney et al., Trump Names Scott Pruitt, Oklahoma Attorney General Suing EPA on 
Climate Change, to Head the EPA, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/e
nergy-environment/wp/2016/12/07/trump-names-scott-pruitt-oklahoma-attorney-general-suing-epa-on-
climate-change-to-head-the-epa/.  
369. See David Z. Morris, Steve Bannon Says Trump’s Cabinet Picks Are Intended to ‘Deconstruct’ 
Regulation and Agencies, FORTUNE (Feb. 25, 2017), https://fortune.com/2017/02/25/bannon-trump-
cabinet-cpac.  
370. Jeremy Diamond et al., EPA Chief Scott Pruitt Resigns Amid Scandals, Citing ‘Unrelenting Attacks,’ 
CNN (July 5, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/05/politics/scott-pruitt-epa-resigns/index.html.  
371. See, e.g., infra note 428, Administrator Wheeler’s decision to revoke California’s waiver for 
setting its own vehicle emissions standards. 
372. See Popovich et al., supra note 16.  
373. By one count, during the Obama administration (through June 2016) the EPA published 
“approximately 3,900” final rules in the Federal Register. Memorandum from the H. Comm. on Energy 
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rollback is also not indiscriminate—it has concentrated almost exclusively on Obama-
era regulations, and disproportionately on those aimed at climate.374 The Trump 
rollback has been significant, but it has not signaled a complete breach with the 
traditional regulatory ratchet of environmental law. For the most part, longstanding 
environmental law unrelated to climate, such as regulations on criteria or 
“conventional” pollutants, like lead and sulfur dioxide, under the Clean Air Act have 
been left intact, although the Trump EPA has pursued structural and institutional 
changes that could have broad effects on the agency’s ability to identify and regulate 
risks in the future.375 
Only two Clean Air Act climate policies have survived the rollback intact: 
the Phase I light vehicle standards—already implemented for the planned 2012-2016 
model years—and the initial 2010 greenhouse gas endangerment finding, though 
there have been persistent rumors that the endangerment finding might be 
withdrawn.376 Every other Clean Air Act climate policy has been withdrawn, seen 
withdrawal proposed, or been damaged in some way. Although not comprehensive, 
the following list illustrates the scope of the rollback. 
 
• March 2017: Information request on methane emissions from existing 
oil and gas wells is withdrawn.377 
• March 2017: Executive order directs EPA and other agencies to stop 
using estimated social cost of carbon in cost-benefit analyses.378 
• May 2017: EPA announces that landfill methane new source 
performance standards (“NSPS”) are being reconsidered and stays 
 
& Commerce, to the Members of the Subcomm. on Energy and Power at 2 (June 30, 2016), 
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF03/20160706/105153/HHRG-114-IF03-20160706-SD002.pdf.  
374. All of the twenty-five air pollution-related rollbacks proposed or completed by the Trump 
administration are of actions taken under President Obama. See Popovich et al. supra note 16. While not 
all of those rollbacks are of climate rules, a disproportionate number are, and the Trump administration 
has to date made no effort to roll back core air quality standards for conventional pollutants like 
particulates and ozone. 
375. See Laura Bloomer & Joe Goffman, The Legal Consequences of EPA’s Disruption of the NAAQS 
Process, HARV. ENV’T & ENERGY L. PROGRAM (Sept. 30, 2019), https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/2019/09/t
he-legal-consequences-of-epas-disruption-of-the-naaqs-process/ (detailing Trump administration moves 
“politicizing and weakening [EPA] advisory panels”). 
376. See, e.g., Nick Sobczyk & Geof Koss, Conservatives Warn Endangerment Finding Fight Is ‘Still 
Alive,’ E&E DAILY (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060094933.  
377. EPA, Notice Regarding Withdrawal of Obligation to Submit Information, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,817 
(Mar. 7, 2017). 
378. Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093, 16,095 (Mar. 31, 2017) (Promoting Energy 
Independence and Economic Growth), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-
executive-order-promoting-energy-independence-economic-growth/.  
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enforcement;379 litigation challenging this move is eventually 
successful.380 
• June 2017: President Trump announces that the United States will 
withdraw from the Paris Agreement.381 Formal withdrawal is initiated 
in 2019.382 
• October 2017: Repeal of Clean Power Plan is proposed.383 
• November 2017: EPA proposes withdrawing portions of the Phase II 
heavy-duty vehicle standards applying to “glider” trucks.384 In July of 
2018, Secretary Pruitt further announces that the glider regulations will 
not be enforced, pending further rulemaking,385 though Secretary 
Wheeler quickly reversed this non-enforcement policy.386 
 
379. EPA, Stay of Standards of Performance for Municipal Solid Waste Landfills and Emission 
Guidelines and Compliance Times for Municipal Solid Waste Landfills, 82 Fed. Reg. 24,878 (May 31, 
2017). 
380. State of California v. EPA, No. 18-cv-03237-HSG at 5 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2019), 
https://d12v9rtnomnebu.cloudfront.net/diveimages/050619CAEPAEG.pdf (order granting in part and 
denying in part Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and denying Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment) (ruling that EPA “failed to meet its nondiscretionary obligations to implement” the landfill 
NSPS when it stayed enforcement pending reconsideration). 
381. See WHITE HOUSE, supra note 367. 
382. See Press Release, Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State, On the U.S. Withdrawal from the 
Paris Agreement (Nov. 4, 2019), http://www.state.gov/on-the-u-s-withdrawal-from-the-paris-agreement.  
383. EPA, Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: 
Electric Utility Generating Units, Proposed Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,035 (proposed Oct. 16, 2017) 
[hereinafter CPP Repeal Proposal]. 
384. EPA, Repeal of Emission Requirements for Glider Vehicles, Glider Engines, and Glider Kits, 
Proposed Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 53,442 (proposed Nov. 16, 2017). 
385. See Memorandum from Susan Parker Bodine, Assistant Administrator, EPA Enforcement and 
Compliance to Bill Wehrum, Assistant Administrator, Office of Air and Radiation (July 6, 2018), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-07/documents/glidernoactionassurance070618.pdf 
(Conditional No Action Assurance Regarding Small Manufacturers of Glider Vehicles). 
386. See U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, Office of the Adm'r., MEMORANDUM FROM ANDREW R. 
WHEELER, ACTING ADMINISTRATOR, TO SUSAN PARKER BODINE, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, 
OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE AND WILLIAM L. WEHRUM, ASSISTANT 
ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF AIR AND RADIATION (July 26, 2018), https://www.epa.gov/sites/producti
on/files/2018-07/documents/memo_re_withdrawal_of_conditional_naa_regarding_small_manufacturers_
of_glider_vehicles_07-26-2018.pdf (Withdrawal of Conditional No Action Assurance Regarding Small 
Manufacturers of Glider Vehicles). 
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• April 2018: EPA announces it will not enforce bans on HFCs387 (much 
of this regulation had already been struck down by the D.C. Circuit in 
August of 2017).388 
• August 2018: EPA proposes the Safe Affordable Fuel-Efficient 
(“SAFE”) Vehicles Rule, which would substantially lower Phase II 
light-duty vehicle standards for model years 2021-2026 .389 
• August 2018: The Affordable Clean Energy (“ACE”) Rule is proposed, 
replacing the Clean Power Plan with substantially weaker 
requirements.390 
• September 2018: EPA proposes a rule weakening oil and gas methane 
NSPS and exempting some facilities from the regulation entirely.391 
• December 2018: EPA proposes a rule reducing the stringency of NSPS 
for power plants such that carbon capture and storage is no longer 
required for new coal plants.392 
• July 2019: The ACE Rule repealing and replacing the Clean Power Plan 
is finalized.393 
• August 2019: EPA proposes partially or fully withdrawing oil and gas 
methane NSPS.394 
 
387. EPA, Protection of Stratospheric Ozone: Notification of Guidance and a Stakeholder Meeting 
Concerning the Significant New Alternatives Policy (SNAP) Program, 83 Fed. Reg. 18,431 (Apr. 27, 
2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 82). 
388. Mexichem Fluor, Inc. v. EPA, 866 F.3d 451, 454 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
389. See The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021–2026 
Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, 83 Fed. Reg. 42,986 (Aug. 24, 2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 
85 and 86) [hereinafter Proposed SAFE Rule]. 
390. See Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing Electric Utility 
Generating Units; Revisions to Emission Guideline Implementing Regulations; Revisions to New Source 
Review Program, 83 Fed. Reg. 44,746 (Aug. 31, 2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, and 60). 
391. See Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified 
Sources Reconsideration, 83 Fed. Reg. 52,056 (Oct. 15, 2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). 
392. See Review of Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New, Modified, 
and Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 83 Fed. Reg. 65,424 (Dec. 20, 
2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). 
393. Repeal of the Clean Power Plan; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from 
Existing Electric Utility Generating Units; Revisions to Emission Guidelines Implementing Regulations, 
84 Fed. Reg. 32,520 (July 8, 2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R pt. 60) [hereinafter ACE Rule]. 
394. Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified 
Sources Review, 84 Fed. Reg. 50,244 (Sept. 24, 2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). 
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• September 2019: EPA withdraws California’s waiver allowing it to set 
independent, more stringent vehicle emissions standards.395 
 
As this list illustrates, while the rollback is sweeping, it is still a work in 
progress. Rulemakings cannot be undone by executive fiat—rollback or repeal actions 
are themselves rulemakings, and must instead go through the same notice-and-
comment process used to give the rule legal effect in the first place.396 Much of the 
Trump EPA’s climate rollback is only at the proposed rulemaking stage,397 and many 
of the actions that have been finalized are being litigated.398 While agencies are 
accorded significant deference, especially when deciding not to regulate,399 the 
Trump administration’s track record in administrative law litigation is terrible.400 
The rollback of fuel-economy standards seems to have been bungled, leading to 
delays and making it perhaps more vulnerable to court challenge.401 The outcome of 
that litigation, and of the 2020 election, will have a significant impact on how 
extensive the rollback is in practice. 
As described above, the light-duty vehicle emissions standards and the 
Clean Power Plan were the centerpieces of the Obama EPA’s climate policy efforts, 
and it is therefore worth describing the Trump administration’s efforts to roll them 
 
395. The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule Part One: One National Program, 
Withdrawal of Waiver, 84 Fed. Reg. 51,310 (Sept. 27, 2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pats. 531 and 
533) [hereinafter CA Waiver Revocation]. 
396. See Office of the Federal Register, A Guide to the Rulemaking Process at 10, 
https://www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2011/01/the_rulemaking_process.pdf (“[i]f an agency decides to 
amend or revoke a rule, it must use the notice-and-comment process to make the change”). 
397. See Popovich et al., supra note 16. 
398. See, e.g., Nicholas Kusnetz, 17 States Sue EPA Over Auto Emissions Standards Rollback, INSIDE 
CLIMATE NEWS (May 1, 2018), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/01052018/states-lawsuit-epa-vehicle-
emissions-standards-fuel-efficiency-rollback-pruitt-climate-change.  
399. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (holding that agency inaction is presumptively 
unreviewable); but see Biber, supra note 74, at 461 (discussing the Court’s review of agency inaction in 
Massachusetts and concluding that “[j]udicial review of agency inaction . . . is often doctrinally incoherent 
and unclear”). 
400. See Fred Barbash & Deanna Paul, The Real Reason the Trump Administration Is Constantly Losing 
in Court, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/the-
real-reason-president-trump-is-constantly-losing-in-court/2019/03/19/f5ffb056-33a8-11e9-af5b-
b51b7ff322e9_story.html (identifying, at the time of publication, 63 cases in which courts had rejected 
administrative actions taken by the Trump administration). See also Roundup: Trump-Era Agency Policy in 
the Courts, Inst. Pol’y Integrity, https://policyintegrity.org/trump-court-roundup (last updated Feb. 25, 
2020) (finding a 10% success rate in APA cases for the Trump administration, relative to a traditional 
success rate of around 70%). 
401. See Davenport, supra note 104 (describing draft rulemakings sent to OMB for review as 
incomplete and rife with errors). 
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back in greater detail, then briefly discussing a rollback that did not happen: repeal 
of the greenhouse gas endangerment finding. 
A. Rolling Back Vehicle Standards 
By the time President Trump came into office in early 2017, the Phase I 
light-duty standards issued in 2010 had already been implemented and the Phase II 
standards, applying to 2017 model year vehicles and set to increase in stringency 
through the 2025 model year, had just begun to take effect. The Trump EPA quickly 
indicated that it would seek to halt or reverse the Phase II standards.402  
From their inception, the standards included a provision for a “mid-term 
evaluation,” requiring the agency to determine no later than April 2018 whether the 
Phase II standards in the latter half of the compliance period, model years 2022–
2025, were “appropriate.”403 The Obama EPA conducted the required midterm 
review and concluded the standards were appropriate, based in part on 
manufacturers’ demonstrated over-compliance with the Phase I standards.404 The 
review was released in January 2017 as a “midnight rulemaking” (i.e., during the 
lame-duck period).405 Just two months later, the Trump EPA and Department of 
Transportation announced the midterm review would be reconsidered, signaling that 
standards would be weakened.406 EPA’s stated rationale for the reconsideration was 
to allow harmonization with as-yet-unreleased NHTSA fuel-economy standards.407 
But the true reason appears to have been the impact of the Phase II standards on the 
U.S. auto industry, and on manufacturing jobs; President Trump promised an 
audience of autoworkers in Michigan at the time: “We are going to ensure that any 
 
402. See Notice of Intention to Reconsider the Final Determination of the Mid-Term Evaluation 
of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Model Year 2022–2025 Light Duty Vehicles, 82 Fed. Reg. 
14,671 (Mar. 22, 2017) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 86). 
403. Phase II Light Duty Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,624, 62,628 (Oct. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 
40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, and 600). 
404. Env’t Prot. Agency, EPA-420-R-17-001, FINAL DETERMINATION ON THE 
APPROPRIATENESS OF THE MODEL YEAR 2022-2025 LIGHT-DUTY VEHICLE GREENHOUSE GAS 
EMISSIONS STANDARDS UNDER THE MIDTERM EVALUATION (2017) (this document was not published 
in the Federal Register before the March 2017 decision by the incoming Trump administration to 
reconsider it). 
405. Id. 
406. See Notice of Intention to Reconsider the Final Determination of the Mid-Term Evaluation 
of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Model Year 2022–2025 Light Duty Vehicles, 82 Fed. Reg. 
14,671 (Mar. 22, 2017) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 86). 
407. Id. at 14,672. 
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regulations we have protect and defend your jobs, your factories. We’re going to be 
fair.”408 
The Trump EPA released its midterm review (replacing the Obama EPA’s 
2017 version) in April 2018, just missing the deadline on the first of the month.409 It 
concluded, unsurprisingly, that the 2022-2025 standards were not appropriate and 
should be revised.410 EPA based this determination on changed circumstances since 
the 2017 review (e.g., lower fuel prices), projected negative effects on the auto 
industry that were given (it argued) insufficient weight in the 2017 review, and 
differing policy and analysis choices, such as rejection of the Obama administration’s 
estimate of the social cost of carbon.411 Secretary Pruitt claimed when the review was 
released that “[t]he Obama Administration’s determination was wrong. . . [it] cut the 
Midterm Evaluation process short with politically charged expediency, made 
assumptions about the standards that didn’t comport with reality, and set the 
standards too high.”412 The eleven-page document made no mention of climate 
change and only briefly discussed co-benefits from reduction of conventional 
pollutants before rejecting such co-benefits as valid considerations in evaluating the 
standards.413  
Some legal and policy analysts criticized the review, questioning its claims 
of changed circumstances and accusing EPA of failing to provide any economic 
evidence to support revising the Phase II standards.414 In May 2018, seventeen states 
 
408. See Alex Guillén, Trump Takes Steps Toward Undoing Obama’s Auto Emissions Limits, POLITICO 
(Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/03/donald-trump-auto-emissions-236070 (“The 
auto industry has made it a top priority to review the Obama administration’s 11th-hour attempt to lock 
in tough standards . . . and Trump will deliver on a trip to Michigan Wednesday. He will direct EPA to 
reconsider its recent conclusion that automakers would be able to meet strict limits strict limits on 
greenhouse gas emissions that would have vehicles getting more than 50 miles per gallon on average by 
2025.”) 
409. See Mid-Term Evaluation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Model Year 2022–
2025 Light-Duty Vehicles, 83 Fed. Reg. 16,077 (Apr. 13, 2018). 
410. Id. 
411. Id. at 16,078. 
412. Press Release, Env’t Prot. Agency, EPA Administrator Pruitt: GHG Emissions Standards for 
Cars and Light Trucks Should Be Revised (Apr. 2, 2018), https://archive.epa.gov/epa/newsreleases/epa-
administrator-pruitt-ghg-emissions-standards-cars-and-light-trucks-should-be.html.  
413. See Mid-Term Evaluation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Model Year 2022–
2025 Light-Duty Vehicles, 83 Fed. Reg. 16,077 (Apr. 13, 2018). 
414. See BETHANY NOLL ET AL., INST. FOR POLICY INTEGRITY, ANALYZING EPA’S VEHICLE-
EMISSIONS DECISIONS: WHY WITHDRAWING THE 2022-2025 STANDARDS IS ECONOMICALLY 
FLAWED 8 (2018), https://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/Analyzing_EPAs_Fuel-Efficiency_Decis
ions_Policy_Brief.pdf.  
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sued EPA, claiming the revised midterm review was arbitrary and capricious.415 The 
D.C. Circuit rejected this challenge in October 2019, on the grounds that the 
midterm review was not final agency action and, therefore, was not reviewable.416 
The revised midterm review committed the agency to reopen the Phase II 
standards and signaled they would be weakened or eliminated.417 EPA proposed 
revised standards in August 2018, calling the revised standards the Safer Affordable 
Fuel-Efficient (“SAFE”) Vehicles Rule.418 As proposed, it would slash the fuel 
economy improvements required under the Phase II standards for vehicles in model 
years 2021–2025—it invited comment on a variety of alternatives, but the primary 
proposal was to freeze 2021-2025 fuel efficiency standards at the 2020 level.419 This 
would amount to withdrawing the standards for five of the nine model years 
originally regulated under the Phase II standards. EPA also proposed striking 
regulations of vehicle GHG emissions from air conditioner refrigerants, methane, 
and other greenhouse gases not directly related to fuel economy.420 EPA estimated 
that the revised standards would increase greenhouse gas emissions from affected 
vehicles by four percent annually in 2025—relative to the 2012 Phase II standards 
being replaced—and increasing to 9.1 percent in 2035 (the last year for which the 
agency estimated relative impacts).421 Calculating estimated total additional 
emissions under the SAFE Rule is difficult because the Trump and Obama rules 
present their estimates differently, but outside analysis suggests that the SAFE Rule 
would forgo about half of the emissions reductions projected under the Obama Phase 
II standards.422 
 
415. See Nicholas Kusnetz, 17 States Sue EPA Over Auto Emissions Standards Rollback, INSIDE 
CLIMATE NEWS (May 1, 2018), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/01052018/states-lawsuit-epa-vehicle-
emissions-standards-fuel-efficiency-rollback-pruitt-climate-change.  
416. California v. EPA, 940 F.3d 1342, 1345 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“[b]ecause we conclude EPA has 
not engaged in ‘final action’ under the Clean Air Act, the petitions for review are dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction.”). 
417. See Mid-Term Evaluation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Model Year 2022–
2025 Light-Duty Vehicles, 83 Fed. Reg. 16,077, 16,078 (Apr. 13, 2018) (“the Administrator believes the 
MY 2022–2025 GHG emission standards are not appropriate and, therefore, should be revised. . . [EPA] 
will further explore the appropriate degree and form of changes to the program through a notice and 
comment rulemaking process.”) 
418. Proposed SAFE Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 42,986 (Aug. 24, 2018). 
419. Id. at 42,988. 
420. Id. 
421. Id. at 43,326. 
422. See Sean O’Kane, Automakers Still Want to Lower Emissions Standards in the US, THE VERGE 
(June 7, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/6/7/18656986/automakers-lower-emissions-standards-us-
environment-pollution-trump; Hiroko Tabuchi, The Oil Industry’s Covert Campaign to Rewrite American Car 
Emissions Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/13/climate/cafe-
emissions-rollback-oil-industry.html.  
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A large group of automakers claimed in an open letter that they would have 
preferred an approach “midway” between the Obama EPA’s standards and the 
Trump EPA’s freeze.423 A lack of strong support for a rollback of the standards from 
the auto industry suggests that it was not motivated by industry lobbying, but rather 
by the administration’s own ideological preferences (or, perhaps, by lobbying from 
another industry: oil).424 California criticized the proposed rule in comments, 
claiming it “abdicate[d] the Agencies’ statutory directives to promulgate increasingly 
stringent requirements to ensure continued reductions of air pollutants and 
continued increases in fuel economy from motor vehicles” and failed to meaningfully 
address climate change.425 Environmental groups were similarly critical.426 This 
opposition suggests states and environmental groups will challenge the SAFE Rule 
in court when it is finalized (if there was ever any question about that).427 
But wait, you may ask—why does California care so much about changes in 
the federal vehicle emissions standards if it has a waiver allowing it, alone among 
states, to set its own standards? Because in addition to proposing rollback of the Phase 
II standards, the SAFE Rule also proposed revoking that waiver. While the 
substantive changes to the standards have yet to be finalized, EPA did issue a final 
rulemaking revoking California’s waiver in September 2019.428 The agency claimed 
revoking the waiver was necessary to preserve a “harmonized” national standard in 
line with what it saw as “Congress’s intent to provide for uniform national fuel 
economy standards.”429 The agency further claimed that regulation by California (or 
any other state) of vehicle carbon dioxide emissions is indistinguishable from fuel 
economy standards, which are preempted by the federal Energy Policy and 
 
423. Dieter Bohn, 17 Automakers Reportedly Ask Trump to Back Off His Plan to Lower Emissions 
Standards, THE VERGE (June 6, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/6/6/18655820/ford-gm-toyota-
automakers-trump-lower-emissions-standards-letter-california.  
424. See O’Kane, supra note 422; Tabuchi, supra note 422. 
425. See CAL. AIR RES. BD., ANALYSIS IN SUPPORT OF COMMENTS OF THE CALIFORNIA AIR 
RESOURCES BOARD ON THE SAFER AFFORDABLE FUEL-EFFICIENT (SAFE) VEHICLES RULE FOR 
MODEL YEARS 2021-2026 PASSENGER CARS AND LIGHT TRUCKS 73 (Oct. 26, 2018), 
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2018-10/2018-10-26%20FINAL%20CARB%20Detailed%20Co
mments%20on%20SAFE%20NPRM.pdf.  
426. See, e.g., Heather Smith, A 17 Million Car Pile-Up: The Trump Administration’s Plan to Freeze 
Tailpipe Regulations Could Wreck the Auto Industry, SIERRA (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.sierraclub.org/sierr
a/trump-epa-auto-efficiency-standards-automakers-emissions.  
427. In fact, the rule is already the subject of legal challenge, but by groups alleging that it is too 
strong, not too weak. See Chris Knight, US fuel-economy rollback hit with first lawsuit, ARGUS MEDIA (May 
1, 2020), https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2101891-us-fueleconomy-rollback-hit-with-first-lawsuit.  
428. CA Waiver Revocation, 84 Fed. Reg. 51,310 (Sept. 27, 2019). 
429. Id. at 51,311–13. 
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Conservation Act.430 After the agency proposed revocation of the waiver as part of 
the 2018 SAFE proposal, California entered into a voluntary agreement with some 
automakers to meet fuel economy standards similar to those in the original 2012 
Phase II standards.431 This move inspired EPA to revoke the waiver ahead of release 
of the full final SAFE Rule.432 Ironically, in the waiver revocation, EPA claimed that 
the fact that the standards agreed to in the voluntary agreement were (marginally) 
weaker than those in the 2012 Phase II standards compelled the agency to act, despite 
the fact that the agency itself was in the midst of the SAFE rulemaking  that would 
torpedo the standards.433  
The revocation of the waiver was motivated by Trump administration 
antipathy toward California, rather than the claimed principled stand in favor of 
centralized standards (and against federalism).434 President Trump was reported to 
have been “blindsided and angered” by California’s voluntary agreement with 
automakers, and “wanted to press forward with a policy that would punish 
California.”435 After the voluntary agreement was announced, the president tweeted 
that “Henry Ford would be very disappointed if he saw his modern-day descendants 
wanting to build a much more expensive car, that is far less safe and doesn’t work as 
well, because execs don’t want to fight California regulators.”436  
Announcing the revocation, Secretary Wheeler said, “We embrace 
federalism and the role of the states, but federalism does not mean that one state can 
dictate standards for the nation.”437 While other states could adopt the California 
standards, and thirteen did so by 2019,438 the waiver does not, despite Wheeler’s 
claim, allow California to dictate standards outside its borders. After the waiver was 
revoked, the Department of Justice announced an antitrust investigation into the 
 
430. Id. at 51,313. 
431. See California and Major Automakers Reach Groundbreaking Framework Agreement on Clean 
Emission Standards, OFFICE OF GOVERNOR GAVIN NEWSOM (July 25, 2019), https://www.gov.ca.gov/2
019/07/25/california-and-major-automakers-reach-groundbreaking-framework-agreement-on-clean-
emission-standards/.  
432. CA Waiver Revocation, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51,312 (Sept. 27, 2019). 
433. Id. at 51,312–13. 
434. See Davenport, supra note 158. 
435. Id. 
436. See Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Aug. 21, 2019, 7:01 PM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1164311594081247233.  
437. See Davenport, supra note 158. 
438. Id. 
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voluntary agreement.439 The investigation was criticized as inconsistent with 
accepted principles of antitrust law,440 and even characterized as an abuse of power.441 
Civil subpoenas were issued to manufacturers in November 2019, 442 but the 
investigation was dropped in early 2020.443 
In any event, California and twenty-two other states have sued to block 
revocation of the waiver, arguing inter alia that EPA lacks statutory authority to 
revoke it and acted arbitrarily and capriciously in doing so. 444 Few court decisions 
have considered the boundaries of EPA’s authority under the waiver provision in the 
Clean Air Act.445 A 2018 analysis by the Institute for Policy Integrity at New York 
University reached the conclusion that the agency has authority to grant waivers but 
not to revoke them.446 EPA argues in the waiver revocation that it does have the 
requisite authority, noting that “[a]gencies generally have inherent authority to 
reconsider their prior actions” and that nothing in the relevant part of the statute 
“indicates Congressional intent to remove that authority with respect to waivers.”447 
 
439. See Hiroko Tabuchi & Coral Davenport, Justice Dept. Investigates California Emissions Pact That 
Embarrassed Trump, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/06/climate/automake
rs-california-emissions-antitrust.html.  
440. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Are Regulatory Agreements to Address Climate Change 
Anticompetitive?, REGULATORY REV. (Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.theregreview.org/2019/09/11/hovenk
amp-are-regulatory-agreements-to-address-climate-change-anticompetitive/ (arguing that the California 
agreement would be likely to survive antitrust challenge under the general rule of reason doctrine even if 
not shielded by the state action doctrine). 
441. Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Trump’s Justice Department’s Antitrust ‘Investigation’ of 
California’s Deal with Car Makers Is an Abuse of Power, CALMATTERS (Oct. 20, 2019), 
https://calmatters.org/commentary/auto-investigation/.  (quoting “abuse of power”). 
442. See Brent Kendall & Ben Foldy, Justice Department Issues Civil Subpoenas to Auto Makers in 
California Emissions Pact Probe, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 7, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-
department-issues-civil-subpoenas-to-auto-makers-in-california-emissions-pact-probe-11573161496.  
443. See Coral Davenport, Justice Department Drops Antitrust Probe Against Automakers That Sided 
With California on Emissions, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2020) https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/07/climate/tr
ump-california-automakers-antitrust.html.  
444. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 4, California v. Chao (D.D.C. 2019) 
(No. 1:19-cv-02826), http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/
16/case-documents/2019/20190920_docket-119-cv-02826_complaint-1.pdf.  
445. The D.C. Circuit has twice ruled that state standards not are preempted by the EPCA, as the 
EPA alleges in its waiver revocation, however. See CA Waiver Revocation, 84 Fed. Reg. 51310, 51323 
(Sept. 27, 2019); Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Herrington, 768 F.2d 1355, 1364 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
446. See generally DENISE A. GRAB ET AL., INST. POL’Y INTEGRITY, NO TURNING BACK: AN 
ANALYSIS OF EPA’S AUTHORITY TO WITHDRAW CALIFORNIA’S PREEMPTION WAIVER UNDER 
SECTION 209 OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT (Oct. 26, 2018), https://policyintegrity.org/publications/detail/no-
turning-back.  
447. CA Waiver Revocation, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51,331 (Sept. 27, 2019). 
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Assuming that the final SAFE Rule is similar to the proposal, the 
revocation of the California waiver will effectively eliminate the Phase II light-duty 
vehicle standards for model years beyond 2020, severely limiting greenhouse gas 
reductions under the Clean Air Act. By one estimate, the freeze of federal standards 
in the SAFE Rule would increase emissions by 493–684 million metric tons between 
2020 and 2035 relative to the Phase II standards as originally issued.448 Revocation 
of the California waiver could increase that reduction by an additional 562–633 
million metric tons.449 Taken together, the rollbacks have an estimated emissions cost 
of over a billion metric tons (for comparison, U.S. annual emissions are currently 
around 6.5 billion metric tons).450 However, whether the impact of the rollback on 
emissions will be so severe is currently unclear. The rollback (and the waiver 
revocation) is being litigated, and even if it survives, its effects will be not be felt 
until after the 2020 election (starting with model year 2021);451 if that election yields 
a president for whom climate policy is a priority, the rollback could itself be rolled 
back before taking effect. The voluntary agreement between automakers and broader 
industry commitments to electric vehicles suggest a secular trend towards lower 
vehicle emissions regardless of federal standards,452 though the increasing popularity 
of SUVs and other large vehicles in the U.S. market cuts in the opposite direction.453 
As a matter of law and policy, the rollback is unprecedented. Federal fuel 
economy and vehicle emissions standards had never been weakened before—perhaps 
the strongest illustration of the Clean Air Act regulatory ratchet.454 Nor had 
California’s waiver ever been revoked. On only one occasion had EPA denied a 
request for a waiver—the Bush administration revocation in the wake of 
 
448. Emily Wimberger & Hannah Pit, Come and Take It: Revoking the California Waiver, RHODIUM 
GRP. (Oct. 28, 2019), https://rhg.com/research/come-and-take-it-revoking-the-california-waiver/.  
449. Id. 
450. See EPA DRAFT INVENTORY, supra note 133, at ES-5. 
451. See SAFE Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 42,986 (proposed Aug. 24, 2018) (applicable to 2021-2026 model 
year vehicles). 
452. See, e.g., Patrick Hertzke et al., Expanding Electric-Vehicle Adoption Despite Early Growing Pains, 
MCKINSEY & CO. (Aug. 2019), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/automotive-and-assembly/our-
insights/expanding-electric-vehicle-adoption-despite-early-growing-pains (reporting doubling of U.S. EV 
sales to 360,000 vehicles in 2018, though noting that rollback of emissions standards may limit future 
attractiveness of EVs). 
453. See, e.g., Bill Vlasic, Bigger, Faster, More Lavish: Americans Crave S.U.V.s, and Carmakers Oblige, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2017) https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/12/business/suv-automakers-fuel-
economy-new-york.html.  
454. See A Brief History of US Fuel Efficiency Standards, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Dec. 
6, 2017), https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/brief-history-us-fuel-efficiency (detailing increase of light 
vehicle fuel economy standards from 1975-1985, with a plateau until the 2007 EISA and subsequent Phase 
I and Phase II standards). 
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Massachusetts.455 The courts and the 2020 presidential race will determine how 
important the rollback of light-duty vehicle standards is for climate change. The 
proposal is poorly drafted, and a similarly incomplete final rule would face increased 
judicial scrutiny.456 Nevertheless, the rollback of the Phase II standards is already 
among the most sweeping repudiations of a previous administration’s environmental 
regulation. 
B. Undoing the Clean Power Plan 
Perhaps the only other contender for that crown is the Trump EPA’s 
parallel rollback of the Clean Power Plan. President Trump was a longstanding 
opponent of the Plan, criticizing and promising to repeal it during his campaign457 
while accusing the Obama administration of a “war on coal.”458 Soon after taking 
office and just weeks after withdrawing the midterm evaluation of the Phase II 
vehicle standards, President Trump issued an executive order on “Promoting Energy 
Independence and Economic Growth.”459 In the order, he directed agencies to 
“immediately review existing regulations that potentially burden the development or 
use of domestically produced energy resources and appropriately suspend, revise, or 
rescind those that unduly burden the development of domestic energy resources 
beyond the degree necessary to protect the public interest or otherwise comply with 
the law.”460 The order went on to direct EPA to “suspend, revise, or rescind” the 
Clean Power Plan,461 and EPA announced days later that it was reviewing the Plan 
as directed.462 Meanwhile, the agency asked the D.C. Circuit to delay ruling on the 
 
455. See EPA, California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; Notice of Decision 
Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s 2009 and Subsequent Model Year 
Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards, 73 Fed. Reg. 12,156 (Mar. 6, 2008). 
456. See Davenport, supra note 104 (reporting basic drafting errors, analysis showing costs exceed 
benefits, and incomplete sections of the proposal). 
457. See Ashley Parker & Coral Davenport, Donald Trump’s Energy Plan: More Fossil Fuels and Fewer 
Rules, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/27/us/politics/donald-trump-
global-warming-energy-policy.html detailing a speech by then-candidate Trump on energy policy, in 
which he said “[r]egulations that shut down hundreds of coal-fired power plants and block the construction 
of new ones—how stupid is that?”). 
458. See Coral Davenport, Donald Trump, in Pittsburgh, Pledges to Boost Both Coal and Gas, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/23/us/politics/donald-trump-fracking.html 
(“[W]e will end the war on coal and the war on miners.”). 
459. Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 31, 2017) (Promoting Energy 
Independence and Economic Growth), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-
executive-order-promoting-energy-independence-economic-growth/.  
460. Exec. Order No. 13,783, supra note 378. 
461. Id. 
462. EPA, Review of the Clean Power Plan, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,329 (Apr. 4, 2017). 
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Plan463 (oral arguments had been held in 2016 but no decision on the merits had yet 
been made).464  
In October 2017, Secretary Pruitt announced that the agency had completed 
review of the Plan and would, as requested, repeal it.465 In its proposed repeal, the 
agency claimed it lacked authority under Section 111(d) to implement the Plan, or to 
base required emissions reductions on “outside the fence” measures466 (interestingly, 
the agency did not cite conflict with Section 112 as a legal barrier to the Plan).467 The 
agency further said it “had not determined” whether it would issue any replacement 
for the Plan or, if it did, when it might happen or what form a replacement might 
take.468 
Why say anything about a replacement at all? Clearly the Trump 
administration had little interest in emissions regulations, particularly of coal plants, 
so why not simply repeal the Clean Power Plan and be done with Section 111(d) 
regulation? The answer is that there is a strong argument that regulation of 
greenhouse gases under that part of the statute is mandatory, based on the Court’s 
rulings in Massachusetts and AEP—or at least that not regulating required taking 
political and/or legal risks that the administration was unwilling to take.469 One way 
to avoid regulating would be to withdraw the endangerment finding on which all 
Clean Air Act climate regulation is based (more on that below). Failing that, the 
agency could simply refuse to replace the Clean Power Plan, inviting or 
strengthening opponents in inevitable litigation. That might not be all bad, from the 
Trump EPA’s perspective: if repealing the endangerment finding was the bold move, 
the really bold move would be to do nothing, invite legal challenge, then ask the 
Supreme Court to overrule Massachusetts. But the agency was unwilling to take the 
 
463. See Notice of Executive Order, EPA Review of Clean Power Plan and Forthcoming 
Rulemaking, and Motion to Hold Cases in Abeyance, West Virginia v. EPA (D.C. Cir. 2016) (No. 15-
1363), http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/case-
documents/2017/20170328_docket-15-1363_notice.pdf.  
464. See Jonathan Adler, Opinion, The En Banc D.C. Circuit Meets the Clean Power Plan, WASH. 
POST (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/09/28/the-
en-banc-d-c-circuit-meets-the-clean-power-plan/.  
465. CPP Repeal, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,035 (proposed Oct. 16, 2017). 
466. Id. at 48,039–40. 
467. See discussion related to note 306 supra. 
468. CPP Repeal Proposal at 48,036. 
469. Withdrawing the Clean Power Plan without replacement would have exposed the agency to 
at least two legal challenges. One is that EPA must provide reasons grounded in the statute and consistent 
with the endangerment finding to refuse to regulate power plant GHG emissions, citing Massachusetts. 
Another is that failure to regulate these emissions exposes power plant operators once again to federal 
nuisance suits. See discussion of AEP, supra Section II.E. 
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risk.470 Even if successful, failure to regulate power plants under Section 111(d) would 
undercut the displacement analysis in AEP, possibly allowing suits under the federal 
common law of nuisance to proceed again. 
The minimalist approach seems to have appeared attractive: replace the 
Clean Power Plan, but do so with a rule that does as little as possible. Typically, it is 
easier for an agency to defend inaction as opposed to action.471 But, given 
Massachusetts, AEP, the 2011 settlement agreements, and the endangerment finding, 
that was less true here. Rather than do nothing, it was easier to do little and defend 
the resulting action as within agency discretion. This is the approach the agency took, 
proposing, and in June 2019 finalizing, its ACE Rule.472 
The ACE Rule is relatively simple: it drops the Clean Power Plan’s 
estimated emissions reductions from shifting coal to gas generation and constructing 
new renewables (the “outside the fence” measures the agency found legally 
objectionable).473 It retains in barest form the Clean Power Plan’s estimates of 
emissions reductions available from efficiency improvements at coal plants (“inside 
the fence” measures).474 But instead of using these estimated improvements to set 
emissions-reduction targets for states to meet, as the Clean Power Plan did, it simply 
invited states to submit plans for meeting the now-undefined standards, effectively 
allowing them to set their own targets.475  
Given its lack of ambition or direction, the ACE Rule was projected to do 
far less to reduce emissions than the Clean Power Plan would have. EPA estimated 
that it would reduce emissions by 10.9 metric tons annually in 2025, declining to 8.4 
metric tons in 2035.476 This was compared to the 375 million metric tons of annual 
emissions reductions projected for the Clean Power Plan in 2030.477 EPA did not 
compare estimated impacts of the ACE to Clean Power Plan, on the grounds that 
 
470. The agency could have also argued that any §111(d) standards for coal plants were preempted 
because those sources were also subject to §112 regulations, as discussed above. But the agency’s failure to 
even discuss that argument in the proposed and final repeal of the Clean Power Plan suggests it never 
took it seriously.  
471. See Biber, supra note 74. 
472. ACE Rule, 84 Fed. Reg. 32,520 (July 8, 2019). 
473. Id. at 32,523–32. 
474. Id. at 32,534–43. 
475. Id. at 32,549–53. 
476. Id. at 32,561 (converting from short to metric tons). 
477. Clean Power Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,924 (Oct. 23, 2015) (converting short tons to 
metric tons). 
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the earlier rule had already been repealed.478 An analysis by Amelia Keyes and other 
economists suggests that under some circumstances the ACE Rule could increase 
emissions compared to no policy at all due to a rebound effect, wherein more efficient 
plants run more often..479 According to the analysis, as many as eighteen states plus 
D.C. would see their emissions increase, though emissions would still decline by a 
small amount nationally.480 In short, the ACE Rule was designed to do as little as 
legally possible, and sometimes does even less than that. 
The repeal-and-replace-with-a-weak-rule approach the agency took with 
the Clean Power Plan contrasts superficially with its approach to the Phase II light-
duty standards. The agency effectively repealed those standards by freezing them at 
the 2020 model year level and withdrawing California’s waiver.481 The difference in 
approach can be explained by the fact that in the case of vehicle standards, a rule was 
in place; all that was necessary was for the agency to weaken it and then play legal 
defense. Challengers could (and did) allege that EPA had acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously, or that the vehicle standards were so weak that they failed to fulfill the 
agency’s legal duties.482 But they could not argue the agency failed to act at all. With 
the Clean Power Plan first stayed by the Court and then repealed, the agency was on 
weaker footing, since it had no rule at all. The ACE rule therefore put the agency in 
a position for power plant regulation similar to the one it was in for vehicle standards 
after those rollbacks. 
Because the Clean Power Plan was never implemented, repealing it and 
replacing it with the ACE Rule was a less radical move than rolling back the light-
duty vehicle standards; it ostensibly does not violate the traditional Clean Air Act 
policy ratchet, especially if one takes the view that the Clean Power Plan was always 
legally tenuous and unambitious in emissions terms. But the end of the Clean Power 
Plan and, with it, any meaningful regulation of power plant emissions, is nevertheless 
a major blow to viable Clean Air Act climate policy. The Clean Power Plan was 
intended to prove that Massachusetts augured more than just a one-sector regulatory 
program and was intended as the model for regulation of other sectors. The ACE 
Rule is a poor model, to say the least, and hardly worth the administrative effort of 
duplicating. And even if the repeal-and-replace strategy is less radical, it is more 
 
478. ACE Rule, 84 Fed. Reg. at 32,561 (“As noted earlier in this section, the illustrative policy 
scenario is compared against a baseline that does not include the CPP. This is because the ACE action 
only occurs after the repeal of the CPP.”). 
479. Amelia T. Keyes et al., The Affordable Clean Energy Rule and the Impact of Emissions Rebound on 
Carbon Dioxide and Criteria Air Pollutant Emissions, 14 ENV’T RESEARCH LETTERS 1(2019). 
480. Id. at 5-6. 
481. See supra Section III.A. 
482. Initial Opening Brief of Public Health and Environmental Petitioners, American Lung Ass’n 
v. EPA (D.C. Cir. 2020) (No. 19-1140), http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-
content/uploads/sites/16/case-documents/2020/20200417_docket-19-1140_brief-6.pdf.  
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cynical, suggesting Clean Air Act climate policy is politically malleable, untethered 
from serious consideration of climate harms.  
As with the rollback of vehicle standards, the ACE Rule is being challenged 
in court by states and environmental groups.483 Meaningful success in this litigation 
seems unlikely. As the 2016 stay indicates, elements of the Clean Power Plan were 
always legally vulnerable,484 making repeal and replace likely even under an 
administration favoring serious climate policy. And as weak as the ACE Rule is, 
would the D.C. Circuit really be willing to say it is so weak as to fail to meet the 
agency’s statutory obligations? Would such a ruling survive Supreme Court review, 
without triggering a UARG-style exclusion of climate from Section 111 (or, less likely, 
a repeal of Massachusetts)? And even if the Supreme Court did, somehow, rule in 
favor of the challengers and remand the ACE Rule to a Trump EPA for revision, 
would the new rule be meaningfully more stringent in light of the fact that the Clean 
Power Plan itself was pretty weak? It seems unlikely. The chances of real and durable 
emissions limits on the power sector from the Clean Air Act appear extremely low. 
C. Bullet Dodged or Loaded Gun—The Endangerment Finding 
What remains after the Trump rollback of Clean Air Act climate policy? 
Only three rulemakings of any significance were left intact. Two, the Phase I light 
and heavy-duty vehicle standards, had been fully implemented by 2017, so there was 
nothing to roll back. Only one rule had continuing relevance—the 2009 
endangerment (and cause-and-contribute) finding on which all other Clean Air Act 
climate rules are ultimately based. 
Why go through so many complex rollback rulemakings, non-enforcement 
decisions, and ensuing litigation when Clean Air Act climate policy could be 
removed, root and branch, by repealing the endangerment finding? This is a 
surprisingly difficult question to answer. Certainly, many within and connected to 
the Trump administration appear to have advocated for withdrawal of the 
endangerment finding. Myron Ebell, a member of the Trump transition team and a 
strident climate denier, advocated such a move in 2017:  
 
“You can’t just take out the flowers—you have to take out the 
roots—starting with the endangerment finding. . . [y]ou can undo 
the Obama climate agenda on the surface by reopening the Clean 
Power Plan Rule, the Methane Rule, rescinding the [auto 
 
483. See Sonal Patel, 22 States, Environmental Groups Mount Legal Challenges to EPA ACE Rule Power, 
POWER (Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.powermag.com/22-states-environmental-groups-mount-legal-
challenges-to-epa-ace-rule/.  
484. See supra Section II.E. 
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emissions] standards and so on. But the underlying foundation 
remains.”485  
 
Secretary Pruitt criticized the endangerment finding, claimed to be unconvinced by 
consensus climate science,486 and repeatedly suggested that repeal was on the table, 
but never took action to do so.487 Internal emails obtained as a result of records 
requests in 2018 indicate that Pruitt pushed for a “red team-blue team” review of 
climate science and, separately, for a public request for comment on repeal of the 
endangerment finding.488 But although the former was temporarily given the go-
ahead,489 no formal review of the finding was ever announced. Outside the 
administration, opponents of climate policy continually criticized EPA for failing to 
repeal the finding.490  
However, in an interview with the Washington Post after being named 
Pruitt’s replacement as EPA Secretary, Andrew Wheeler referred to the 
endangerment finding as “settled law” that would not be revisited under his 
leadership without a “major, compelling reason” to do so.491 When the ACE Rule 
was finalized in 2019, EPA Office of Air and Radiation Assistant Administrator 
William Wehrum stated: “Just to be clear, this [the ACE Rule] is a regulation of 
 
485. John McQuaid, One Big Legal Obstacle Keeps Trump from Undoing Greenhouse Gas Regulation, 
SCI. AM. (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/one-big-legal-obstacle-keeps-
trump-from-undoing-greenhouse-gas-regulation/.  
486 . See Doina Chiacu & Valerie Volcovici, EPA Chief Unconvinced on CO2 Link to Global Warming, 
REUTERS (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-epa-pruitt/epa-chief-unconvinced-on-
co2-link-to-global-warming-idUSKBN16G1XX.  
487. See Ledyard King, EPA’s Pruitt Says Challenge to Endangerment Finding Still on the Table, USA 
TODAY (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/01/30/epas-pruitt-says-
challenge-endangerment-finding-still-table/1078282001/.  
488. Emily Holden, Scott Pruitt Never Gave up EPA Plans to Debate Climate Science, Records Show, 
THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 22, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/dec/21/scott-pruitt-
epa-climate-change-science-red-team-blue-team-debate.  
489. Coral Davenport & Mark Landler, Trump Administration Hardens Its Attack on Climate Science, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/27/us/politics/trump-climate-science.ht
ml.  
490. E.g., Marianne Lavelle, Climate Policy Foes Seize on New White House Rule to Challenge 
Endangerment Finding, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (May 14, 2019), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/
13052019/climate-change-epa-endangerment-finding-challenge-cei-trump-omb-memo-health-
environment; James Delingpole, Obama’s Climate Legacy is Toast, BREITBART (Aug. 22, 2018), 
https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2018/08/22/delingpole-obamas-climate-legacy-is-toast/ (“But the 
situation is still not ideal. Arguably the most damaging of all Obama’s climate policies is still live and 
dangerous: the EPA’s notorious 2009 CO2 Endangerment Finding.”). 
491. Brady Dennis & Juliet Eilperin, Incoming EPA Chief: ‘This is the right Job for Me.,’ WASH. POST 
(July 6, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2018/07/06/incoming-
epa-chief-this-is-the-right-job-for-me/.  
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greenhouse gases . . . [n]o doubt about it.”492 At least for the time being, the agency 
appears to have little appetite for revisiting the endangerment finding. 
Determining why is difficult, and without a window into internal 
deliberations, likely impossible. Repealing the finding would have invited litigation, 
but as the above discussion of the Trump rollback efforts makes clear, litigation was 
inevitable. It is possible that the administration feared losing that litigation, which 
would have been embarrassing and would have cemented the finding. EPA would 
presumably have been accorded substantial deference on its scientific judgments by 
reviewing courts, under Chevron, so proving that an endangerment finding repeal was 
arbitrary and capricious (or otherwise contrary to law) could be difficult for 
challengers. That said, scientific evidence for human-caused climate change and 
associated harms has increased since the endangerment finding was issued, making it 
difficult for the agency to argue that the best available evidence points toward 
repeal.493 Despite Chevron deference on scientific questions, EPA leadership may 
have concluded that policy choices—like the ACE Rule versus the Clean Power Plan, 
or the freezing the model-year 2020 vehicle standards—would be safer ground to 
defend. Alternatively, leadership may have concluded that putting all their eggs in 
one legal basket (endangerment repeal) was simply less risky than defending multiple 
policies. Democratic Senator Brian Schatz attributed the more conservative approach 
under Secretary Wheeler to agency concerns over legal risk: “My sense is that 
because they keep losing in court, they’ve now got some smart lawyers trying to 
figure out how to actually comply with the law.”494 
Or, the decision may not have been driven by legal risk at all, but rather by 
politics. Industry groups that may have welcomed climate regulatory rollbacks may 
not have relished a high-profile fight over climate science in the courts and in the 
media. There is some evidence that large firms and industry groups pushed the 
Trump administration to leave the endangerment finding intact as early as 2017.495 
Industry and, perhaps, some within the administration may have concluded that a 
fight over climate science would be less politically attractive than one over regulation.  
 
492. Sobczyk & Koss, supra note 376. 
493. See generally Philip B. Duffy et al., Strengthened Scientific Support for the Endangerment Finding 
for Atmospheric Greenhouse Gases, 363 SCI. (2019), https://science.sciencemag.org/content/363/6427/eaat5
982.  
494. Sobczyk & Koss, supra note 376. 
495. See Mark Hand, Industry Opposition Leads ALEC to Withdraw Anti-Climate Resolution, 
THINKPROGRESS (Dec. 7, 2017), https://thinkprogress.org/alec-resolution-fails-b576afd1456f/; see also 
Timothy Cama, ExxonMobil Opposes ALEC’s Attempt to Fight EPA Climate Policy, THE HILL (Dec. 5, 2017), 
https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/363389-exxon-opposes-alecs-attempt-to-fight-epa-
climate-policy.  
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It is possible that all of these reasons and others, including personal or 
power struggles,496 played a role. It is hard to say how close the administration came 
to pursuing repeal of the endangerment finding. That the debate spilled out into 
public view suggests that repeal was considered, though it is possible that a few vocal 
advocates attracted media attention disproportionate to their actual influence. 
Secretary Pruitt’s ethical troubles and eventual resignation seem to have been the 
final blow for repeal efforts.497 
The failure of the Trump EPA to repeal the finding suggests that there are 
still some limits—either to the administration’s anti-climate-policy ambitions or to 
the instability of Clean Air Act climate policy. Even if substantive rulemakings on 
climate have not been normalized and integrated into the traditionally static Clean 
Air Act firmament, the endangerment finding itself seems to have been so integrated. 
IV. WHY HAS CLEAN AIR ACT CLIMATE POLICY FAILED? 
The Obama EPA built the most ambitious and detailed climate policy any 
President has considered, using only the powers made available to it under the 
existing Clean Air Act and Massachusetts. Three years after Obama left office, there 
is almost nothing left. Massachusetts’s foundations were sand. Clean Air Act climate 
policy was never normalized into the regulatory firmament. Moreover, the policies 
not yet rolled back by the Trump EPA have been superseded by events. 
Why did Clean Air Act climate policy fail? How did this happen so quickly? 
Was it inevitable? Who is to blame?  
A. Leadership 
Two easy answers are tempting: one blames President Obama for not going 
far enough, fast enough, while the other blames President Trump for reckless 
destruction. The vast difference in policy priorities and leadership style between the 
two men plays a major role. But focus on the two Presidents leads to a simplistic 
understanding that ignores other actors and structural factors. Nevertheless, the 
policy decisions of both administrations are central, and it is worth laying out the 
case that one or the other is primarily responsible for the Clean Air Act’s climate 
failure. 
 
496. There is little reporting on the internal politics of decisions on the endangerment finding, but 
some related decisions have been personality-driven. See, e.g., Andrew Restuccia, How Bannon and Pruitt 
Boxed in Trump on Climate Pact, POLITICO (June 1, 2017), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/05/31/tru
mp-paris-climate-agreement-239008 (detailing the importance of personal conflicts and power plays in 
President Trump’s decision to exit the Paris Agreement). 
497. See supra note 494 and related discussion. 
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1. Trump, Breaker of Norms 
Donald Trump is a norm-breaking president who campaigned on rejecting 
traditional approaches to governing.498 Trump appointed officials with the clear 
intent of “deconstruct[ing] the administrative state.”499 His administration is 
inexperienced and at times reckless, failing to appreciate the consequences and legal 
difficulties of radical regulatory change.500 It should therefore come as little surprise 
that the longstanding norm of stability in environmental regulations is among those 
it disregards.501  
The Trump administration’s rollback of Clean Air Act climate regulation 
has however been particularly aggressive, even by the administration’s own 
standards. Trump’s antipathy to signature Obama-administration policies and to 
climate policy in particular is well-established.502 The Trump administration is the 
first and only administration to openly reject climate science.503 And while it has 
rolled back other environmental regulations (or attempted to do so), these efforts 
have nowhere been as extensive as with climate regulation under the Clean Air Act.504 
Perhaps most notably, the Trump EPA has made no attempt to roll back Clean Air 
Act limits on conventional “criteria” air pollutants like ozone, lead, and sulfur 
dioxide(though it has engineered structural changes aimed at undercutting the 
process for updating these limits).505  
 
498. See, e.g., Ezra Klein, Donald Trump and the Destruction of America's Political Norms, VOX (June 
7, 2016), https://www.vox.com/2016/6/7/11872834/donald-trump-norms.  
499. See Morris, supra note 369. 
500. See, e.g., Knight, supra note 427 (detailing errors and sloppiness in EPA’s rollback of fuel 
economy standards, leading to conflict with OMB). 
501. See supra Section III. 
502. See supra note 366 and related discussion on President Trump’s views on climate change. See 
also David Smith, The Anti-Obama: Trump's Drive to Destroy His Predecessor's Legacy, THE GUARDIAN (May 
11, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/may/11/donald-trump-barack-obama-legacy 
(“[f]rom climate change to criminal justice to international relations, rarely has one occupant of the Oval 
Office appeared so obsessed with taking a chainsaw to the work of another.”). 
503. George H.W. Bush took climate change seriously and signed the UNFCCC. See Scott 
Waldman and Benjamin Hulac, This Is When the GOP Turned Away from Climate Policy, E&E NEWS (Dec. 
5, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060108785/. While the George W. Bush administration tried 
to avoid regulating GHGs under the CAA, spawning the Massachusetts challenge, it did not (at least 
openly) question climate science, as the ANPRM it issued illustrated. Only President Trump called 
climate change a hoax. 
504. See Popovich et al., supra note 16.  
505. Most recently, the Trump administration has decided to preserve the existing NAAQS for 
particulate matter. See EPA, Review of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate 
Matter, 85 Fed. Reg. 24,094 (Apr. 30, 2020); see also supra Section I.C.3 for discussion of this long-term 
pattern of stability of most Clean Air Act standards; Laura Bloomer and Joe Goffman, Harvard 
Environmental and Energy Law Program, The Legal Consequences of EPA’s Disruption of the NAAQS Process 
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The Trump administration is uniquely disdainful of regulation, norms, and 
climate policy. If the failure of Clean Air Act climate regulations could be attributed 
solely to an aberrant, possibly naive president, other potential causes could be 
rejected. On this view, a return to “normal” behavior by future presidents of either 
party who hold greater respect for norms would make for more stable climate policy. 
But norms are contingent: having been broken, it may be difficult or impossible to 
reestablish them. 
All this presupposes that the Trump rollbacks will be successful. Some of 
the administration’s efforts remain incomplete more than three years into its first 
term, and many of those that have been finalized are being litigated.506 The Trump 
administration’s track record in administrative law cases is abysmal.507 Richard 
Lazarus suggests rollbacks will fail because the Trump administration is making the 
same mistakes as the Bush administration did, failing to act on climate and risking 
reversal in the courts a la Massachusetts.508 Even if so, that reversal would almost 
certainly be narrower in scope.  
The largest source of legal risk in those moves are their ham-handedness,509 
not their compliance with underlying statutory mandates.510 Unlike the Bush 
administration in the 2000s, the Trump administration is not trying to escape climate 
regulation under the Clean Air Act but instead to regulate as little as possible, as the 
ACE Rule, SAFE Rule, and its decision not to repeal the endangerment finding 
illustrate.511 It may face setbacks as its poorly crafted rollbacks are remanded back to 
 
(Sept. 30, 2019), https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/2019/09/the-legal-consequences-of-epas-disruption-of-the-
naaqs-process/.  
506. See Popovich et al., supra note 16. 
507. Fred Barbash & Deanna Paul, supra note 400. 
508. Richard Lazarus, INSIGHT: Harvard’s Lazarus Expects More EPA Blundering on Climate Change, 
BLOOMBERG ENV’T (Feb. 28, 2020), https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/ 
environment-and-energy/insight-harvards-lazarus-expects-more-epa-blundering-on-climate-change.  
509. See Davenport, supra note 104 (reporting basic drafting errors in the Trump administration’s 
SAFE rule). 
510. I have little doubt that the Supreme Court would accept a pause or rollback in vehicle 
emissions standards that was carefully crafted, with clear justifications articulated. It is possible that no 
such rollback is possible—that the cost-benefit case for emissions reductions from vehicles in a time of 
increasing climate risk and market shifts toward electric cars is so clear that any well-crafted rule must 
conclude that tighter standards are warranted. But I am skeptical that a court would conclude as much 
over a contrary agency position. One should not underestimate the ability of a motivated agency to 
selectively present and interpret evidence, or of the Court’s necessarily deferential approach to “hard-
look” arbitrary & capricious review to license that approach. If the Trump EPA’s rollbacks of vehicle 
standards are rejected by courts, it is far more likely to be due to sloppiness than their substance. And 
even if they are rejected, the result will be remand to the agency for another try. 
511. Morris, supra note 369. The typical Trump administration’s strategy has been to heighten the 
contradictions, inciting political and legal conflict to remake the status quo (see, for example, Steve 
Bannon’s claim that cabinet officials were selected to lead the “deconstruction of the administrative state”). 
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the agency, but only a change in leadership will prevent rollback over the longer term. 
In the face of an administration determined to regulate as little as possible, the courts 
are unlikely to be much of a barrier.  
The Trump rollback may not even be that radical. Rules like the Phase II 
vehicle standards and the Clean Power Plan, with compliance dates in the future, 
may not have survived intact under a more “normal” Republican administration 
either; it is possible that only the rules that industry is already complying with have 
the Clean Air Act’s trademark durability.512 
The failure of Clean Air Act climate policy cannot, therefore, be attributed 
to the Trump administration’s norm-breaking destructiveness alone. A regulatory 
program vulnerable to attack and courts willing to permit or encourage that rollback 
were necessary too. 
2. Did Obama Fail to Do Enough? 
Despite all its regulatory efforts, missteps by the Obama administration 
contributed to the failure of Clean Air Act climate policy. The first and probably 
most significant error was delay: the Obama administration dragged its feet, taking 
far too long to finalize climate regulations, particularly the Clean Power Plan.  
Initially the administration moved quickly, issuing the Section 202 
endangerment finding in 2009 and the first round of vehicle standards in 2010;513 any 
subsequent momentum was quickly lost, though. Despite President Obama’s 
December 2010 claim after the failure of cap-and-trade that there were “other ways 
to skin the cat,”514 significant climate regulation was not proposed until the Clean 
Power Plan proposal three and a half years later. The Clean Power Plan was not 
finalized until August 2015, two months after Donald Trump announced his 
candidacy for president.515 Writing detailed regulation takes time, but should it really 
have taken more than four years to finalize the Clean Power Plan? If so, that alone is 
an indictment of climate policy via Clean Air Act regulation: any policy route that 
takes an entire Presidential term to build is impractical. 
Had the Obama EPA released the plan earlier, there would have been more 
time to resolve legal challenges and begin implementation of the Rule before the 
2016 election. Industry might have made more investments toward compliance, 
solidifying the Rule. Industry would certainly have challenged the Rule, but would 
 
512. See supra Section II. Some elements of the rollback do stand out as unusually aggressive, 
however, such as the refusal of Secretary Pruitt to enforce Phase II standards for glider vehicles (a policy 
reversed by his successor), or the agency’s suspension of the landfill methane NSPS (rejected by a 
reviewing court).  
513. See supra Sections II.A and II.B supra for a full discussion of this regulatory timeline. 
514. See Press Release, White House, Obama Admin., Press Conference by the President (Nov. 3, 
2010), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/03/press-conference-president.  
515. See Clean Power Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015). 
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the Supreme Court have stayed it pending litigation if faced with that decision a year 
or two earlier, before having been publicly stung by EPA’s eye-rolling response to 
the Court’s Michigan decision?516 Even if so, the agency would still have had more 
time to get a merits decision from the D.C. Circuit and Supreme Court, and perhaps 
enough time to issue a revised regulation on remand. Concurrently, the agency could 
have begun work in earnest on performance standards for other sectors. In reality it 
barely had time to issue standards for one sector of the economy—the oil and gas 
industry.  
Another tactical error was the Obama EPA’s decision to delay the 
compliance date for the Clean Power Plan until 2022, seven years after the Rule was 
finalized.517 Power plant operators were under little or no pressure to prepare to 
comply with the rule while it was under legal challenge and the subject of political 
controversy. The result was that no emissions reductions were “baked in” by the time 
the Rule was stayed or the 2016 election intervened. This is not to suggest that the 
Obama EPA was wrong to target emissions reductions that would (it then believed) 
only be achievable over the long term, out to 2030. But not requiring any emissions 
reductions for seven years seems like a misstep in retrospect, making the regulation 
particularly vulnerable to rollback by the next administration. 
Relatedly, the Clean Power Plan was almost certainly too lax when it was 
issued. As discussed above, some greens lamented at the time that it would achieve 
little, and reductions in emissions from the power sector since 2015 have vindicated 
that view.518 The Obama EPA either underestimated opportunities for low-cost 
emissions cuts or overestimated the political cost of more ambitious targets, or both. 
Paradoxically, a more stringent rule might have been more resilient to challenge. A 
rule requiring deeper inside-the-fence emissions cuts at coal plants could have 
remained robust even if courts had stripped outside-the-fence measures. A more 
stringent rule might have also pushed power plant operators to make structural 
changes sooner. 
One defense is that these critiques of the Clean Power Plan are evaluating 
it on the wrong criteria. Maybe it was less about raw emissions cuts than it about 
pushing Congress to act on climate legislation by threatening a more expensive 
regulatory approach.519 Possibly, but the Plan’s limited stringency and long 
 
516. A macabre counterpoint to the claim of unnecessary delay is that if the Clean Power Plan had 
been finalized a week later, the Supreme Court would not have considered the request for an interlocutory 
stay until after Justice Scalia had died. In the presumptive event of a 4-4 deadlock, no stay would have 
been granted. 
517. Clean Power Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,664 (Oct. 23, 2015). 
518. See supra Section II.G. 
519. Or maybe it was a feint, designed to check a statutory box, attract political attention, and 
occupy opponents while other regulations actually achieved meaningful emissions reductions. If so, it is 
unclear what the real emissions-cutting move shielded by the Clean Power Plan feint was supposed to be. 
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compliance times limited its ability to motivate Congress and attract political 
attention. 
In contrast to the Clean Power Plan, the Obama EPA’s vehicle emissions 
standards required relatively rapid compliance and were stringent enough to force 
manufacturers to make real changes to their fleets.520 This has not stopped the Trump 
administration from attempting to roll them back. But some emissions reductions 
have already occurred and will persist because standards have forced the mix of 
vehicles on the road to get cleaner.521 Having already made compliance investments, 
the auto industry broadly favors leaving the Obama standards in place.522 A Clean 
Power Plan released earlier, with earlier compliance deadlines, might have been 
similarly successful. 
Despite these apparent errors, hindsight bias means some caution is 
warranted before attributing much blame to the Obama administration for climate 
policy failures. Would a bold push for the Clean Power Plan in 2012 have really hurt 
Obama’s reelection prospects? It seems unlikely, given Obama’s eventual margin of 
victory,523 but it is impossible to say for sure. It is easy to underappreciate political 
and administrative constraints from the outside.  
B. Structural Limitations 
It is possible that the differences between Trump and Obama matter less 
than what they have in common: the constraints of climate politics in America, and 
of the Clean Air Act itself. 
1. Political Constraints 
Perhaps it is not Trump that is different, but the climate issue itself. The 
traditional one-way-ratchet pattern of Clean Air Act regulation may have persisted 
because air quality issues are just not that politically salient. Environmental and 
industry groups care a great deal, and exert some influence, but they don’t get 
everything they want. Green groups don’t get all the regulatory stringency they want 
under Democratic administrations, and industry groups are rarely if ever able to push 
 
520. See EPA, The 2019 EPA Automotive Trends Report, Executive Summary at ES3-ES4 (March 
2020), https://www.epa.gov/automotive-trends/download-automotive-trends-report (detailing sharp 
increase in fleet-average fuel economy and resulting decline in carbon emissions per mile from 2013-2018). 
521. Id. 
522. See supra Section III.A (discussion of industry opposition to Trump administration rollbacks 
of the standards). 
523. See US Election 2012 Results, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 7, 2012), https://www.economist.com/ 
graphic-detail/2012/11/07/us-election-2012-results (“Barack Obama handily won the American 
presidential election, gaining an expected 332 electoral-college votes to Mitt Romney’s 206”). 
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Republican administrations to roll back air quality regulations.524 Air quality is not a 
high-profile political issue, at least so long as policy operates within certain 
boundaries—the air doesn’t get dirty enough nor do regulations get costly enough.525 
The result is the traditional one-way ratchet. Climate’s political salience means it 
does not fit this technocratic/interest group model. 
The reverse could be true. Rolling back regulations on traditional pollutants 
could be difficult or impossible because it invites opponents to claim that those 
rolling back the regulations are in favor of dirty air, smog, and the palpable health 
effects that come with them—problems the American public takes seriously and 
views as responsibilities of government.526 Climate, in contrast, is a relatively new 
danger in the public consciousness, is politically contested, and has effects that are 
less direct, less observable, and which may not be felt for decades. Climate regulatory 
rollbacks are therefore less politically costly. In either case, climate’s high profile and 
politicized nature distinguish it from most other areas of environmental regulation.  
It is not just industry but also large segments of the Republican base that 
oppose strong climate regulation.527 This raises the political cost to a Democratic 
administration of proposing and implementing climate rules. The Obama 
administration was able to finalize significant rulemakings, but only after delay over 
political fears, and at political cost: those regulations became a campaign issue in the 
form of “war on coal” rhetoric.528 This added political cost to climate regulations may 
help explain why the Clean Power Plan was not more ambitious. 
Clean Air Act regulation is not as separate from partisan politics as it may 
have previously appeared. When an air pollution issue is politically salient, 
regulatory actions (new rules or repeal of old ones) will follow. At some level this 
should not be surprising. The Clean Air Act and its 1990 Amendments would never 
have passed Congress had air quality issues not become sufficiently politically 
 
524. See supra Section I.C.3 (discussion of this historical pattern). 
525. See, e.g., Jason West and Barbara Turpin,  As air pollution increases in some US cities, the Trump 
administration is weakening clean air regulations, THE CONVERSATION (May 2, 2019), 
https://theconversation.com/as-air-pollution-increases-in-some-us-cities-the-trump-administration-is-
weakening-clean-air-regulations-115975 (arguing that air pollution “does not receive the attention it 
deserves as a public health threat” despite killing “more Americans than all transportation accidents and 
gun shootings combined”); but see Gallup, In Depth: Topics A to Z: Environment, 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/1615/environment.aspx (finding a consistent majority of Americans 
“personally worry about” air pollution either a “great deal” or a “fair amount”). 
526. Gallup, supra note 525. 
527. See Pew Research Center, U.S. Public Views on Climate and Energy (Nov. 25, 2019), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2019/11/25/u-s-public-views-on-climate-and-energy/ (finding that 
only 39% of Republicans/Republican leaners think the federal government is doing too little to reduce the 
effects of climate change). 
528. See Davenport, supra note 458 (describing Trump’s campaign promise to “end the war on coal” 
and repeal the Clean Power Plan). 
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significant.529 No major climate legislation has passed in Congress, but that does not 
mean the issue is not politically relevant; in fact the opposite—the polarization of 
the issue appears to be a key factor blocking legislation. That same polarization also 
appears to have weakened climate regulation and made its subsequent repeal more 
likely. 
2. A Poor Fit for Climate? 
Critics of climate regulation under the Clean Air Act have long alleged that 
the statute is ill-suited for regulating greenhouse gases, most notably the Bush EPA 
in Massachusetts itself.530 The statute does not mention climate change. It primarily 
targets domestic emissions, while climate is a global problem. Critics suggest that 
using the statute to regulate climate is anti-democratic in that it circumvents a public 
debate on climate policy that would occur as a predicate to new climate legislation.531  
There are structural problems too. The most robust sections of the statute 
for controlling stationary-source emissions, the Section 110 NAAQS program and 
Section 112 for hazardous air pollutants, are, most observers believe, a poor fit for 
climate.532 Some of the parts of the statute most suited to greenhouse gases are 
skeletal and rarely-used gap-fillers. 533 The tools in the statute most useful for limiting 
greenhouse gas emissions (vehicle standards in Section 202 and stationary source 
standards in Section 111) must be applied to classes of emissions sources separately; 
EPA must issue rulemakings for motor vehicles, power plants, refineries, etc.534 This 
 
529. See, e.g., Richard Revesz and Jack Lienke, Nixon's "Environmental Bandwagon": Richard Nixon 
Signed the Landmark Clean Air Act of 1970 -- But Not Because He Had Any Great Concern about the 
Environment, SALON (Jan. 3, 2016), https://www.salon.com/2016/01/02/nixons_environmental_bandwag
on_richard_nixon_signed_the_landmark_clean_air_act_of_1970_but_not_because_he_had_any_great_co
ncern_about_the_environment/  (describing political competition between Nixon and Senator Edward 
Muskie as the driving force behind passage of the 1970 Clean Air Act). 
530. See supra Sections I.A. 
531. See, e.g., William Yeatman, Competitive Enterprise Institute, EPA’s Illegitimate Climate Rule 
(July 28, 2014), https://cei.org/sites/default/files/Yeatman%20-%20EPAs%20Illegitimate%20Climate%20
Rule_0.pdf (calling the Clean Power Plan “an illegitimate exercise in executive authority” and a “power 
grab” “never. . . vetted with voters”). 
532. Richardson, supra note 22. 
533. See supra Section II. Section 111 deals mostly with standards for new sources, with standards 
for existing sources restricted to pollutants not covered under Section 110 (and possibly under Section 112. 
Section 115, covering international emissions, has also been proposed as a climate regulatory vehicle, but 
is even more skeletal and rarely-used. See Nathan Richardson, An Elephant in the Room or the Elephant in 
the Mousehole: The Legal Risks (and Promise) of Climate Policy Under §115 of the Clean Air Act, 69 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 291 (2017). 
534. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q, 7411, 7521 (7411 shows directing EPA to issue 
performance standards applicable to “source categories,” 7521 is applicable to motor vehicles and motor 
vehicle engines only). 
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increases administrative expense and complexity relative to a single economy-wide 
policy and makes emissions trading between sectors difficult or impossible. Some 
emitting sectors, like agriculture, are probably outside of the reach of the statute 
entirely.535 Regulation of greenhouse gases under these provisions also has other 
limitations, ranging from the frustrating to the possibly fatal.536  
The Clean Air Act is therefore less durable, adaptable, and flexible when 
applied to greenhouse gases than it has been when applied to other air pollution 
problems in the past. Instead, climate regulation is (the argument goes) out on a legal 
limb, vulnerable to rhetorical attack, constraint by courts skeptical of administrative 
authority, and abuse by bad faith actors.537 
While parts of this account are correct, it cannot alone explain the lack of 
success of Clean Air Act climate regulation. First, whether climate was envisioned as 
an issue the Clean Air Act might address when it was first passed is irrelevant. While 
the statute does not mention climate change, it does envision change, as science reveals 
new air pollution risks and technology for mitigating them evolves—something the 
Massachusetts Court recognized.538 It grants the agency authority to identify new 
pollutants and new harms and then to regulate them.539 Climate is no different, or if 
it is different, it is so in scope, not in kind. 
In practice, at least some of the statute’s diverse regulatory programs can 
be effective tools for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Vehicle emissions standards 
(Section 202) and stationary-source performance standards (Section 111) may be 
second-best alternatives to an economy-wide carbon price, but their long track record 
shows they can drive emissions reductions. Clean Air Act regulatory tools have to be 
command-and-control dinosaurs; EPA has proven that flexible regulations involving 
market-based mechanisms like emissions trading are compatible with the Clean Air 
 
535. Much of the carbon emissions associated with agriculture, such as those from land-use change 
or from livestock animals, do not fit into the broad categories of polluting sources (mobile and stationary) 
regulated under the Clean Air Act. 
536. For example, the interpretation of conflicting versions of §111 that would forbid regulation of 
emissions from sources also subject to hazardous air pollutant regulation under §112, discussed above. 
Even if one concludes (as I do) that this argument is unlikely to succeed, if it does it is fatal to effective 
§111 regulation of greenhouse gases because all significant carbon emissions sources are large facilities 
already subject to §112 regulations.  
537. For example, the Trump administration’s EPA, claiming to fulfill statutory requirements to 
limit greenhouse gas emissions in the ACE rule. 
538. See supra I.B.  
539. Supra note 1 (Massachusetts itself illustrates this: §202 of the statute directs EPA to regulate 
emissions of “any air pollutant” that it identifies as a threat to public health or welfare). See supra Section 
I.A. 
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Act.540 Both the vehicle fuel economy standards and the Clean Power Plan allowed 
emissions trading.541 
Nor is the sector-by-sector approach required by the Clean Air Act a major 
limitation, at least in the short term. The key advantage of an economy-wide carbon 
price over a piecemeal regulatory approach is that it allows achievement of an 
environmental goal without requiring knowledge of how or where in the economy 
emissions can most cost-effectively be reduced.542 But in 2015 and today, the best 
opportunities for emissions reduction are obvious: power plants (especially 
inefficient coal plants) and road vehicles are the largest emitters.543 How emissions 
reductions should be achieved in those sectors—that is, which coal plants should shut 
down, and how the vehicle fleet should become more efficient—is a harder question, 
but that is why the regulations do allow flexibility and trading within their sectoral 
domains. Once the low-hanging fruit are picked, cross-sector or economy-wide 
regulations that the Clean Air Act cannot readily provide may be needed. But this 
limitation of the statute is not yet significant. 
The fractured, sectoral nature of Clean Air Act regulation could also make 
it more stable, rather than less so. It is harder for new agency leadership to repeal 
many regulations than it is to repeal just one. It was far easier for the Trump 
administration to withdraw from the Paris Agreement that it has been to roll back 
Clean Air Act climate regulation. Congress could repeal many regulations at once by 
stripping climate from the statute. But such efforts have been unsuccessful to date.544 
The Supreme Court has been more successful at undercutting broad regulatory 
authority all at once, as UARG illustrates and the next subsection discusses in more 
detail. 
The claim that using Clean Air Act for climate policy is somehow anti-
democratic rings hollow as well. Agencies frequently apply old statutes to new 
problems without creating a legitimacy crisis.545 If agencies go too far, Congress, the 
courts, and the ballot box can, and do, constrain them.  
No one creating a regulatory scheme for dealing with greenhouse gas 
emissions would re-create the Clean Air Act, but it provides all the tools (and 
 
540. See Richard Schmalensee & Robert N. Stavins, Policy Evolution under the Clean Air Act, 33 J. 
OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 27–50 (2019) (describing evolution in policy tools used under the Clean Air 
Act, to include various forms of emissions trading). 
541. See Phase I Light Duty Standards at 25,338. See also Clean Power Plan at 64,665. 
542. See Richardson & Fraas, supra note 22, at 10,477-10,478. 
543. See EPA Draft Inventory, supra note 133, at 2-25 (estimating transportation sector emissions 
at 27.9% of total U.S. GHG emissions, slightly more than the electric power industry at 26.9%). 
544. See, e.g., Stopping EPA Overreach Act of 2017, H.R. 637 115th Cong (2017), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/637?r=84&s=1.  
545. For example, the Sherman Antitrust Act has remained the bedrock of U.S. antitrust law 
throughout its evolution since the 19th century. 
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legitimacy) necessary for a robust climate policy. This makes its failure to create such 
a regulatory scheme all the more bitter. In a recent volume on the Clean Air Act, 
Ann Carlson and Dallas Burtraw describe it as “a remarkable statute” with a nearly 
fifty-year track record of “large reductions in harmful air pollutants.”546 They 
attribute this success to the statute’s durability (in that it has outlasted the political 
coalition responsible for its creation), adaptability (in that it is capable of addressing 
new air pollution problems), and flexibility (in that it allows for use of innovative 
regulatory tools).547 This praise is deserved, but the strengths of the statute have not 
held for climate. 
C. A Hostile Court 
Until 2016, the most significant limiting factor for Clean Air Act climate 
policy was the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the scope of agency authority. Until 
Massachusetts, it was unclear whether the Clean Air Act could be applied to 
greenhouse gases at all. For a time, Massachusetts seemed to have resolved that 
question. But subsequent decisions, UARG (quietly) and the Clean Power Plan stay 
(loudly and clearly), demonstrated otherwise. Every Supreme Court case on climate 
policy since Massachusetts has constrained EPA authority, with the possible and 
limited exception of AEP.548 As a result, Massachusetts is constrained, maybe limited 
to its facts, and there is now substantial legal risk for any Clean Air Act climate 
policy. 
The Court’s has restricted Clean Air Act climate authority both directly 
and indirectly. The Clean Air Act stay blocked the highest-profile part of the Obama 
EPA’s climate policy, and suggested the Court would eventually have rejected the 
rule on the merits. UARG created substantial legal risk for climate regulation under 
each provision of the statute, forcing the agency to replay Massachusetts for each new 
program.  
More broadly, the Court has become skeptical of agency authority in recent 
years; in particular its Clean Air Act cases since Massachusetts have been vehicles for 
constraining and criticizing the administrative state.549 Gillian Metzger has 
 
546. LESSONS FROM THE CLEAN AIR ACT, supra note 4, at 3. 
547. Id. 
548. See discussion of UARG, AEP, and the Clean Power Plan, supra Sections II.D and II.E. 
549. See, e.g., UARG v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 323-24 (2014) (“We expect Congress to speak clearly 
if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of vast ‘economic and political significance.”); see also Michigan 
v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015) (denying deference to an agency statutory interpretation despite its 
ambiguity, i.e., at Chevron’s Step Two). Massachusetts itself is arguably anti-administrative if it is viewed 
as insufficiently deferential to the agency’s interpretive authority and/or setting of priorities for 
regulation. 
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characterized this project as “contemporary anti-administrativism.”550 In her view, it 
has become sufficiently ascendant that the administrative state can be described as 
“under siege,” with battles over the scope of administrative power thought resolved 
in the New Deal era now being refought.551  
In UARG, Justice Scalia further solidified a clear-statement rule for 
statutory provisions that an agency claims give it significant powers,552 constraining 
deference to agency readings under Chevron by increasing the scope of its no-
deference Step One inquiry.553 Justice Scalia’s Michigan v. EPA opinion was a rare 
loss for an agency at Chevron’s deferential Step Two.554 As discussed above, EPA’s 
reaction to it may have contributed to the Court’s decision to stay the Clean Power 
Plan. The stay may have been driven in part or whole by anti-administrativism, with 
the Court skeptical of asserted EPA authority to regulate a broad sector of the 
economy based on thin statutory text.555 Even Massachusetts itself could be 
characterized as an anti-administrativist decision, in that the Court refused to defer 
to the agency’s interpretation, though the result was to block the agency’s attempt to 
shrink its own authority, not to constrain that authority.556 The revival of the “major 
questions” exception to Chevron deference in 2015’s King v. Burwell  decision further 
eroded deference to agencies.557 The Court’s palpable skepticism toward 
administrative agencies in general and toward Clean Air Act climate policy in 
particular will continue to be a constraint for the foreseeable future. 
The Court’s Clean Air Act jurisprudence post-Massachusetts is a double 
barrier to climate policy under the statute. It constrains administrations that want to 
use the statute’s powers and enables administrations that do not use this statutory 
power, or that want to roll back existing regulations. Under President Obama, EPA 
was not blind to these trends on the Court. This likely caused EPA to be more 
cautious in crafting the Clean Power Plan than it would have otherwise, though any 
caution was little help in the end.558 Under President Trump, the Court’s skepticism 
 
550. Gillian E Metzger, 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 
(2017). 
551. See id. at 2-8. 
552. UARG, 573 U.S. at 323–25.  
553. See Richardson, supra note 46, at 371–77, 419-22.  
554. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2718. 
555. See Adler, supra note 312. 
556. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532-535 (2007); see also Freeman & Vermeule, supra 
note 3. 
557. See generally Richardson, supra note 46, at 367–71. 
558. To be sure, the Court has not ruled that Section 111 stationary source standards are wholly 
inapplicable to climate, a la UARG, whatever reservations about the Clean Power Plan led it to stay that 
rule. But that should not inspire much confidence that Section 111 remains a solid vehicle for future policy 
for the power sector or other sectors with large contributions to U.S. emissions. A majority including the 
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has worked hand-in-glove with the administration’s desire to halt and roll back 
climate regulation. As the ACE Rule illustrates, the Trump administration can 
readily claim that its rollbacks are driven by legal constraints on the agency, rather 
than different policy preferences that must be supported by evidence. This makes 
the administrative burden of rollback rulemakings substantially lower, and constrains 
the scope of legal challenges to them.  
The Court’s skepticism and hostility toward climate regulation turned 
Massachusetts from a license to build a regulatory program into a trap, drawing the 
Obama EPA into a legal quagmire and enabling the Trump EPA’s rollback. Jody 
Freeman characterized UARG as a doctrinal “improvised explosive device” shortly 
after it was decided.559 As it turns out, the bomb doesn’t even have to go off to do 
severe damage to Clean Air Act climate policy. Instead, it merely upends the 
traditional environmental policy ratchet for Clean Air Act climate regulation, making 
it harder to implement rules and easier to repeal them. The same has not occurred 
for other Clean Air Act programs where there has been no parallel shift in the Court’s 
jurisprudence (e.g., on authority to set national ambient air quality standards).560 
This may explain why Trump administration rollback efforts have been so much 
more successful for climate programs than in other areas. The Court’s skepticism 
toward the scope of EPA authority under the Clean Water Act (i.e., the extent of 
“waters of the United States”) and its scattered jurisprudence on that question appear 
to have had a similar, parallel effect—making expansion of authority more difficult 
and retraction easy.561 The fragmented structure of the statute, requiring multiple 
rulemakings for various programs and sectors, exacerbates this risk. 
That said, there have already been some changes in personnel on the Court 
since UARG (and the Clean Power Plan stay) were decided. Justices Kavanaugh and 
 
Chief Justice did rule in AEP that Section 111 was applicable to greenhouse gas emissions, 564 U.S. 410 
(2011), but I do not have confidence that determination would hold were the Court faced with a merits 
decision on Clean Power Plan-like regulation. The alleged conflict between Section 112 and Section 111, 
noted in AEP itself, provides one ready escape, and there are likely others. And even if the basic 
applicability of Section 111 to climate is preserved, that it may not be sufficient to allow meaningful 
emissions standards if the Court were to adopt the position advanced by Clean Power Plan critics (and 
the Trump EPA) that “outside the fence” emissions reduction opportunities cannot be considered. If the 
agency can only base its standards on incremental efficiency improvements at coal plants, the emissions 
gains will be minimal (as the ACE rule illustrates). A possible way for the agency to circumvent a narrow, 
inside-the-fence only reading of Section 111 is to redefine the regulated source categories. If performance 
standards apply to, say, all fossil-fuel power plants rather than separate standards for coal and natural gas, 
then EPA could presumably take natural gas as the “best system of emissions reduction”, effectively 
requiring existing coal plants to shut down (or install carbon capture technology). Such a move, even if 
legal, would be politically risky. 
559. Freeman, supra note 242, at 10. 
560. But see generally Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015). This case is an exception, but is 
limited to a one-off provision of the statute. 
561. See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (plurality opinion) (narrowly 
interpreting the scope of the Clean Water Act’s application to “waters of the United States”). 
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Gorsuch have not yet ruled on a Clean Air Act climate case at the Court, but their 
statements and track record in other cases suggest they would be skeptical of EPA 
authority. While serving on the D.C. Circuit, Justice Kavanaugh dissented from his 
colleagues’ denial of en banc review of the panel decision upholding the Tailoring 
Rule in the case that became UARG, arguing in favor of an even narrower 
interpretation of “any air pollutant” than that eventually adopted by the Supreme 
Court.562 Kavanaugh has also shown a consistent skepticism toward expansion of 
agency authority, repeatedly ruling against EPA.563 In particular, he has consistently 
interpreted grants of authority in regulatory statutes narrowly, applying UARG’s 
“clear statement” rule in matters of “vast economic and political significance.”564 It 
seems unlikely that Kavanaugh would vote to expand EPA authority over climate 
under the Clean Air Act. Similarly, he is likely to be skeptical of any agency claims 
of expansive or flexible authority. With the replacement of Justice Kennedy, the 
presumptive swing vote in Massachusetts, with Justice Kavanaugh, The legal future of 
Clean Air Act climate authority appears bleaker now than it has ever been.  
Justice Gorsuch’s judicial record shows similar skepticism toward agency 
authority and even greater dedication to textualism, though his service on the Tenth 
Circuit means he has relatively little experience with Clean Air Act cases.565 His 2020 
decision in Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia,566 however, might offer some hope that 
he would accept a broad reading of the Clean Air Act, along the lines of Massachusetts. 
In Bostock, Gorsuch rejected an “elephants in mouseholes” argument that the bar on 
sex discrimination in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act should not be read to forbid 
 
562. See Order on Petitions for Rehearing En Banc, Coal. for Responsible Regulation v. EPA,  
(D.C. Cir. Dec. 20, 2012) (No. 09–1322), 2012 WL 6621785, at *14 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from denial 
of rehearing en banc). Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in UARG quotes Justice Kavanaugh’s dissent 
favorably. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 328 (2014). 
563. See F. William Brownell et al., From Judge to Justice: What Brett Kavanaugh’s Supreme Court 




565. See, e.g., Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring) (“There’s an elephant in the room with us today. We have studiously attempted to work our 
way around it and even left it unremarked. But the fact is Chevron and Brand X permit executive 
bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of core judicial and legislative power and concentrate federal power 
in a way that seems more than a little difficult to square with the Constitution of the framers’ design. 
Maybe the time has come to face the behemoth.”). See also Neil M. Gorsuch, Lecture, Of Lions and Bears, 
Judges and Legislators, and the Legacy of Justice Scalia, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 909 (2016) (2016 
Sumner Canary Lecture at Case Western Reserve University School of Law (Apr. 7, 2016)) (“[A]n 
assiduous focus on text, structure, and history is essential to the proper exercise of the judicial function.”). 
566. Bostock v. Clayton County, Ga., No. 17-1618, slip op. (June 15, 2020), https://www.supreme 
court.gov/opinions/19pdf/17-1618_hfci.pdf.  
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discrimination against homosexual and transgender employees.567 Congress may not 
have explicitly intended the statute to reach LGBT protections, Gorsuch noted, but 
as “a major piece of federal civil rights legislation . . . written in starkly broad terms,” 
Congress did intend it to have wide reach, including “unexpected applications.”568 
Even if extension to LGBT protections was an elephant, Title VII was no 
mousehole.569 A very similar argument could be made for the CAA: even though 
climate regulation is an elephant not explicitly anticipated by Congress, the statute’s 
“any air pollutant” language and broad reach throughout the economy mean it is no 
mousehole.570 This argument may be constrained by Justice Scalia’s UARG clear 
statement rule, finding that climate regulation in at least some provisions of the CAA 
is impermissible mousehole-stuffing.571 On the other hand, Justice Gorsuch has also 
expressed interest in a revival of the nondelegation doctrine, which would 
substantially constrain broad delegations to agencies, perhaps fatally dooming Clean 
Air Act climate regulation.572 Time may tell how these threads in Justice Gorsuch’s 
thinking, currently in some tension, are resolved. It would not be surprising for 
Justice Gorsuch to be the pivotal vote in a future CAA/climate case. 
The antipathy on the Court towards Massachusetts runs sufficiently deep 
that some have speculated it will be overturned.573 That remains possible, and some 
Justices would clearly vote to do so, having already called for the case to be 
overturned in their UARG dissents.574 But in my view, five votes for overturning 
seems unlikely. No confrontation with stare decisis is therefore necessary. The reason 
is that Massachusetts is now so weak that it is hardly worth overturning (though fear 
the Court might overrule or further constrain Massachusetts may deter environmental 
groups from suing over rollbacks).575 
 
567. Id. at 30. 
568. Id. at 34. 
569. Id. at 30. 
570. See Jennifer Hijazi, LGBT Rights Ruling: 'Potent New Precedent' on Climate?, E&E NEWS (June 
18, 2020), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1063407045.  
571. Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 573 U.S. at 2432 (“EPA’s interpretation would also bring about an 
enormous and transformative expansion in EPA’s regulatory authority without clear congressional 
authorization.”). 
572. See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
573. See, e.g., Amanda Reilly, Is Massachusetts v. EPA a Goner?, CLIMATEWIRE (June 28, 2018), 
https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2018/06/28/stories/1060087211.  
574. UARG, 573 U.S. at 344 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
575. See Reilly, supra note 573 (quoting David Bookbinder, former general counsel of the Sierra 
Club saying “If there's a bad environmental decision in an appellate court, whereas previously you might 
have asked the Supreme Court to take it, they will now not do so. . . Better to limit the damage than turn 
a circuit court opinion into a Supreme Court one.”). 
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Environmental lawyers that cheered Massachusetts thought it would push 
EPA to embark on a broad climate regulatory program. But it did no such thing. The 
Obama EPA did not need Massachusetts to regulate climate; even Justice Scalia’s 
Massachusetts dissent would have left that decision to agency discretion. The 
unpunished inaction of both the Bush EPA in the year after Massachusetts and the 
Trump EPA today illustrate that there is no effective pressure from the courts to 
regulate greenhouse gases. The Court’s jurisprudence therefore does little or nothing 
to push the agency to regulate carbon, while doing a great deal to constrain it. It’s not 
just that Massachusetts doesn’t deserve its rank among the most important 
environmental cases: it’s that it does almost nothing at all. The narrowest reading of 
the case is that it prevents EPA from refusing to act on climate. In practice, a decade 
of the Court’s Clean Air Act cases show it doesn’t even do that. 
D. Conclusions 
American federal environmental law is at a point of crisis, driven by its 
failure to grapple with the challenge of climate change. Obstruction and delay by the 
George W. Bush administration and wholesale rollback of climate policy by the 
Trump administration have wasted over a decade. The years in between saw the rise 
and fall of a grand policy experiment under President Obama. The contours of Clean 
Air Act climate policy have been under constant evolution since the mid-1990s. Such 
delay is hardly ideal but could perhaps be justified if there were something to show 
for it. Lack of a meaningful policy outside of one round of vehicle emissions 
standards, in the face of a grave climate emergency, is unforgivable. It is true that 
the cornerstones of Clean Air Act climate policy—Massachusetts and the 
endangerment finding—remain in place. But prospects for meaningful future climate 
policy under the statute are dim. Continuing rollback seems more likely. 
Massachusetts seemed to settle the most important legal questions, normalizing Clean 
Air Act climate policy, but it has failed in practice to do so. 
Any future president interested in meaningful action on climate therefore 
should not rely on the Clean Air Act. This is not widely understood: all the major 
contenders for the Democratic nomination in 2020 announced climate policy plans 
that rely to some extent on using the Clean Air Act to regulate greenhouse gas 
emissions for sectors other than vehicles.576 New climate regulatory programs would 
 
576. See, e.g., Biden for President, Joe’s Plan for a Clean Energy Revolution and Environmental Justice 
(last visited Mar. 4, 2020), https://joebiden.com/climate/ (promising “aggressive methane pollution limits 
for new and existing oil and gas operations.”); see also Mike Bloomberg for President, 100% Clean Power 
(last visited Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.mikebloomberg.com/policies/plan-for-100-percent-clean-power 
(“Mike also will reverse Trump’s rollbacks of environmental rules and put in place aggressive standards 
for carbon and other air pollution from coal and gas plants.”); Elizabeth Warren, Tackling the Climate Crisis 
Head On, (last visit. Mar. 4, 2020), https://elizabethwarren.com/plans/climate-change (“She will work to 
decarbonize our electric sector by restoring the Clean Power Plan to put limits on carbon pollution emitted 
from our power plants.”); Bernie Sanders, The Green New Deal (last visit. Mar. 4, 2020), 
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require a large number of rulemakings, occupying much of EPA’s regulatory 
resources. But given past experience their likelihood of surviving legal challenge and 
meaningfully reducing emissions over the medium- to long-term is low. Any future 
Clean Air Act climate rules will need to be crafted to minimize legal risk, rather than 
to maximize environmental and cost-effectiveness.  
This is a shame, not least because the Clean Air Act has proved itself 
environmentally successful, economically efficient, flexible, and politically robust in 
addressing a wide variety of other air pollution problems.577 It remains one of the 
most important and successful statutes in American law. The Clean Air Act 
regulations proposed and finalized by the Obama administration were the most 
significant federal actions yet taken on climate, whatever their flaws and limitations. 
They could have provided the basis for continued regulatory efforts that would have 
substantially reduced U.S. emissions and, perhaps, unlocked more ambitious 
international climate policy commitments. A good part of my career has been 
devoted to legal analysis of climate policy options under the Clean Air Act. I continue 
to believe that its text and design are compatible with environmentally meaningful, 
reasonably cost-effective, and durable climate policy. Many others have reached 
similar conclusions.578 But any hopes of this actually materializing have now nearly 
vanished.  
Some of the reasons why were baked in: structural limitations in the Clean 
Air Act made regulating a globally-mixed and economy-wide pollutant particularly 
difficult and unusually vulnerable to legal challenge. EPA under President Obama 
could also have moved more quickly or sought greater emissions reductions, though 
the extent to which either would have led to more durable policy is ambiguous. 
The primary reasons for the failure of Clean Air Act climate policy are 
political and legal—the 2016 election, the Supreme Court’s 2014 UARG decision, and 
its 2016 stay of the Clean Power Plan stand out as turning points. The political story 
is so obvious it barely merits retelling: the contrast between President Trump and 
President Obama in both their views on climate policy and respect for norms is stark. 
Some degree of climate policy rollback was likely inevitable under Trump. But the 
change in administrations is insufficient to explain the retreat from Clean Air Act 
climate policy. No other change in administrations has resulted in so great an 
environmental policy rollback.  
 
https://berniesanders.com/issues/green-new-deal/ (promising “economy-wide regulations to limit carbon” 
under the Clean Air Act). 
577. LESSONS FROM THE CLEAN AIR ACT, supra note 4, at 3.  
578. Most obviously and notably, the EPA itself under President Obama, as illustrated by their 
regulatory program. Outside government, many scholars and observers reached similar conclusions. See, 
e.g., Ann Carlson, An Ode to the Clean Air Act, 30 LAND USE AND ENV’T LAW 119 (2014); Dallas Burtraw 
et al., The Costs and Consequences of Clean Air Act Regulation of CO2 from Power Plants, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 
557 (2014).  
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Though they have attracted far less attention than President Trump’s policy 
shifts, the Supreme Court’s skepticism towards Clean Air Act climate authority 
specifically and broad administrative authority more generally have enabled and 
empowered those rollback efforts. If the story of the failure of Clean Air Act climate 
policy has one author, it is Donald Trump, but if it has a second it is Chief Justice 
Roberts. The Court’s antipathy toward Clean Air Act climate regulations directly 
undercut the assertion that they were in any sense “normal” rules under the statute. 
Nothing made that clearer than the Court’s unheard-of interlocutory stay of the 
Clean Power Plan. Any future president attempting to build climate policy through 
the Clean Air Act will have to contend with the skepticism or outright hostility of 
this majority of Supreme Court Justices. Environmental and state litigants can, and 
will, still challenge rollback rulemakings, but they will be forced by the Court’s 
subsequent jurisprudence to concede the commanding heights they thought they had 
gained with Massachusetts. 
That said, Congress’ inability to pass new climate legislation, or even to 
update and clarify decades-old environmental statutes, is the root problem. It is 
unreasonable to rely on the courts to shape national environmental policy, and 
perhaps even unfair to force them to do so. Relying on executive action without a 
clear legislative mandate substantially increases the risk of sharp policy swings 
between administrations. For meaningful progress on climate to be made, Congress 
must act. Even more deeply, political elites and much of the American public have 
all failed over the past few decades to take climate change seriously, as the issue has 
been drawn into the twin maws of partisan polarization and ideological battles on the 
Court. The Clean Air Act’s failures are ultimately a symptom of this wider neglect.  
V. CODA: A WAY FORWARD? 
Where, then, from here? Global carbon emissions must be reduced sharply 
in the coming decades if catastrophic climate change is to be avoided. Substantial 
U.S. reductions are both practically and diplomatically necessary (though not 
sufficient) for such global cuts to occur. For a decade, the Clean Air Act has been the 
primary vehicle for federal climate policy. But absent major political shifts, including 
new views on core questions of administrative law on the Supreme Court, spending 
resources on ambitious climate regulation under the Clean Air Act appears unwise. 
A new foundation for climate policy is desperately needed at the federal level. 
First, it is important not to overreach by declaring Clean Air Act climate 
policy a complete failure. Climate-driven emissions standards for new motor vehicles 
still have a relatively firm legal foundation. With transportation now the sector of 
the U.S. economy with the greatest emissions,579 this is an extremely valuable policy 
tool. Future presidents should consider tightening car and truck emissions standards, 
 
579. See EPA DRAFT INVENTORY, supra note 133, at 2-25 (estimating transportation sector 
emissions at 27.9% of total U.S. GHG emissions, slightly more than the electric power industry at 26.9%). 
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as past presidential administrations have successfully done. Standards for ships and 
aircraft should also be considered. Regulatory authority over vehicle emissions is 
extremely strong, but nevertheless limited: the agency could in principle ban the 
internal combustion engine, but standards only apply to new vehicles. This limitation 
means standards have to stay in place for the long term as vehicle fleets turn over in 
order to be effective. But the ability of the Trump administration to roll back much 
of the Obama EPA’s vehicle standards suggests that long-term stability cannot be 
assumed. 
Other Clean Air Act regulations might yield substantial carbon emissions 
reductions as co-benefits even if not aimed explicitly at greenhouse gases. Re-
imposition of limits on mercury emissions on coal plants put in place by the Obama 
administration and rolled back under Trump would likely force marginal coal plants 
to close, reducing carbon emissions as well.580 Tighter NAAQS for nitrogen oxides, 
ozone, particulate matter, or other pollutants could speed turnover of vehicle fleets, 
power plants, and industrial emissions sources. 
However much Clean Air Act climate policy and Massachusetts have been 
eroded, the statute’s ability to push greenhouse gas emissions cuts can’t be fully 
dismantled without two additional major moves: overturning Massachusetts and 
repealing the Section 202 endangerment finding. Despite much noise about both 
from some Justices and Trump administration officials, respectively,581 neither 
appears likely soon. These Clean Air Act tools are valuable, but inadequate. The 
statute lacks tools to reduce transportation sector emissions quickly, and lacks durable 
and reliable tools for regulating other sectors at all. Beyond transportation, another 
way to skin the cat must be found. 
In the long term, the only viable solution is new legislation. In the wake of 
Massachusetts, some commentators noted the necessity of climate legislation even 
while praising the decision’s empowerment of EPA.582 To the extent that any of us 
believed that the Clean Air Act could alone provide the tools for broad climate policy, 
we had far too much faith in administrative technocracy divorced from politics. That 
faith seems naïve in hindsight. Hope springs that a federal carbon tax, the Green 
New Deal, or some other economy-wide climate policy could pass in the near future. 
The failure of any such legislation to pass, or even to come close since 2010, 
sometimes makes those hopes appear foolish. But, to paraphrase a view on America 
 
580. Until their rollback, the mercury standards had been a driver of coal plant retirements. See 
EIA, Coal plants installed mercury controls to meet compliance deadlines (Sept. 18, 2017), 
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=32952.  
581. See discussion of endangerment finding rollback, supra Section III.C and discussion of 
overturning Massachusetts, supra Section IV.C. 
582. See, e.g., Cannon, The Significance of Massachusetts v. EPA, supra note 3 at 59 (“Further action 
by Congress and the President [i.e., beyond the CAA] will be necessary to achieve a comprehensive 
climate change policy.”) 
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itself often attributed to Winston Churchill, perhaps Congress will do the right thing, 
after trying everything else.583  
The fates of Clean Air Act climate policy and new climate legislation may 
yet be linked. The day may come again when regulatory authority might be traded 
away in legislative negotiations for more robust and enduring climate policy.584 Clean 
Air Act authority is of course a smaller bargaining chip now than in was in 2009, but 
it is worth something. On the other hand, many green groups that historically have 
opposed any sacrifice of hard-won regulatory powers might be more willing to do so 
now. Whether this tradeoff is wise will probably remain contentious. 
The failure of the Obama administration’s executive-led climate policy 
illustrates not just the limitations of the Clean Air Act described at length above, but 
the risks inherent in executive branch-led policymaking. It should be noted that 
persistent legislative and judicial attack on the Affordable Care Act show that 
legislation is not immune to rollback either. Australia’s imposition and subsequent 
repeal of a carbon tax show the difficulty of creating enduring climate policy even 
through the legislature.585 
But what to do if new legislation remains elusive? Congress may move 
slowly but the climate crisis does not. The risks of executive-led action on climate 
having been noted, there are tools outside the Clean Air Act available to the President 
to reduce emissions and to pressure Congress into action.586 Some of these tools have 
been used to a limited degree by past presidents: for example, the executive branch 
has permitting authority over interstate and international oil and gas pipelines, as 
most famously illustrated by controversy over the Keystone XL pipeline.587 The 
executive also controls (within constraints set by courts) the degree to which climate 
impacts are considered in the National Environmental Policy Act analysis of all 
 
583. See Scott Horsley, A Churchill 'Quote' That U.S. Politicians Will Never Surrender, NPR (Oct. 28, 
2013) https://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2013/10/28/241295755/a-churchill-quote-that-u-s-
politicians-will-never-surrender (finding little evidence that Churchill ever said “Americans will always 
do the right thing, only after they have tried everything else.”).  
584. As it would have been in the last climate bill to pass either house of Congress. See discussion 
of ACES (“Waxman-Markey”), supra Section II.C. 
585. See Padraig Collins, How Not to Introduce a Carbon Tax: The Australian Experience, IRISH TIMES 
(Jan. 3, 2019), https://www.irishtimes.com/news/environment/how-not-to-introduce-a-carbon-tax-the-
australian-experience-1.3746214.  
586. See, e.g., Nathan Richardson and Peter Anderson, Resources for the Future, CLIMATE 
CHANGE REGULATORY AUTHORITY BEYOND THE CLEAN AIR ACT (2012), https://www.rff.org/ 
publications/working-papers/climate-change-regulatory-authority-beyond-the-clean-air-act.  
587. See Caitlin McCoy,  Energy EOs In Depth: New Presidential Permit for Keystone XL and Changes 
to Presidential Permitting, HARVARD ENV’T & ENERGY LAW PROGRAM (Apr. 30, 2019), 
https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/2019/04/energy-eos-in-depth-new-presidential-permit-for-keystone-xl-and-
changes-to-presidential-permitting/ (“[t]he President has the authority to grant permits for projects that 
cross international borders based on the President’s inherent foreign affairs power”). 
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federal projects.588 Acting as landowner or steward rather than as regulator, the 
executive also has authority to restrict (or even halt) extraction of fossil fuels on 
federal lands. The role of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in balancing 
interests of fossil-dependent utilities, nominally independent energy markets, and 
state governments intent on limiting emissions has become increasingly salient;589 a 
President’s choice of nominees to the commission could therefore be among his or 
her most significant actions on climate. The President also has expansive authority 
to impose tariffs on imported goods, as amply illustrated by President Trump 
(though this authority is constrained, at least in theory, by World Trade Organization 
obligations).590 This authority could be used to impose tariffs based on the carbon 
content of imports, in hopes of influencing exporting countries to limit their own 
emissions.591 More radical options available to a future President facing continued 
congressional inaction may include declaring climate change to be a national 
emergency, unlocking additional Presidential powers.592 
Another option is to use the CAA, but as a political rather than a policy 
move. For example, a future EPA could issue a rule similar in structure to the Clean 
Power Plan, but simpler much more stringent, possibly going so far as to ban coal. 
Litigation would ensue, but if there is sufficient public support for action on climate 
change, rejection of the rule by the Supreme Court could be politically beneficial. 
Either such a bump in public support or the threat of the rule itself could motivate 
Congress to act. Whether this scenario is plausible depends on assessment of political 
factors beyond my expertise. But even if it is, it does not use the CAA as a primary 
regulatory tool, as envisioned under the Obama EPA (and as I suggest above would 
be unwise). 
 
588. See, e.g., Council on Environmental Quality, Draft National Environmental Policy Act Guidance 
on Consideration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 84 Fed. Reg. 30,097 (June 26, 2019).  
589. See Shelley Welton, Rethinking Grid Governance for the Climate Change Era (forthcoming 
2020) (on file with author) (“U.S. electricity law suffers from a gaping and growing accountability gap, in 
which neither FERC nor states have the authority needed to make electricity markets bend to 
democratically established prerogatives that harm industry incumbents. To remedy the situation, federal 
and state regulators need more robust authority to shape energy market rules to public aims.”). 
590. See Yong-Shik Lee, Three Wrongs Do Not Make a Right: The Conundrum of the US Steel and 
Aluminum Tariffs, 18 WORLD TRADE REV. 481–501 (2019). 
591. See Josiah Neeley, Climate Tariffs are Coming, R STREET (July 19, 2019), 
https://www.rstreet.org/2019/07/19/climate-tariffs-are-coming/.  
592. See, e.g., Dan Farber, Bold but Realistic Climate Actions, LEGAL PLANET (Feb. 13, 2020), 
https://legal-planet.org/2020/02/13/bold-but-realistic-climate-actions/.  
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Beyond the federal government, state and local government action593 and 
private firms’ increasing prioritization of emissions reductions594 may drive emissions 
reductions. In my view, the global nature of the climate problem means federal and, 
eventually, international policy commitments are necessary. But this is not to suggest 
that sub-federal action is not useful or, in the absence of federal action, vitally 
important to maintain some progress. Nor is it incompatible with future federal 
policy, as California’s leadership on vehicle emissions under the Clean Air Act 
illustrates. Nevertheless, sub-federal policy options are an immense topic of their 
own, well-covered elsewhere. 
Massachusetts inspired great hope, now revealed to have been misplaced. 
The Trump administration’s environmental rollbacks have inspired great pessimism. 
The near future will show whether that, too, is misplaced. In my view, progress must 
largely come through new politics, not old law. 
 
 
593. See State and Local Regulation of Climate Change, REGULATORY REV. (Feb. 19, 2018), 
https://www.theregreview.org/2018/02/19/state-local-regulation-climate-change/ (series of essays on state 
and local climate policy). 
594. See generally MICHAEL P. VANDENBERGH & JONATHAN M. GILLIGAN, BEYOND POLITICS: 
THE PRIVATE GOVERNANCE RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE (2017). 

